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INFORMATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR DECISIONS 
Summary 
The theoretical models in this thesis address questions relating 
to the interaction between information and decisions. The main 
issues are as follows: i) decisions are based on uncertain 
parameters, ii) parameter estimates are used for specific policy 
decisions, iii) policy decisions take the form of sequential 
reforms whose magnitude and frequency must be determined, iv) there 
are dynamic interactions between the properties of estimators and 
the performance of decision rules. 
The method of investigation is by formulation of algebraic models 
whose properties are examined by analytic and numerical techniques. 
The contribution to the knowledge of the subject is as follows: 
i) a well-known linear control model is extended to incorporate 
sequential reforms, ii) the properties of a limited class of 
optimal active learning strategies are described, iii) in Monte 
Carlo simulations, least squares estimates are not found to have 
desirable tatist al properties when used in conjunction with 
active earning decision rules, iv) a number of well-known optimal 
tax m eis are extended to incorporate parameter uncertainty. 
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Notation 
The notation is defined where it first appears in each Chapter. 
The following definitions are maintained throughout. 
c cost, or cost function 
k reform cost 
!C labour supply 
m lump-sum transfer 
p consumer price 
q demand 
r rate of interest 
t tax 
w wage 
x target 
y instrument 
z fixed instrument 
J discounted flow of benefits 
M date of reform 
R government revenue 
T time endowment 
U evaluation function 
V indirect utility function 
W welfare function 
a, $, y parameters 
d discount factor 
c additive error 
p rate of time preference 
u risk 
a2 variance of E 
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AL Active learning 
CE Certainty equivalent decision rule 
FOC First order condition 
OLS Ordinary least squares 
PWR Pressurise water reactor 
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VM Variance minimising decision rule 
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Introduction 
The models of public sector decision making which are formulated 
in this thesis may in general be expressed in the following way: given 
rationality, and given also a particular situation S, the best choice 
of action is A. Rationality, in the sense that "agents always act in 
a manner appropriate to the situation in which they find themselves" 
(Popper, 1967, p. 361) is assumed throughout, and therefore the analysis 
proceeds by indicating the connection between the situation and the action. 
The novelty of the thesis results firstly from putting the public sector 
decision-maker in situations where particular emphasis is placed on 
information; and secondly, by postulating rather unusual types of actions, 
particularly related to learning, and establishing the kinds of situations 
for which this behaviour is appropriate. 
Simon (1960) may be regarded as one of the leading exponents of 
models of perfectly rational decision-making. The process takes place 
in four stages: intelligence (or data) gathering, identification of 
options, assessment of consequences, and evaluation of consequences. 
In theory it would be best to execute these stages simultaneously so 
that all possible interactions between them could be captured. For 
example, examination of the means of evaluating consequences may indicate 
that some options are inferior and need not be considered: this in turn 
may allow the relevant data set to be more accurately identified, saving 
effort at the information gathering stage. However, practical consid- 
erations often dictate that the decision-making process must be broken 
down into tasks which may be performed independently by different 
institutions at different times. The considerations of information and 
learning which are discussed in this thesis indicate connections both 
ix. 
between these-tasks, and within tasks over time, and have implications 
for the desirable break-down of the decision, and subsequent co-ordin- 
ation between tasks. 
in economics, policy issues are often divided into tasks of 
parameter estimation, and policy optimisation. The analysis of economic 
data to produce parameter estimates frequently takes place independently 
of the uses to which they will be put. Hendry and Richard (1982,1983) 
have set out a methodology for model selection. Their criteria 
for choosing between competing models include valid marginalisation and 
conditioning, white noise errors, theory consistency, and parsimony, but 
notable by its absence is the performance of decision rules based on the 
estimates. Similarly, Mizon and Richard (1986) use the encompassing 
principle to draw together the literature on nested and non-nested 
hypothesis testing, but the comparisons between models are on the basis 
of the statistical properties of their estimates, not the performance of 
the estimates in a given policy optimisation problem. Similarly, economic 
analysis of particular policy issues, such as Ahmad and Stern (1984) on 
Indian indirect tax reforms, make use of parameter estimates without 
taking account of the econometric model which produced them. 
Inter-temporal connections between decisions are of particular inter- 
est in the context of the tax reform literature. Given a piecemeal 
approach to decision making, current decisions affect the options which 
will be available in the future. Henry (1974a) and (1974b), and Arrow 
and Fischer (1974) develop the concept of option values for irreversible 
decisions, but it is also applicable to decisions which may be reversed 
X. 
at some cost. Reform options are often limited by the availability of 
accurate information. Then an important criterion in evaluating the 
benefits of a given reform is the amount which may be learnt from it, 
and hence the potential which it creates for improving subsequent reforms. 
Popper (1967) makes this connection between information and reform quite 
explicitly. 
" the piecemeal engineer knows, like Socrates, how 
little he knows. He knows that we can learn only 
from our mistakes. Accordingly, he will make his way, 
step by step, carefully comparing the results expected 
with the results achieved, and always on the look-out 
for the unavoidable unwanted consequences of any reform; 
and he will avoid undertaking any reforms of a complexity 
and scope which make it impossible for him to disentangle 
causes and effects, and to know what he is really doing". 
(Popper, 1967, pp. 309) 
Other authors have gone further in advocating particular decision strat- 
egies: Lindblom (1959) proposes "muddling through", and Braybrooke and 
Lindblom (1963) "disjoint incrementalism", and a recent review is provided 
by Hogwood and Gunn (1986). However, the objective of this thesis is 
not to propose some new decision strategy, but rather to indicate when 
co-ordination between and within decisions is required. 
The Issues 
The main issues are as follows: firstly, in a static context 
i) Decisions are based on uncertain parameters 
xi. 
ii) Parameter estimates are used as inputs for specific policy 
decisions. 
Theil (1957), and Simon (1956) provide certain equivalent theorems which 
establish the conditions under which uncertain parameters may be used as 
though they were perfectly accurate. These conditions do not apply to 
most standard models of public sector decisions, such as the optimal tax 
models described by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). Therefore uncertainty 
generally does matter, and the immediate questions are those of its sig- 
nificance, and the direction of effect. Instead of adjusting the policy 
decision for uncertainty, the same effect may be achieved by adjusting 
the estimating technique. Policy makers may then regard these "certainty 
equivalent estimates" as though they were known with certainty. A 
closely related question is whether, given uncertainty, a particular 
parameter estimate should be regarded as an upper or lower bound for a 
particular problem. 
Secondly, in a dynamic setting 
iii) The size and frequency of reforms must be determined 
iv) There may be important interactions between the properties 
of estimators, and the performance of decision rules. 
When the economic environment is changing, the frequency of policy reforms 
may be determined in order to keep up to date, or may be contingent upon 
observed changes in economic variables. When the size of reforms affects 
the accuracy of the information available in the future, the policy-maker 
icii. 
behaves like Rothschild's (1974) gambler on the two-armed bandit, simul- 
taneously playing for current returns and accumulating information on 
which to base future decisions. Connections between estimation and 
decisions in a dynamic setting may be particularly important because 
current decisions form part of the data set for subsequent estimates. 
It is quite possible to envisage combinations of decisions and estimates 
which get stuck at a sub-optimal position: the estimates are poor so the 
decision is cautious, as a result the data has little variation and is 
uninformative so the estimates do not improve, therefore another cautious 
decision is made ... and so on. The main questions arising here relate 
to the relative performance of different kinds of decision rules, given 
that they are based on particular parameter estimates; and the statistical 
properties of the estimates given that a particular decision rule has been 
applied. 
The issues are explored by means of simple models, and numerical simul- 
ations. In common with many economic models, these are not intended to be 
realistic: they are ideal types in the sense of Weber (1904), and are 
designed to draw attention to specific issues of information and learning. 
Such simplifications are justified by Machlup (1978) "... it is better to 
be approximately right than absolutely lost in the labryinth of an excess- 
ively complex 'realistic' ideal-typical world" (p. 220). Of course, the- 
inferences which can be drawn from this methodology are limited. A 
description is provided, in general terms, of the kinds of situations 
where information and learning form important connections between parameter 
estimation and decision-making. It is neutral on questions of whether or 
not these circumstances actually exist. Therefore, it is only a first 
tentative step towards providing maxims for policy-makers, or establishing 
a mechanism for generating specific policy prescriptions. 
xiii. 
Much of the discussion is in terms of abstract states and instruments. 
However, the underlying motivation relates to public sector decision-making, 
and in particular the choice of tax rates. The public sector has become 
one of the main participants in economic activity in both developed and less 
developed countries. In 1985 the UK central government expenditure made up 
39% of GDP, and this proportion has grown since 1965 at an annual average 
rate of 2.25%. This growth in the public sector is a world-wide phenom- 
enon, discussed in the Journal of Public Economics (no. 3,1985). The size 
of the public sector means that decisions affecting it are of considerable 
importance for the economy as a whole, and their significance is reinforced 
by subsequent effects in other sectors of the economy. 
Outline of the Thesis 
The outline of the thesis is summarised in Figure 1. The contents 
of the boxes are related to Simon's (1960) description of the perfectly 
rational decision-maker. The first two boxes, representing the types of 
information available, and the method used to learn from this information, 
correspond to Simon's intelligence gathering. Options are identified by 
reference to the box of constraints, and the benefits of all possible 
actions are assessed according to the functions in the evaluation box. 
Simon's concept of "assessment of consequences" does not appear explicitly 
but may be regarded as a preliminary step in the process of evaluation. 
The final decision box indicates the kinds of decisions which are approp- 
riate in the given situation. The models in each of the chapters are 
represented by paths through the flow chart. 
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FIGURE 1: Outline of the Thesis 
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Chapter One assumes fixed information, but perfect knowledge is 
precluded by the uncertainty surrounding the estimated parameters of 
the economy. The purpose of this chapter is partly to review some of 
the relevant literature, and introduce the required techniques, there- 
fore some fairly standard examples are presented where maximisation of 
a social welfare function is the basis for once and for all decisions 
under uncertainty. In this context, time lags between the date on 
which the decision must be made and the date when the required infor- 
mation is revealed, are used to motivate choice under uncertainty. As 
an introduction to subsequent models Chapter one also describes a model 
where procrastination is desirable since it allows more information to 
be incorporated in the subsequent decision. 
Chapters Two, Three and Four deal with changing information and 
sequential decisions. These are essential ingredients of the research 
programme proposed by Newbery and Stern (forthcoming). 
"A major topic which has emerged (from their 
examination of the Theory of Taxation for 
Developing Countries) has been the size and 
frequency of policy change ... These issues 
are not easy to capture formally and we 
require simple models to train intuition and 
provide insights". 
(Newbery and Stern, forthcoming, Chapter 25). 
Chapter Two discusses the timing of policy reforms with evolving infor- 
mation, and Chapters Three and Four question the desired extent of reform 
when this influences the quality of future data. 
xvi. 
These different types of information changes are connected with 
different means of learning. In Chapter Two, the policy-maker keeps 
up to date with the evolving economy simply by observing a state variable. 
On the basis of this information, the policy-maker revises his decisions 
according to a rule depending on whether costs are incurred by making 
new decisions, or in making new observations. Chapters Three and Four 
describe an estimation process, where the policy-maker predicts the 
impact which his decisions will have on the variance of future parameter 
estimates, and hence upon the accuracy of future information. 
Chapter Six (using the methods set out in Chapter Five) returns to 
the model of fixed information. Whereas Chapter Three examines a situation 
where the optimal decision affects the information available in the future, 
Chapter Six asks how the quality of information affects optimal tax 
decisions. Existing models of optimal taxation are adjusted for uncer- 
tainty in order to judge the accuracy of the 'ideal type' of perfect 
information, and how it may be modified. 
CHAPTER ONE 
PRECOMMITMENT AND PROCRASTINATION 
1. 
CHAPTER 1 
SUMMARY 
Precommitment is an important characteristic of a large proportion 
of public sector decisions. For some it is a technologically determined 
fact; and for others it is both a desirable and feasible property of the 
optimal policy. 
Its significance lies in the requirement that decisions must be 
made before all relevant information has come to light. Two examples 
are presented to illustrate the possible consequences of such uncertain- 
ties. In the first it is shown that if nuclear energy is a "necessity", 
and uncertainty takes a particular form, greater certainty about the 
capabilities of nuclear technology will reduce the number of nuclear 
power stations which are needed. The second shows how the intertemporal 
allocation of a fixed budget is determined by the relative magnitudes of 
the rate of time preference, the expected rate of return on investments, 
and the degree of risk and risk aversion. 
Whereas precommitment suggests that the quality of information should 
affect decisions, procrastination raises questions of.: how decisions may 
be used to affect the quality of information. A simple model is presented 
where delayed implementation allows better decisions in the future because 
data observations accumulate over the period of procrastination. 
2. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Though my personal experience of the races is confined to 
accidental glimpses whilst changing channels on the TV on Saturday 
afternoons, I have it on good authority that bookmakers are completely 
homogeneous but punters may be divided into various categories. The 
bookmakers all share the characteristic that once a bet has been 
placed, the only way to get the money back is for the horse to win - 
it is no good going back ten minutes before the race having changed 
your mind. The punters however, are quite diverse: some place their 
bets well in advance and use the day of the meeting as an opportunity 
to socialise. others watch the horses in the paddock, and watch the 
changing odds as others arrive at their decisions, and choose the best 
moment to put their money down. Another category of more dedicated 
gamblers may make any number of bets: after the start of the race they 
receive signals from their associates in the grandstand about which 
horses are running well, and which have fallen, and this information 
is used to revise a portfolio of bets as the race progresses. 
These three kinds of behaviour are relevant to economic decision- 
making in an uncertain environment. The first, where the decision is 
made once and for all, before the state of the world is fully revealed, 
is called precommitment. The second involves choosing the right moment 
to make the decision. Given existing information, and given also that 
the date of implementation of the policy change must be announced today, 
at what point is the marginal cost of delay matched by the marginal 
benefit of improved information? The solution to"this problem is the 
optimal degree of procrastination. The third, irreversibility, 
3. 
envisages incremental revisions or policy reforms, with the added 
restriction that changes in at least one of the instruments are 
irreversible. 
The discussion of precommitment in this chapter is fairly standard, 
and serves to outline some of the techniques which are required for the 
model of procrastination (and for subsequent chapters), and to review 
some of the relevant literature. The main question is how optimal 
decisions are affected by the constraint that they must be made before 
the state of the economy is revealed. Section 1.2 discusses the liter- 
ature and the techniques, and section 1.3 applies them to models deter- 
mining the optimal division of a fixed public sector budget between 
different categories of expenditure. Section 1.4 allows the policy- 
maker another instrument - procrastination - and asks what implementation 
date the policy-maker would announce under the assumption that optimal 
use will be made of information which has accumulated up to that date. 
Concluding remarks are in section 1.5. 
Issues of irreversibility have received some attention in the liter- 
ature. Henry (1.974a, 1974b) describes a situation where the use of 
an irreversible policy today closes options which would otherwise have 
been open tomorrow. Therefore optimal use of such instruments is more 
cautious the riskier is the environment. Freixas and Laffont (1984), 
in a more general setting, spell out precisely the assumptions required 
to obtain this "irreversibility effect". Precommitment and procrastin- 
ation both have elements of irreversibility since they entail once-and- 
for-all decisions. However they exclude the vital characteristics that 
4. 
the policy maker may like to revise his decisions in the light of 
future information. I shall return to issues of information and 
incremental policy reform in Chapter Two. 
1.2 PRELIMINARIES 
In general the objective function U may be defined on the target 
variable x. There may be some overlap between target variables and 
instruments y, but often it is convenient to define U exclusively 
in terms of x. This broad class of functions may be approximated 
l/ 
with a Taylor series expansion around some arbitrary x 
U (x) =u+ Ux (x-x) +2U (x-x) 
2+6 
UX (x-x) 
3+... (1.1) 
It would be simple to generalise this expression to allow a vector of 
target variables: such a case is considered in example one. However, 
some of the economic interpretations of the derivatives are meaningful 
only in the one dimensional case. Therefore, for the time being 
attention is restricted to a single target variable. 
If the last two derivatives in (1.1) are insignificant then the 
function is locally risk neutral. It is well known in the economic texts 
that with linear utility functions the utility of the expected outcome 
is the same as the expectation of the sum of the utilities of the out- 
comes weighted by their probabilities of occurance. If the second 
derivative is negative the function is said to display risk aversion, 
and a decision-maker with this kind of objective would not accept fair 
bets, the expected outcome always being preferred to the risky alternative 
1/ For brevity, the arguments of the functions on the right-hand side 
have been suppressed. 
5. 
with the same expected payoff. 
The third derivative relates to the symmetry of objectives, 
and also has implications for changes in absolute and relative risk 
aversion. If it is zero then the objective function is locally 
symmetric and a small shift from the optimum in either direction 
brings about approximately the same decrement to utility. However, 
if Uxxx is negative (positive) then the marginal disutility of a 
small increase (decrease) in x above the optimum exceeds the marginal 
disutility of an, equal reduction in x. In additign, it is straight- 
forward to show (see Appendix 1.1) that if U is zero or negative, 
xxx 
both absolute and relative risk aversion are increasing' in x. 
Finally, a policy choice is said to be certainty equivalent if the 
same choice would be made under complete certainty. This term may 
also be applied to target variables: the certain equivalent value of 
the target variable is the expected outcome of a certainty equivalent 
policy choice. These concepts are all related to the properties of 
the objective function. Rational choice between alternative policies 
also requires well-defined beliefs about the likely consequences of 
any decision. 
A frequently used method for analysing the consequences of actions 
is to allow an unknown state variable to determine what outcome will be 
associated with any given choice. All that is required is then a means 
of describing the policy-maker's beliefs about the probability that any 
state will arise. A convenient way to do this is to use a distrib- 
ution function, the main drawback being that for tractability, the state 
variable must be a continuous random variable. In practice there may 
6. 
be situations where the state variable is discrete - the disaster 
either happens or it does not - and for these cases the state space 
approach would be more suitable. However, the models here are based 
exclusively on distribution functions. 
The choice of distribution function raises two important issues. 
The first is one of dimensionality. It is assumed throughout this 
chapter that only one parameter is uncertain. This is a convenient 
assumption because existing theories, such as Diamond and Stiglitz 
(1974) which operate in terms of uni-dimensional risk, are directly 
applicable. In a more general multi-dimensional situation, it would 
be difficult to say when increases in some kinds of uncertainty, inn 
reductions in others, added up to an overall increase or reduction in 
risk. (Criteria for making such judgements are discussed by Atkinson 
and Bourgignon, 1984). Having restricted attention to a single uni- 
variate distribution, the second issue is the choice of a particular 
function. Normal and uniform distributions are particularly conven- 
ient because they may be completely described in terms of means and 
variances. Then, increases in risk may be regarded as synonymous 
with increases in variance. For more general classes of distributions, 
this correspondence does not necessarily hold: an increase in variance 
could be dominated by changes in higher moments of the distribution" 
and result in an overall reduction of risk. A similar point is made by 
Atkinson (1970): inequality indices such as the Gini coefficient only 
give an unambiguous ranking of distributions whose Lorenz curves do 
not intersect. More generally when Ii renz curves cross, an 
inequality index may give a lower value for a distribution which 
according to social welfare criteria is more equal. When risk rather 
7. 
than inequality is the requirdd measure of spread of the distrib- 
ution, it may be the case that a distribution function with a high 
variance is less risky than one with a low variance. This possibility 
is ruled out by distributions for which mean and variance are suffic- 
ient statistics. 
Clearly, the riskiness of the distribution of the'uncertain 
variable may have implications for the optimal policy. Its influence 
will depend not only on the specification of the objective function, 
but also on the source of uncertainty. Waud . (1976) draws a 
distinc- 
tion between additive and multiplicative uncertainty. The former is 
the element of risk which must be faced regardless of what decisions 
are made. The latter may be interpreted as parameter uncertainty, 
where the influence of the policy decision is imperfectly known. 
Additive uncertainty may be represented 
X=y+E (1.2) 
where c is distribution normally with expectation zero and variance 
2 
a Then necessary conditions for policy optimisation may be derived 
by substituting into (1.1), having defined x as the mean of x, 
taking expectations and differentiating with respect to y 
ä= 
uy +u Q2 =o (i. 3) 
8. 
Clearly, with additive uncertainty, symmetry of the objective function 
would mean that the optimal decision is independent of Q, or in algebraic 
2 
terms, Uyyy =0 (and all higher order derivatives equal to zero) 
implies that y should be chosen such that Uy = 0. Thus Theil 
(1957), and Simon (1956) find that certainty equivalence follows from 
additive uncertainty with quadratic objectives, because these functions 
are symmetric. Clearly the direction in which the optimal policy 
would diverge from certainty equivalence depends on the sign of U yyy. 
If it is positive (negative) the decision maker will prefer to aim 
high (low) since a small overshoot is preferred (inferior) to a small 
undershoot. Malinvaud (1969) interprets Uyyy >0 as describing a 
good which is a necessity - its marginal utility decreases at a rapidly 
decreasing rate - and this may lead to increases in the consumption of 
a good as it becomes riskier. Hahn (1970) for example, discusses this 
proposition in the context of savings. For a public investment inter- 
pretation see Example 1. 
1/ 
Multiplicative uncertainty " may be represented 
x=y(1+n) (1.4) 
where Ti has expectation zero and variance s2. In this case, sub- 
stitution into (1.1), taking expectations and differentiating yields 
the optimal decision rule 
äyU = uy + u__ys2 +1=0 (1.5) 
I 
1/ The distinction between additive and multiplicative uncertainty is 
clearly related to the choice of units. For example, if logs were 
taken of (1.4) it would become a case of additive uncertainty. 
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If the objective function is symmetric the last term is zero but 
even so certainty equivalence does not apply. Inspection of (1.4) 
reveals that the variance of x depends on the choice of y, and when 
the decision=maker is risk averse this dependence will induce him to 
aim low, i. e. choose a value for -the instrument below the certainty 
equivalent level. Hence multiplicative uncertainty with risk aversion 
means that smaller y's tend to be preferred since they are associated 
with smaller variance in the outcome. This is the algebraic argument 
underlying Waud (1976)'s diagramatic discussion of additive and multi- 
plicative uncertainty. For a simple model of intertemporal public 
investment decisions with uncertain rates of return, see Example 2. 
1.3 PRECOMMITMENT 
As a rule, larger expenditure decisions are associat. d with a 
greater degree of precommitrae" _ The consumer can 
decide virtually 
on the spur of the moment whether or not to buy an ice cream and can 
have available virtually all relevant meteorological infcrmaticn covering 
the period of consumption. However, house purchases may require 
commitment six months in advance, and such decisions have to be made 
without full knowledge of such things as geographical location of future 
employment. For a significant proportion of public sector decisions 
precommitment is simply a technological fact: the lead times on the 
construction of power stations, for example, may be ten years. 
Precommitment is not only a characteristic of production technology, 
but in some cases may be a desirable policy objective in itself. The 
private sector faces many uncertainties which may have haz; mful or 
distorting effects on their behaviour. By annorr-zing in advance that 
a particular policy will be implemented, the government may attempt to 
compensate for such uncertainties. In effect the government agrees to 
share some of the risk with the private sector, and in this sense acts 
as an insurance agency. Since the oil crises of the 1970's, industrial- 
ists in the UK have been aware of the unpredictable nature of the world 
energy markets. It could be argued that the expansion of the domestic 
nuclear energy programme is a means of hedging against the uncertainties 
of global energy-price shocks. The government, on behalf of all sectors 
of the economy, agrees to share this risk with the industrialists. 
Should another oil crisis occur, the electricity industry would be in 
a better position to provide a substitute for oil, and alleviate the 
industrial consequences. However, if oil markets remain stable, the 
UK economy as a whole bears the burden of excess nuclear energy capacity. 
For some policy decisions precoxnmitment plays a crucial role. , It 
is frequently argued that for certain classes of policy choices, the 
policy can only be successful if the government can precommit. 
That is, the government must be able to put itself in a position where 
it is difficult to change its mind. Backus and Driffill (1985) discuss 
the example where inflation is the result of the private sector's 
inflationary expectations. If the private sector believes that the 
government is prepared to take the unpleasant but effective anti- 
inflationary medicine, then inflation will be rapidly reduced. How- 
ever, if there is some chance that policy-makers will be discouraged' 
by the unpleasant side-effects, and will only half-heartedly implement 
the policy, then the private sector will have little faith and inflation 
will persist. Indeed, if the private sector knows that the government's 
optimal plan is time inconsistent - that they would like to announce 
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harsh policies but then implement soft ones - the scope for effective 
government intervention seems severely restricted. 
The consequence, given that precommitment is either necessary, or 
desirable and feasible, is that decisions must be made before all 
relevant information has become available. Rather than attempt a 
review of the literature on choice under uncertainty, two specific 
examples are examined. They are intended to illustrate the importance 
of the type of uncertainty and the nature of objectives, and to provide 
a basis for subsequent models incorporating changes in information. 
1.3.1 EXAMPLE 1 
Choice of expenditure on risky public investments, with additive 
uncertainty and asymmetric objectives. 
The government has to decide how to allocate a fixed budget R 
between expenditure on conventional and nuclear power stations, yl 
and y2. The two kinds of electricity x1 and x2 which they 
produce have different characteristics (in terms of the ability to 
respond to transient changes in demand) so the objective function 
depends on both, U(xl, x2). Conventional technology is certain but 
nuclear is subject to additive risk: attention is restricted to those 
uncertainties which are independent of the scale of investment 
xl y1 
x2 = y2 +e (1.6) 
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where e is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ß2 
Using the budget constraint R= yl + y2, it is possible to write 
the government's objective function in terms of the choice variable 
yl and the unknown state e. 
U (xl. x2) =U (Yl, R- Yl 4 :)=w (Y1, ) (1.7 ) 
Taking a Taylor expansion of w around the expectation of c gives 
w=w (Y190) +2 wee Q2 (1.8) 
Differentiating with respect to y1 yields the first order condition 
w W1+2 
1 
8 ý2 O Weel yl 
(1.9) 
which implicitly defines the optimal choice y1. Since at a maximum 
wll < O, the implicit function theorem in conjunction with (1.9) 
reveals that 
ay2 
<0 if w eel <0 ýQ 
(1.10) 
which is a particular case of Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) theorem 1. 
From (1.7), and using Young's theorem, 
Wee1 = Wlee U122 - U222 (1.11) 
13. 
Now, if U222 is positive and U122 is small or negative, 
wlss will be negative and the choice of yl will be decreasing 
in a2To interpret these third derivatives consider the rates 
of change of the marginal utilities of x1 and x2 with increases 
in the consumption of x2 illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
The signs of these derivatives are consistent with the proposition 
that x2 is a necessity: its own marginal utility diminishes at a 
1/ 
decreasing rate; and the marginal utility of x1 increases with 
consumption of x2 but at a diminishing rate. Thus consumption of 
x2 in excess of some necessary level adds little to utility, and 
also the satisfaction resulting from the consumption of the other good 
increases with consumption of the necessity but at a decreasing rate. 
Hence, this example shows that if nuclear power is a necessity, 
reductions in the uncertainties of nuclear technology should lead to 
a transfer of resources towards conventional generating capacity. 
The intuition behind this result is that given the definition of 
necessity, the consequences of having too little nuclear power is 
disastrous, therefore uncertainty leads the decision maker to aim high. 
As a result, reductions in uncertainty make it possible to reduce 
nuclear investment and still be as sure of reaching that target. 
Additive uncertainty, as in example 1, is perhaps rather implausible. 
The degree of uncertainty is independent of any decision which the policy 
maker may take. Multiplicative_ uncertainty has more' 
immediate economic interpretation since parameter estimates may be 
1/ The result is not affected if U12 < 0, i. e. the goods are 
substitutes. 
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U22 < 0, U222 >0 U12 > 0, U122 <0 
U2 
X2 
U1 
X2 
FIGURE 1.1 Third Derivatives, x2 a necessity 
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the outcome of an uncertain process of econometric estimation. Also, 
with multiplicative uncertainty, responses to risk may be incorporated 
in a model with simple quadratic objectives. Such a model is described 
in example 2. 
1.3.2 EXAMPLE 2 
An inter-temporal public investment decision with risky returns, 
in a model with symmetric objectives, multiplicative uncertainty, and 
dynamic programming. 
The model consists of two periods, in period one the decision 
maker chooses consumption and investment on the basis of the wealth 
endowment R. The rate of return on investment r is uncertain, and 
determines the amount available for consumption in the second period. 
A dynamic programming solution (see Intriligator, 1971, and Kamien 
and Schwartz, 1981), is presented (although the problem is simple 
enough for other methods to be applicable) since familiarity with 
this technique is required for the subsequent arguments. Using a 
Taylor series expansion around zero, and letting U(O) = 0, the 
symmetric objective function at time t may be written, suppressing 
the arguments of the functions on the right-hand side 
U (x )= Ux (xt) +2U (xt) 
2 (1.12) 
Obviously, the optimal policy in period two is to consume every- 
thing 
x2= (1 +r+n)(R-y1) (1.13) 
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where r is the rate of interest, and n is a stochastic distur- 
bance with mean zero and variance s2. By substitution into (1.12) 
the expectation of the maximised value for U2 is 
EU2 = UX(1+r) (R-y1) +1 UXX[_(1+r)2 + s2ý (R-yl)2 (1.14) 
The period one problem is then-to maximise present utility, 
taking account of the influence of current decisions on future 
opportunities. 
Max J= EU1 + l+ p 
EU; 
yL 
(1.15) 
where p is the rate of time preference. The first order condition 
for this problem implies 
UX(r-p) + U. C(l+r)2 + s2JR 
yl 22 Uxx [(l+p) + (1+r) + s] 
(1.16) 
The approximation entailed by (1.12) is only locally applicable, 
and certainly breaks down if UX + Ux R>0 since this would mean a 
negative marginal utility of money. The expectation of y2 is given 
by the budget constraint 
Ey2 = (l+r) (R-Yl) il . 17 ) 
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Thus from (1.16) it is possible to show that 
r2 
yl - Ey2 >0 <=> (p-r) L+ (2+r) Uxx R] -sR 
Uxx 
>0 (1.18) 
x 
(2+r) Ux 
With no uncertainty, if the rate of time preference is greater than 
the rate of interest then more of the budget will be allocated to current 
rather than future consumption. The more uncertain is the rate of 
return on investment, and the larger is -U xx , 
the greater is the 
tendency to plan to consume more at present than in the future. Dixit 
(1976) (example 9.1, pp. 105-107) derives a similar result in a model 
with continuous time and perfect certainty: in his terminology the 
consumption path is increasing (decreasing) if the rate of interest is 
greater (less) than the rate of time preference. In the two period 
model presented here, the element of uncertainty about future returns 
tends to shift the allocation of funds away from investment in favour 
of more secure current consumption. 
Examples 1 and 2 have attempted to show two particular ways in 
which precommitment, and the uncertainty connected with it, may affect 
optimal public sector decisions. in practice, policy-makers almost 
invariably have another instrument at their disposal: they may decide 
to delay making the decision. When information accumulates over time, 
this tool is particularly useful since delays lead to'more accurate 
information and hence better decisions in the future. 
f 
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1.4 OPTIMAL PROCRASTINATION 
The potential for beneficial procrastination arises if the 
following conditions are fulfilled: firstly, there must be improve- 
ments in information over time; and secondly, the decision must have 
some consequences which may not be altered by subsequent policy 
revisions. Then, the benefits of delay will result from the ability 
to make a better informed decision, and the costs will be associated 
with the toleration of unsatisfactory conditions over the learning 
period. 
Precommitment is essential to the argument. If there were no need 
to make decisions before all information was fully revealed, there could 
be no informational advantages to be gained from delay. Another 
important aspect is irreversibility. If decisions could be costlessly 
altered, then surely the best policy would be to update decisions 
sequentially as new information becomes available. However, restrict- 
ions on the ease with which decisions may be changed mean that mistakes 
may persist - good choices require good anticipation. For the time 
being, attention is concentrated on the most extreme form of irrever- 
sibility, where a single decision must be made once and for all. In 
this context the procrastinating government is deciding when to decide 
- just as the punter must decide when to place his bet. 
The recent Sizewell enquiry is one of the few public sector decision- 
making procedures for which such extreme assumptions may be applicable. 
One of the many possible interpretations of the events is provided as 
an illustration. The date of the report of the enquiry may be regarded 
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as the moment of decision: the recommendations made at that time having 
a decisive influence on the development of the PWR (Pressurised Water 
Reactor) programme. It seems unlikely that the enquiry could ever be 
repeated and therefore the decision may be regarded as once and for all. 
Throughout the previous decade, domestic and world energy markets were 
evolving, and information about nuclear technology was accumulating. 
It could be argued that there came a time when it was necessary to end 
the uncertainties about the UK nuclear strategy both because of the 
repercussions within the energy sector and the subsequent influence on 
other industries. At that time, the date of the enquiry was announced. 
The lag between the annoucement and the expected report of the enquiry 
may be interpreted as procrastination. The duration of that period 
effectively determined the amount of information which should be allowed 
to accumulate before the decision is made. 
This example is clearly imperfect: the announcement of the enquiry 
and the proceedings themselves called forth new evidence which few could 
have anticipated. And the length of the enquiry, and the date of the 
report, clearly proved to be determined by events rather than being 
fixed in advance. However, the aspects of a once and for all choice, 
and the accumulation of information over time are the salient features 
for the following analysis. 
These issues have been discussed in the industrial economics liter- 
ature. In a game theory setting, firms who compete over prices are often 
regarded as precommiting themselves to a particular strategy by choice of 
capital. Commitment to a particular investment plan may tie the oligop- 
olist to an aggressive pricing strategy which subsequently deters potential 
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entrants to the market: "the role of an irrevocable 
commitment of investment in entry-deterrence is to 
alter the initial conditions of the post-entry game to 
the advantage of the established firm... " (Dixit, 
1980). In a duopoly environment Benoit (1985) 
introduces research and development and finds that the 
potential for imitation may cause firms to delay 
innovations which would otherwise be profitable. "This 
is because the rival has the option of waiting to see 
if the innovation is a success'before innovating, thus 
foregoing the risk of investment" (p. 105). The model 
below shares the property that anticipated changes in 
information are an important determinant of the optimal 
decision, but the analysis takes place in a passive 
random environment rather than a responsive game. 
The model has three time periods. Period zero 
serves to establish a data base, consisting of N sub- 
periods, upon which the policy-maker's prior estimates 
are formed. At the end of period zero the policy-maker 
decides how long to procrastinate. This determines the 
number of sub-periods M in period one. At the beginning 
of period two, all available information is used to 
make the best choice of the instrument y which is fixed 
for the remaining T-N-M sub-periods. Until the 
beginning of period two, the instrument is assumed to 
be fixed at some non-zero va'ue yo. Under this 
assumption the procrastination decision determines how 
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long the historically determined value of yo is allowed 
to persist before the single optimal reform is 
undertaken. 
The model is a univariate linear regression model 
with no intercept 
xt pyt + Ft (1. IL9) 
The errors are known to have zero expectation (Eit= 4), 
and variance of a-2 (E E t= -2). Information about the 
parameter is assumed to be obtained by ordinary least 
squares. The formulae are presented allowing y to vary, 
since these expressions are required for chapter three. 
For this chapter y is subsequently assumed constant 
over the first two periods. At the beginning of period 
one least squares gives the following estimate of the 
parmeter and variance 
N 
ý yili 
_ (Z 1=NZ 
y2 i 
Z 
and 
cr 
2 
yi 
i =1 
(1.20) 
(1. `: "') 
The data set at the beginning of period two has an 
additional. M observations. The least squares estimate 
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of (3 on the basis of the pooled data set is 
N+M 
Yixi 
02 N+M 2 
yi 
i=1 
where 
S2 
N 
=N y2 
=i 
N+M 
(3 s 
2+ 2yx 
1 i=11+1 ii 
2+ N+M 
y2 
i N+1 l 
The estimate (31 is unbiased with variance v(ß1), 
(1.22) 
therefore the relationship between jj and the true 
value of J3 may be written as 
(s = f31 + V. (1.23) 
where J is independent of £ i, i? N, Ev=0, and Ev 
2= 
v(J31). Using (1.23) in (1.22) the parameter estimate in 
period two may be written as 
N+M 
11 i=N+1 ý2 = T1 + N+M (1.24) 
s2+ yi 
i=N+1 
The variance of the estimate is 
cf2 
v( p2) N+M (1.25) 
s.. + ý. y 
i=N+1 
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This formulation makes clear the distinction between 
those elements which are known at the beginning of 
period one (namely ý1 and s2) and those which are not 
(namely V, yi, and £i where i= N+1,..., N+M). The 
learning aspect of the problem concerns the influence 
of new data on the estimate of the parameter and its 
variance. The expectation of the parameter at the 
beginning of period two is therefore conditional upon 
the particular drawing of random variables. A 
considerable simplification is obtained by invoking the 
assumption that the instrument is fixed in periods zero 
and one. This reduces the random element of the right- 
hand side of (1.24) which may now be written 
N+M 
Z Z-- 
+M 
ti 4- 
i N-ß-1 1 (1.26) ý2 ßl 
N+M (N+M)y0 
This expression contains the random variables U and 
Vi. These both depend or the parameters of the model. 
Therefore, to simplify subsequent analysis it is 
convenient to normalise these random variables as 
follows. Let 
fct/(f Ny0) (1.27) 
and 
N +M 
L, F- i= gd'J M (1.2 8) i=N+1 
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where f and g are standard normal variables. 
Substituting these expressions into (1.26) gives P2 as 
a function of two standard normal variables. A further 
simplification is possible because a weighted sum of 
standard normal variables is a constant times a third 
standard normal variable. Given constants a and b 
of + bg = f(a2+b2)h (1.29) 
where h is the third stanc'ird normal variable. Using 
this rule in conjunction with the previous 
normalisation, the final expression for r2 is 
IMch 
ß2 = ý1 + (1.30) 
IN J(N+M) y0 
Clearly, the fixity of y also simplifies the 
expressions for the variances, and the other parameter 
estimate. 
0-2 
V(A2) =2 (1.31) 
(N+M)y0 
,, -2 
v(31) =2 (1.32) 
Ny0 
N 
i=1 
ßl = (1.33) 
Ny0 
Equations (1.30) to (1.33) are the final expressions 
representing the government's information in this 
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model. 
The governemnt has quadratic objectives defined on 
deviations from the most preferred value x. In the 
final period the government minimises 
Ely (xt 
A (1.34) 
where E2 denotes expectations conditioned on 
information consisting of the parameter estimate 72 
and its variance v((12). Given this information they 
choose a single value y* for the instrument. This value 
applies to each of the T-N-M sub-periods in the final 
period. The final-period objective is to minimise 
T 
E2 (xt-t) 
2=E. 'L (J y+Et 
x) 2 (1.35) 
t=N+M+1 
This expression may be expanded as follows 
2 C- 2 E22 (xt-x) E2-" t(ý-()y + (ý2y -x+£ tl 
_ (T-N-M) ((v((ý2)+ý52]y2 + 
x2 + a'2 - 2ýi2yx) 
Note that there is assumed to be no covariance 
(1.36) 
between ( and 6. Differentiation of (1.36) gives the 
first order condition for optimality of y 
E2 (xt-x) 2= 2(T-N-M) ([v(ß2)+ 2]y - , ý2x) =0 aY (1.37) 
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This condition is satisfied by 
A 
* 
y= 
A2 x 
-2 
(1.38) 
v(j2)+2 
Clearly, the second order condition for a minimum is 
also satisfied. 
The optimal value function is derived by 
substituting (1.38) into (1.36) 
2X2 i 2X2 
7- (X x)2 = (T-N-M)Lß? + x2 +0-2 - 
A2 
_2] v( ß2)+ 
2 
v( j32) º ß2 
x v(ý ) 
_ (T-N-M) [ 
22+ 2] (1.39 ) 
v(ß2)+ß2 
This expression is the minimised value of final-period 
losses given information available at the beginning of 
the final period. 
The period one objective is to minimise 
J= M[E1(pyo-x)2+a, 2] + (T-N M)[x2E1 
vtß2> 
2+ L721 
v(A2)+ß2 
(1.40) 
Note that expectations Ei are conditioned onýperiod one 
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information. The first order condition is 
aJ 
= E, (Pyo x 
DM 
)2 A2 
v(/32) 
-x Elv(ý32ý+p2 
A2 a y(j32) + (T-N-M)x E-=0 (1.41) 1 aM v(P2)+ß2 
The benefits of procrastination in terms of improving 
the effectiveness of future policies are represented by 
the last term in (1.41). r.. e expectation in this term 
is difficult to evaluate because of the random 
variables in the denominator. Taking derivatives 
through the expression yields 
V( ß2) 
tß2 3v( j32) - 2v(P2) 2äM21 
E1 
v( P2)+ß2 
E1 
[vc )+ X2]2 f2 2 
(1.42) 
The difficulty of taking expectations of this 
expression is apparent since, recalling that A2 is a 
linear function of the random variable h, the numerator 
has terms in h2, and the denominator in h4. This 
suggests that an analytic solution will not be 
forthcoming. Moreover, despite the intuitive appeal of 
the assertion that the expected value of final-period 
losses must fall with procrastination, no proof that 
(1.42) is negative is available. 
It is possible to illustrate the complexity of the 
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problem with a sketch. Figure 1.2 shows the value of 
(1.42) for any given realisation of h. The top section 
uses (1.30) to sketch ß2 and its derivative. Note that 
JN (N+M)y0 
jý2 =0h=- (1.43) 
M Ir 
The middle section sketches the denominator, and the 
two terms in the numerator of (1.42). To confirm the 
shapes of these curves, recall from (1.31) that v(ß2) 
is independent of h, and its derivative with respect to 
M is negative. The bottom section of the figure 
sketches the whole expression. The expectation of the 
expression is simply the weighted average of the three 
areas A, B, and C in the figure, the weights determined 
by the normal distribution for h. Since h is 
distributed around zero, . receives most weight, 
followed by B, and A the least. The sign of the 
expectation is not clear from this discussion. However, 
the sketch does make clear the following. The positive 3 
area B, in the final section of the figure, arises 
since there exist values of h which ensure that 
7 2aß2 ?M is negative. This means that the desirability 
of procrastination associated with reducing the 
variance of the parameter estimate may be partly or 
wholely offset by possible changes in the estimate 
itself. 
Despite the complexity of the general problem, it 
is possible to describe the solution in certain 
0 
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a 72"ll 
; v42)+P2> 
-2v(02) ý2aý2lOýr1 
V(/2) 
VcP2ý+z 
Figure 1.2 
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restricted cases. For this purpose it is convenient to 
re-write the first order condition as 
öJ 
= E1[(IYo x)2 - (py* 
x)2l+(T-N-M)E1; (1Y* x)2 
am aM 
(1.44) 
It is immediately apparent (using the implicit function 
theorem) that since T only enters the last term, 
increasing T has a positive effect on the optimal value 
of m, provided that the derivative in this last term is 
negative. 
A necessary condition for m /- 0 to be optimal is 
that the last term in (1.44) is negative. Otherwise. 
the corner solution M=0 would apply. Note that when M 
= 0, the first term on the right-hand side of (1.44) is 
non-negative. The first three of the special cases 
which follow indicate situations where no 
procrastination is desirable, and argue that under 
their particular assumptions the last term in (1.44) is 
zero. 
Using (1.23) and noting that V is independent of 
subsequent observations, the last term may be expanded 
as 
a (py* x)2 = 2([ý2+v(p)]E y*. 
Y*- xý E 
jy 
) lam 111 ýM 1äM 
(1.45) 
Note that the envelope theo does not apply because 
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y* is optimal for E2(ßy-x) 2 not E1(f3y-x) 2. 
I 
CASE 1 TEN+M 
Provided that the la: t term in (1.44) is bounded, 
this assumption clearly implies that the term is zero. 
This shows that if reform has not been undertaken by 
the last period it will certainly be undertaken then. 
The 'reason for delaying reform is that information, and 
hence the subsequent decision may be improved. By the 
time the last period has been reached, any 
considerations of the future are irrelevant. Therefore, 
at that moment the choice is simply between the single- 
period benefits of reforming and, not reforming. Given 
that the reform would be optimal, the best decision is 
to reform. An alternative explanation of this result 
may be formulated in terms of option values. When the 
model has several time periods remaining, the decision 
to reform closes the option to make a reform at some 
subsequent date. The option has a positive value 
because information is exr: cted to improve and so too 
is the effectiveness of the decision made no the basis 
of that improved information. However, at the last 
period time itself has closed any option to reform in 
the future, therefore the option value (or the returns 
to procrastination) have diminished to zero. Indeed 
Roberts and Weitzman (1981) show that this proposition 
applies to a much broader class of models. 
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CASE 2 Perfect Information 
When a. 2=0, the parameter (3 is known with 
certainty, therefore the optimal choice of the 
instrument is x/ p. This decision is not affected by M, 
so the derivatives on the right-hand side of (1.45) are 
zero, and thus the last term in (1.44) is also zero. 
CASE 3 Complete Uncertainty 
When cr2=00, the estimate of (3 at any time would 
have infinite variance. The optimal choice of y in the 
final period would then be y*=O, which is independent 
of M, and the result is the same as for case 1. 
CASE 4 Favourable Initial Conditions 
When the historically determined value y0 is quite 
close to the y which would be chosen if reform were 
undertaken immediatly, the cost of delaying reform is 
quite low. This means that, provided procrastination 
reduces expected losses in the future, some delay is 
desirable. In terms of the first order condition (1.44) 
setting M to zero would mean that the first term was 
zero and provided the second was negative, a non-zero M 
would be optimal. It is possible to identify the values 
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for y0 when this case arises by setting 
+ v(r1) 
(1.46) 
1 
Substituting for v(f1) from (1.32) 
ß1x 
Yo = p1 + 0-2/Ny0 
(1.47) 
which yields a quadratic whose solution is 
31x ±J(P1x 
2- 4 tr2/N) 
yo =2 T2 
(1.48) 
1 
If yQ takes either of these values, immediate reform 
would not be desirable since it would simply implement 
the existing value for y. 
These simple cases'are_implied by the general 
formulation of the problem in (1.44). To explore more 
fully the properties of the m-del with least squares 
estimation, the results of numerical simulations are 
presented. The objective function (1.40) is rewritten, 
expanding and taking expectations through the first 
term 
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J= M([(ý1+v(ý31) lyö - 2(ilxyo+ a-2+ x2) 
v(ß2) 2 + (T-N-M) ["x 2E_+] lv(A2)+ß2 
(1.49) 
This expression was programmed along with the 
definitions of the estimates (equations (1.30)-(1.33)). 
The computer program then makes a number of drawings 
from a standard normal dic. ribution and calculates the 
value of the objective function for each one. The 
expectation of the objective is simply the average of 
these values. The optimal value for M is identified by 
trying all integer values for M between 0 and T-N and 
choosing the best. Although this method is 
computationally slow, it does not require any 
derivatives, nor does it need to consider problems of 
local optima. The same random numbers were re-used at 
each iteration so that the merits of different possible 
M's were evaluated on the same drawing of random 
numbers. 120 random numbers were used, 60 being 
antithetics (that is, minus one times the other 60). 
The results are presented in tables 1.1-1.4). Each 
table contains the optimal integer value for M given 
the assumed parameter values. 
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Table 1.1 explores the different combinations of a- z 
and T. The limiting cases described above explain the 
following 
i) the first colomn is zero because there is 
perfect certainty 
ii) The first row is zero because T=N+M 
And the comparative static effect of increasing T is 
iii) for any value of a-2, a higher T yields no 
less procrastination. 
Reading across the rows of table 1.1 shows that for a 
given T, increasing 0-2 usually increases M at first, 
and then reduces it. When T=35 the greatest 
procrastination occurs whencr2 lies between 2 and 3 
(assuming that the results may be interpolated), and 
for other values of T maximum procrastination occurs at 
lower values of ýr2. 
Table 1.2 experiments with combinations of yo and 
T. Once again, increasing T never reduces M (other 
things being equal). Reading across the rows of table 
1.2 shows that in these examples for a given T, M has 
two local maxima. These occur when initial conditions, 
ie the value of y0, are quite favourable. Note that for 
the parameter values underlying these examples 
xß 
Yo =1 Yo= 0.1 or 1.72 
v(j1)+ ßl 
Thus when y0 takes'either of these values the 
Table 1.1 Optimal integer values for M. 
Assumed Parameter Values: 
f"1=1, YO=7/4,2=2, N=5 
cr 2 
0123456? 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
20 0 3 3 2 2 0 0 0 
T 25 0 4 4 4 3 3 2 0 
30 0 5 5 5 4 4 3 2 
35 0 5 6 6 5 5 4 3 
40 0 6 7 6 6 6 5 4 
45 0 7 7 7 7 6 6 5 
50 0 8 8 8 8 7 7 6 
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Table 1.2 
x=2, N=5. 
YO 
.1 . 46 . 82 1.18 1.54 1.90 2.26 2.62 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 5 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 
20 6 0 2 3 3 2 0 0 
T 25 8 4 3 4 4 2 0 0 
30 9 6 4 5 5 3 0 0 
35 11 7 5 5 6 4 0 0 
40 12 8 6 6 7 5 1 0 
45 13 10 7 7 8 5 1 0 
50 15 11 8 8 8 6 2 0 
28 .x 
conditions are particularly favorable for 
procrastination. Note also that the higher values of yß 
are associated with less procrastination in these 
examples. This may be explained by the inverse 
relationship between y0 and v((1). 
Table 1.3 shows examples of the interactions' 
between yg and a? As expected, when a2 is very small or 
very large, less procrastination is desirable 
regardless of the value of y0. Note also that higher 
values of cr2 reduce the value of y that would be chosen 
for immediate reform. Therefore the most favourable 
initial conditions entail a lower y0, the higher is 0-2. 
Table 1.4 allows jl, a: d y4 to vary. The 
interacions between ßl and yo seem to be quite 
complicated. Por a given ý1, m may increase or decrease 
with y0; and for a given y0, m may increase or decrease 
with ßi. 
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Table 1.3 
13 1=1.1, T=25, 
x=2, N=5 
y0 
.1 . 46 . 82 1.18 1.54 1.90 2.26 2.62 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 8 4 3 Ir 4 2 0 0 
2 8 10 6 6 5 2 0 0 
3 8 12 9 6 4 2 0 0 
a'2 4 8 13 11 7 4 1 0 0 
5 8 13 11 7 4 0 0 0 
6 8 13 11 6 3 0 0 0 
7 8 '12 11 6 2 0 0 0 
8 8 11 11 6 0 0 0 0 
9 8 11 10 5 0 0 0 0 
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Table 1.4 
ar2=1 T=25, X=2, N=5 
YO 
.1 . 46 . 82 1.18 1.54 1.90 2.26 2.62 
.2 7 7 7 7 6 4 
0 0 
.4 7 8 7 4 3 2 
2 2 
.6 7 8 4 3 3 2 
2 2 
.8 8 7 3 3 3 
3 3 1 
1.0 8 5 3 3 4 3 1 0 
Pt 
1.2 8 4 3 4 4 1 0 0 
1.4 8 4 4 5 3 0 0 0 
1.6 8 4 4 6 0 0 0 0 
1.8 8 4 5 4 0 0 0 0 
2.0 8 4 6 2 0 0 0 0 
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1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The possible connections and interactions between information 
and decisions are many and complex. The literature on choice under 
uncertainty has, concentrated on the contribution of poor information 
to optimal choices. Two examples of public sector investments were 
presented under the heading of precommitment to show, by analysis of 
fairly standard models, the diversity of possible outcomes. This 
line of enquiry is pursued a little further in Chapters 5 and 6 where 
optimal taxation decisions are the focus of attention. 
Just as information influences decisions, so too can decisions 
affect information. The procrastination model displayed this property 
in its simplest form: by delaying the decision more data may be brought 
to bear on the problem. In terms of the racing analogy, the punter 
who decides well in advance certainly frees himself from the worry of 
making a decision at the track; but the more dedicated gambler who waits 
until the last minute before placing. a bet has available the most up to 
date information. Indeed it may be possible to do more than simply 
wait and see. The punter can buy the form book, or travel to the 
stables to see the horses in training. These 'active learning' 
strategies are considered in Chapter 3 with tax reform in developing 
countries in mind. 
The once-and-for-all nature of the procrastination model is quite 
restrictive. In practice the consequences of public sector decisions 
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tend to be measured in flows over time rather than discrete lumps. 
Also, the simple OLS information structure has the property that 
any uncertainty will eventually disappear. The alternative view 
that even the long run may be risky is used in the sequential decision 
making models of Chapter 2. 
L 
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APPENDIX 1.1 
Absolute and r. elative r. isk aversion are increasing in x if 
U<0. From Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) pp. 398-399 absolute 
xxx 
and relative risk aversions are given by 
U (x) xU (x) 
RA xx =- Ux (x) 0* 
RR xx =-U (x) 
x 
Differentiating with respect to x yields, suppressing the argument 
DRA 
UXXXUX (UXX) 
8X DU 2 
DRR xu 
vx + Uxx Ux -x (UXX) 
2 
xxx 
8x 
(Ux) 
2 
Since Ux > 0, x>0, and Uxx < 0, a sufficient condition for both 
of these derivatives to be positive is Ii S 0. xxx 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE TIMING OF POLICY REFORMS 
0 32. 
CHAPTER TWO SUMMARY 
The state of the economy is assumed to evolve according to a 
Markov process. The policy-maker must decide when to implement 
costly reforms, and what policies to implement. Two types of cost 
are distinguished. 
When the accumulation of c'.: 3ta (by means of a survey) is expensive, 
the policy maker undertakes reforms at the date of every survey, and 
simply has to decide on the basis of currently available information, 
the optimal date for the next survey. The duration until this date 
increases with the survey costs, but either increases or decreases 
with uncertainty according to the expected effect on the future stream 
of net benefits. 
When the reform itself is expensive, the policy-maker freely 
observes the evolution of the economy and must decide what values of 
the state variable would be sufficient to trigger the next reform. 
When the state variable remains within the dead band delimited by 
the trigger values, old policies continue. The comparative statics 
are i) the dead band expands with increasing reform costs, ii) the 
dead band shifts in the same direction as shifts in the government's 
priors and iii) if risk increases the dead band shifts and changes 
in width, the direction of these c, `fects depending on the riskiness of 
the situation. This last result arises because of simultaneity 
between the choice of trigger values and the choice of the instrument. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Keeping up to date is an expensive business. In a rapidly 
changing economic environment, policy decisions are rarely once-and- 
for-all; rather they may be regarded as one of a sequence of reforms. 
Recognition of the importance of the concepts of an evolving economy, 
and the sequential nature of decisions, raises the question addressed 
by this chapter: what criteria -should be used to determine the data 
of the next policy reform? 
The assertion that the economy is always in a state of change contra- 
dicts one of the fundamental premises of much economic theory. In 
existing dynamic models (such as Buiter and Miller, 1982) the concept of 
a long run steady state plays a crucial role. Difficulties in empir- 
ically identifying a long run steady state have recently been emphasised 
by Kelly (1985). Its existence, whether or not it may be identified in 
practice, implies that shocks, and imperfect information are relevant 
only to the short run: given sufficient time for all processes of adjust- 
ment to work through, the economy will surely settle again at some state 
where all economic parameters can be known with certainty. By expelling 
the idea of a long run steady state and replacing it with a state of perpe- 
tual flux, imperfect knowledge is built into the model as a durable rather 
than transient phenomenon. Although more data accumulates over time, 
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older observations become less informative about the current state of 
the economy, and less useful as a guide for policy decisions. 
Markov processes have two main advantages for the present purpose. 
Firstly, since current information is a sufficient statistic for these 
processes, expectations about future states of the economy are very 
simple. Secondly, these processes have the required effect of ruling 
out a perfectly informed steady-state, because although the parameters 
of the process may be known with certainty, the information set required 
to forecast the state of the economy is always changing. Whether or 
not the Markov process gives a good approximation to the behaviour of 
economic variables is an empirical question beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, there is some evidence in their favour. For example, 
Hall's (1978) econometric estimates of stochastic life cycle models 
support the proposition that consumption follows a random walk, unpred- 
ictable shifts in permanent income ringing the changes. 
Whereas in a static economy decision-making may be modelling as once- 
and-for-all optimisation, in a changing environment a particular policy 
choice must be regarded as a temporary measure. Sequential decision- 
making is an essential ingredient of many established economic models: 
in super games for example, each player's action is simply one element 
in the whole stream of choices making up his strategy (see Friedman, 1971). 
The model in this chapter is perhaps more closely related to the tax 
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reform literature. Tirole and Guesnerie (1981) concentrate on the 
sequential aspects of reform: the current reform affects future oppor- 
tunities; option values, in the sense of Henry (1974a) arise; and it 
is not obvious that all possible sequences of improving reforms necessarily 
lead to optima. In order to concentrate on the timing of policy reforms, 
the models in this chapter do not rely on the structure of the tax reform 
problem, but are defined in terms of abstract states and instruments. 
As a consequence, the concept of amelioration used by Popper (1945), 
Guesnerie (1977) and Ahmad and Stern (1984) is lost: -the government does 
not make a sequence of improving reforms, they re-optimise at each stage. 
The issues involved in the timing of policy reforms are closely 
related to those of optimal stopping rules. Roberts and Weitzman (1981) 
discuss the sequential nature of the decision to continue or terminate a 
research programme. The decision to continue at any point in time is 
conditional on the ability to stop at some time in the future. They 
find that this tends to make continuation a more favourable choice 
"... the bias towards tentatively going ahead with a project is more 
pronounced as the variance of benefits is greater because the realisation 
of a stage removes more uncertainty and allows a better informed decision 
to be made'' (p. 1263). In a situation where the planning horizon is 
finite and only one policy reform may be made, the Roberts and Weitzman 
results are directly applicable: the single reform is analogous to the 
decision to stop the research project. However, in general the policy 
reform problem would allow any number of reforms in the future. 
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This chapter does not attempt the most general solution to the 
problem since the multi-period dynamic programming problem would be 
quite complicated. Instead, the intention is to describe the properties 
of the solution in greatly simplified cases. Clearly, it is the costs 
of re-optimisation which justify any delay in up-dating policies. Two 
sources of costs are examined. Firstly, it may be expensive to change 
the instrument. Administrative or bureaucratic costs are the immediate 
justification for this assumption. However in a macroeconomic context 
significant destabilisation may result from the adjustment of private 
sector behaviour, and the revisions of expectations, in response to 
policy changes. Secondly, data collection and processing costs could be 
the over-riding consideration. In developing countries, for example, 
tax reforms are frequently made on the basis of large-scale cross-section 
surveys which are extremely expensive to organise. The skilled labour 
tied up in such activities has obvious opportunity costs in terms of 
private sector production. 
The general structure of the model is described in Section 2.2. 
The cost specification determines the kind of strategy for determining 
the timing of reforms. If data costs are important, then all relevant 
information is available at the time of the last survey, and the best 
l/ 
strategy is to announce at that date the timing of the next reform. 
This option is-detailed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 examines reform 
costs in a two-period model where information accumulates freely over time. 
In this case the government re-evaluates the costs and benefits of reform 
at the end of the first period. This strategy may be described in terms. ' 
of trigger values, indicating how far the economic situation would be 
1/ The optimality of, this, and the trigger value strategy are discussed 
in Appendix 2.1. 
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allowed to deteriorate before policy reform costs were justified. 
Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 The Model 
To capture the evolution of the economy, assume that the state 
variable ß follows a Markov process 
at ßt-1 + Eý (2.1) 
where 
EN D(E, a2) 
Beliefs about the future trajectory of the economy are incorporated 
in the distribution of c. It is assumed to be characterised by mean 
and variance. This formulation allows a variety of distributions 
(including normal and uniform); and the non-zero mean would incorporate 
some trend in the e's. For the present, however, it is convenient to 
assume no trend, 
s"= o. Thus the government's best guess about the 
values that 0 will take in the future is the most recent observation. 
However, the more time has elapsed since the last observation, the greater 
will be the variance of their estimate of ß. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. Observation takes place at time t=0, and whatever the 
path of up to that point, the expectation of ß at any time in the 
future is ß0. 
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ßo 
)5% confidence 
interval 
ß0 for 
X11 t>0 
FIGURE 2.1 : Forecasting a Markov Process 
t=o t 
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To construct the confidence interval consider the variance of the 
estimate of 0 t, assuming zero covariance 
var ßt E(ß0 - ßt2 
t 
EE i) 
2 
=E (ß0 13+ 
i=l 
= tv2 
(2.2) 
The further into the future the forecast is applied, the greater is the. 
uncertainty surrounding it. 
The state variable describe:: the influence of the government's 
instrument y on the outcome (or target variable) x. 
xt = ytßt (2.3) 
Thus the expected outcome, conditional on observation ß0 is 
t 
Ext = yt E(ß0 += et) = ytJo (2.4) 
i=1 
and its variance is 
var xt = E(xt - Ext) 
2 
t 
= Elytßo - ytE (ß0 + 
iE let' 
_ )ý 2 (2.5) 
ytt Q2 
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The government is assumed to have a valuation function defined 
on the difference between the outcome at any period and the most 
preferred outcome x 
U=U (xt - x) (2.6) 
The criterion for the evaluation of policy alternatives is then the 
future discounted flow of these payoffs. 
Some additional notation is now introduced to draw out the 
sequential nature of policy choices. Assuming that a policy reform 
takes place at period 0, and remains in force until the next reform, 
MO periods later, the expected flow of benefits over the current 
reform period evaluated at time t=i (where 0<i< M0) and 
conditional on observation ßi, may be written 
E E0 dtU (xt-x) EV 
ßi t=i 
(2.7) 
where S is the discount factor, and V 
is condensed notation for the 
expected sum. The entire expected flow of net benefits is simply the 
discounted sum of benefits over each reform period less costs. This 
may be written 
M 
J(y0rß) =V+6 
°EJ(yMo, OMO) - costs 
(2.8) 
where the costs'are specified below. Notice that the expectations 
implicit in J are evaluated on the basis of the most recent infor- 
oration, ßi, and that the future benefits EJ depend on the policies 
and information applicable to subsequent reforms. 
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The decision of whether or not to reform entails comparison 
between the benefits obtained by re-optimising, with those which would 
arise if old decisions were allowed to persist in states to which they 
were not perfectly suited. Let y(ß) be the value of y which 
maximises J for any given ß, and y0 be that value which maximises 
J if is is the state of the economy. Then it is fairly easy to 
establish that the functions J(yo, ß) and J(y(ß), ß) satisfy an 
envelope property defined by the following. 
i) When 0 arises 
the payoffs are the same when y is fixed 
as yo and when y is allowed to vary optimally. This is true 
because by definition 
y(ß) maximises J given ß 
and yý maximises J given ß0 
Therefore y(ß0) = y0 (2.9) 
and J(y0, ß0) = J(Y(ß0), ß0) (2.10) 
ii) The payoff holding y fixed at yo 'is less than that 
obtained by allowing y to vary optimally when ßf ß0. Let ß be 
any value for ß other than ßo, then 
NNNN 
J(Y(ß), ß) > J(Y, ß) (2.11) 
where y is any value for y other than y(ßl 
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Therefore 
J(Y(ß). ß) > J(yo. ß) (2.12) 
iii) Given any change from ß0 to ß, the change in 
J(y(ß), ß) will be greater than (less than) the change in J(y0, ß) 
as ß is greater than (less than) ß0. This may be written 
<=> ß< ßo escAßs), ß 
of(Aß's) 
which may be expanded as 
NN 
(Y(ß0). ß0)-1(Y(a)a) 
> 
O -a 
-' ß> ßo 
J(yo, oo) -J (yo, ß ) 
ß0-ß 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
The equivalence is then apparent from i) and ii) which allow a 
cancellation, and give the sign of J(y(ß), ß) - J(yo, ß). Thus 
____ 
)ß) 
< 
J(y0. ß) ß< 
ßo (2.15) 
ß- ßO ß ß0 
If, in addition, the functions are continuous and concave, and 
A 
U(x-x) is always decreasing in deviations from x, then Proposition 
2.2 may be restated in terms of the derivatives of J(y(ß), ß) and 
J(yo, ß). The argument then concentrates on the relative magnitudes 
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Jjy( )' J 
ßo 
FIGURE 2.2 : Given policy choice y-, the ideal state is 0 0 
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of the second derivatives of the functions. Figure 2.2 is a sketch 
of the functions under these assumptions. Notice also that 
j(y(ß), ß) could equally well be downward sloping, the important 
characteristic being concavity. 
Changes in ß will be particularly important in Section 2.4, 
where this variable triggers policy reforms. However the case to be 
considered first has costly information acquisition and so new infor- 
mation can only be obtained at the dates of subsequent reforms. 
2.3 Costly Data 
The simplest representation of data costs is to define c as 
the fixed costs of conducting a survey. At the date of the last reform 
this cost must have already been incurred to provide the information set 
ßO . Therefore future costs will apply at the dates of subsequent 
reforms. In addition, this section assumes that the state of the 
economy returns to ß0 at the date of each reform. This assumption 
is not intended to have a literal interpretation; no reform, however 
powerful, could truly set the clock back. Instead it is intended as 
an approximation which asserts that for the purpose of policy decisions, 
the future path of the economy is perceived as being similar after 
each reform. This assunption results in a considerable simplification 
because it means that the infinite future time path of the economy may 
be broken down into identical subsections. The valuation function 
may then be written in the form 
M-1 
J=E EE 6tU (x-ytat) - öMc + 6MJ)] (2.16) 
t=o 
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The problem is then similar to one where a single reform must be 
undertaken in a Zýni, te horizon. (2.16) may be rearranged as 
ý- -M-1 
J1E 
jE 
St U(x-y ß) - SMc (2.17) 
1-SM t=o tt 
Although M and y are re-optimised at subsequent reforms, the 
problem faced at those future dates is always identical to today's 
problem. Therefore re-optimisation in the future simply amounts to 
repetition of the current decision. 
In this simplified model, an increase in data costs cannot bring 
forward the optimal date of the next reform. The proof relies on two 
elements : firstly data costs are discounted from the date of the next 
reform, therefore reducing M would increase the present value of data 
costs; and secondly, because subsequent decisions are merely repetitions, 
there can be no interactions between future reform periods. This may 
be summarised as follows: 
Proposition 2.1 
An increase in data costs delays the optimal date of the next reform 
Proof 
Let M be the optimal reform date. Then, the payoff (2.17) may be 
written in the form 
3 (ß, M) B (M) -D (M) c (2.18 ) 
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1 M-1 t^ 
where B(M) =MEES U(X-Ytßt) 
1-6m t=o 
ÖM 
and D (M) 
1-dM 
Optimality of M requires 
B' - D'C =O (2.19) 
where B' and D' are derivatives with respect to M. This first 
order condition implicitly defines the relationship between c and 
M. The implicit function theorem implies 
dM D' 
dc B" - D"C 
The second order condition for optimality of m is 
B'' -D"C <0 
(2.20) 
(2.21) 
Thus dM/dc has the opposite sign to D'. Clearly, D(M) is 
decreasing in M: delaying reform reduces the present value of 
discounted costs. Therefore 
dM >0 (2.22) dc 
Fl 
I 
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It would be possible to envisage situations where this result did not 
hold. For example, the policy maker might be faced with an array of 
alternative reforms, and a fixed budget constraint. Then the allocation 
of expenditure between possible reforms would be analogous to the 
consumer's decisions about expenditure on different goods, and the income 
effect could dominate the effect of an increase in the cost of a given 
reform. This effect relies on the composition of the Slutsky matrix 
(which contains the derivatives of the compensated demand for good i 
with respect to the price of good j) and clearly cannot apply in the one- 
good model specified here. However, the effect of changes in uncertainty 
are not so clearcut, even in the simple one-dimensional model. 
An obvious difficulty is that of dimensionality. The decision- 
maker would generally be allowed to choose both the type and date of 
reform. With two independent choice variables, changes in risk could 
cause complicated interactions between these choices. The overall 
effect on the reform date would depend on the effect of risk on the 
optimal policy, and also the effect of the optimal policy on the reform 
date. To proceed any further it is necessary to make the simplifying 
assumption that the instrument y is determined by a rule which is 
independent of the degree of risk. This means that the influence of 
risk on the next reform date may be calculated as if ý y` were fixed. 
Let M be the planned reform date which maximises expected 
benefits given the initial degree of risk. Then the realised value 
of_the objective function could be no greater if the reform were 
delayed by an amount i. This may be written 
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J(M) - J(M+i) 
ý O (2.23) 
If an increase in risk increases the value of (2.23) then it cannot 
mean that M+i is a preferable reform date to M. Using (2.17) 
it is possible to write the derivative of (2.23) with respect to 
2 
ß as 
li ý'j M-1 a2 (M) - J(M+i)ý =1M a2 EE ÖtUt 
aQ J 1-6as t=o 
1a M+i-ltu 
-EEat 
1+aM+i acr t=o 
M-r 
E EstU 
1-1 
-ÖM 1-SM+i öQ2 t=o 
t 
1a M+i-) 
1-aM+i CTa EE 
avt (2.24) -at t=M+1 
A 
having defined Ut = U(x-ytßt). The derivatives of U with respect 
to CY2 are negative by risk aversion, therefore the first term is 
negative (SM+i < SM) and the second is positive. 
In either of the limiting cases, 6=O or 6=1, the first 
term in (2.24) is zero and so it cannot be optimal to delay reform in 
response to an increase in risk. However, there is no general result 
for 0<6<1. The second term shows that delay may be harmful 
because it allows risks to persist which could be avoided by reform. 
The first term shows that delay may be desirable because it delays the 
arrival of what are now riskier future benefits. 
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However, in the simplest case of a quadratic valuation function 
a clearcut result is possible. The simplest formulation is to set 
y to unity and x to zero and assume that each time a reform is under- 
taken ß is reset to zero. This formulation gives 
J1 
-Ist2 
- 6MGl 
1-SM 
{`t-o (2.25) 
Notice that this function is homogenous of degree one in a2 and c. 
This means that an equal proportional increase in a2 and c would 
have no effect on the optimal choice of M. However, proposition 2.1 
established that increasing c alone increases M, therefore increasing 
a2 alone must reduce it. This argument may be summarised as follows 
Proposition 2.2 
With quadratic objectives, the optimal reform date is brought forward 
as uncertainty increases 
Proof 
The derivative of (2.25 ) may be written 
as=O (2.26) ö31 .M a2 
M{ EatM} 
-cM 
1-d am 
{-- 
Mý 
1-d 
i) Assuming that the second order condition is fulfilled, the implicit 
function implies that the effect of a parameter change on M has the 
same sign as its effect on 3J/ 3m. 
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ii) 3J/DM is obviously homogeneous of degree zero in c and a2. 
Therefore Euler's theorem implies 
aJ a as a 
D aM c+ 
aha aM 
a-° (2.27) 
iii) Proposition 2.1 established that the first term is positive 
(assuming c and (Y 
2 
are positive), therefore the second is negative 
<0 
dß2 
(2.28) 
0 
The properties of the optimal decision rules in this model result 
from the assumption that data collection is expensive. Information 
arrives in 'discrete bundles on payment of c, and no new information 
can be brought to bear on the government's decisions until the next 
survey has been undertaken. Under the alternative specification, that 
data flows freely, decision rules must take into account optimal adapt- 
ations to the changing environment. 
2.4 Costly Reform 
The model of Section 2.3 must be revised to examine reform costs. 
The analysis is simplified by restricting attention to quadratic object- 
ives, and a uniform distribution for c. Also, it is useful to distin- 
guish between extremely risky and slightly risky situations. The most 
important modification is, however, that the government receives new 
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information every period about the evolution of the economy to date. 
On the basis of that information they must decide both whether to make 
a costly policy reform, and what reform to implement should any 
be 
desirable. The decision rule - reform or no reform - may be described 
in terms of trigger values. The government uses the new information to 
re-evaluate their prospects every period. When the expected future 
benefits, or the state variable, becomes unacceptably poor, the reform is 
triggered. 
Assume that at the date of the last reform, time t=0, the 
government chooses the value of the instrument y to maximise the 
discounted flow of future net benefits conditional on observation ß0 
At some subsequent time t, if a reform were carried out, optimisation 
would be on the basis of the most up-to-date information ß. t. The 
desirability of the reform depends on the outcome of a cost benefit 
analysis. The net present benefit of the reform at time t is 
NPBt = a(Yt. ßt) - J(YO, Ot) -k 
(2.29) 
where J(yt, ßt) and J(y010t) are the flows of benefits resulting from 
reform and no reform respectively, both evaluated on the basis of obser- 
vation and. and, k is the 'fixed cost of reform. Clearly, the reform 
would be undertaken at time t if it yielded a positive net benefit. 
When the net present benefit equals zero the government is indifferent 
between making the reform and persevering with the old policies. The 
values of ß for which the net present benefit of reform is zero are 
the trigger values, and they are implicitly defined by setting equation 
(2.29) to zero. Assuming that there are-two solutions for the trigger 
values, it is possible to sketch the problem as in Figure 2.3. 
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At time t=0a reform takes place and trigger values and 
are chosen. When the state of the economy reaches one of these values 
at t= M0, another reform takes place and new critical values are 
chosen. There is no reason to believe that in general the dead band 
would be a horizontal rectangle of the type sketched in the figure. 
Roberts and Weitzman (1981), for example, find that to justify the 
continuation of a research project, the prospects of continuation must 
become more favourable over time. That is, the lower trigger value 
slopes upwards over time. However, in support of the conjectured 
trigger values in the figure, it is possible to argue that since there 
are no option values (the current reform places no restrictions on 
subsequent reforms), and the variance of the Markov process is known and 
fixed, the factors determining the choice of trigger values in this 
model are unlikely to change over time. When; in addition, the model 
is restricted to two periods, such considerations are irrelevant because 
the trigger values are then applicable to only that moment in time when 
the decision about reform is made, and the compexities of determining 
the dead band as a function of time are eliminated. 
By using the implicit function theorem in conjunction with (2.12) 
it is possible to make some judgements about the effect of reform costs 
on the trigger values. 
dt aNPB/ak (2.3o) 
ax -- BNPB/aßt 
Assuming for the time being that the decision rule determining y is 
independent of k, the numerator is negative. Therefore, the direction 
of influence has the sign of the denominator 
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FIGURE 2.3 : The time path of ß, trigger 
values, and the dead band 
t=0 t=M0 
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3NPB 
aJ (yt. 
t 
ayt aJ (ytr 
t) _ 
aJ (y0 ßt) 
aßt ay aßt 
+ aßt aßt 
ta. 3i) 
t 
Optimality of yt requires that the first term is zero. The relative 
magnitudes of the second two terms are determined by the envelope 
property defined in Section 2.2. Since y0 is fixed, changes in ß 
have a stronger influence on J(y0, ßt)_than on J(yt, ßt). Given also 
that y0 was optimal for ß., the sign of the sum of the last two terms 
is the same as the sign of ßt - ß0" 
8J (Yt. ßt) 3J 
ý. t) ( 
sign a6 86 = sign { 
Bt - ßý} (2.32) 
ttl 11 
Therefore the critical value of ßt increases if it is above ß0 and 
falls if it is below. 
aß aß 
ak '0 ' Wk <o 
As might be expected, higher reform costs would tend to reduce the 
desired frequency of reform, and this would be achieved by increasing 
the width of the dead band. 
This argument is closely related to the proof of proposition 2.1 
in the previous section that the reform date increases with data costs. 
A similar proof may be constructed here under the assumption that ß and 
ß are symmetric. This means that an increase in the width of, the dead 
band b increases ß and reduces B. Under this simplifying assumption 
it is possible to write (2.17) in the form 
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J(a, M) = B(b) - D(b)c (2.33) 
where B(b) is the expected benefits accruing until the expected 
reform date, and D(b) is the expected discount factor applying to 
costs. Then proposition 2.1 may be restated in terms of the dead 
band as follows: 
Proposition 2.3 
The dead band width increases with reform costs 
The proof is a trivial extension of the proof to proposition 2.1. 
The only additional argument required is that D(b) is decreasing 
in b. This is obvious since an increase in the dead band width 
will make it less likely that a reform will have been undertaken by 
any given date. With discounting this means that the expected discount 
factors applying to future reform costs will fall. 
However, this argument excludes the influence of k on decisions 
about y. In general, reform costs, and their influence on the trigger 
values would affect this choice. For example: the knowledge that reform 
will be undertaken if the state of the economy deteriorates beyond a 
certain level may affect the policy-maker's attitude to risk, and may 
enable him to pursue policies which would otherwise 
have been undesirable. 
To examine this issue, and also the more complicated 
influence of 
uncertainty, it is necessary to make some more assumptions, 
and examine 
the determination of y. 
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The solution for the optimal y is by means of dynamic programming. 
The current choice of y affects the trigger values which in turn influence 
the arrival dates and magnitudes of future costs and benefits. To 
simplify the analysis, it is convenient to make some more restrictive 
assumptions. Firstly, the model is restricted to two time periods, the 
second of which is intended to represent the entire future of the economy. 
By lumping together all future decisions into one period, a considerable 
simplification is gained, but connections between current choices and 
allocation within future periods is ruled out. Secondly a quadratic 
form is imposed for the evaluation function. Finally, a uniform 
distribution is used to represent beliefs about the errors in the Markov 
process determining the evolution of the economy. Before proceeding to 
the analysis it may be helpful to explain in some detail the importance 
of these assumptions for the optimal decision. 
Since the objective function is of the quadratic form 
U- (ytßt - x)2 (2.34) 
and the policy maker can choose yt after $t has been observed, 
the best policy in period one is simply to set yl = x/ßl. This would 
ensure zero losses in period one, however the policy revision can only 
be justified if the cost of reform k was less than the losses assoc- 
iated with continuing under the old policy y0. Indifference between 
the reform and the status quo occurs when 
(Yoßl ` x)2 k (2.35) 
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The trigger values are derived by rearranging this equation as follows 
ß_XtßX 
YO y0 
(2.36) 
The width of the dead band is simply the difference between the two 
trigger values 
2k 
y0 
(2.37) 
The following properties of the trigger values emerge. Holding y0 
constant 
i) Increasing k reduces ß and increases ß (as a consequence 
the dead band expands). As will become apparent, there are 
additional effects via the influence of k on y0. 
ii) Increasing the target x shifts both trigger values upwards 
but does not affect the dead band width. 
iii) Increasing y0 reduces both trigger values and reduces 
the dead band width. 
In the dynamic programming solution to the period zero problem 
choice of y0 affects the trigger values which in turn affect the 
payoff in the final period. The period zero criterion is 
EUO (y0BU - x) 
2+ Sf- Pr (reform) k+ Pr (no refozm) EU1(y0)1 (2.36) 
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The first term is the period zero benefits, and the second term, which 
includes the discount factor d, includes the influence of y0 on 
subsequent opportunities. Reform costs, and zero utility (omitted from 
the expression) are incurred in states where the reform is optimal, and 
benefits accruing to the persistence of y0 occur otherwise. 
Under the assumption of a uniform distribution for e, beliefs 
about ß in the final period may also be represented by a similar 
distribution. This is apparent from (2.1). with this distribution 
there is nothing to be gained by assuming that the expectation of e 
is zero. The distribution of future ß's may, without loss of tract- 
ability, be centred around some point other than ß0. Given the interval 
defined by the trigger values, and the interval between the upper and 
lower limits of the uniform distribution, four cases are possible. 
These are 1) the trigger values lie within the distribution, 2) the 
two intervals overlap but neither lies completely within the other 
3) the distribution lies entirely within the dead band 4) the distrib- 
ution lies entirely outside the bead band. The last two cases are of 
little interest because 3) Never allows reform and 4) always requires 
reform. Therefore only the first two possibilities are considered. 
2.4.1 CASE 1: Very Risky Situations 
This is called a very risky situation because a broad range of 
ß's are equally likely. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4, where 
the distribution of ß is over the interval 
LL, H . When uncertainty 
is very great this distribution is stretched out; and it is therefore 
plausible to argue that under extreme risk, both of the trigger values 
for 0 will lie within the interval 1, H] . if this is the case, a 
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small increase in uncertainty, other things being equal, reduces the 
likelihood of observing a$ between the trigger values; density is 
shifted out of the dead band and the no-reform outcome becomes more 
likely. As a consequence, the decision maker would be more confident 
about aiming at the current period target, knowing that the chance that 
the current decision would be required to serve in less favourable 
future conditions was reduced. In terms of the quadratic example, a 
bigger spread for ß would allow the government to aim higher, i. e. 
closer to the target. This reverses the usual comparative-static result. 
In a single-period model the policy maker would hedge against multi- 
plicative uncertainty by reducing the value of the instrument. However, 
in the dynamic model, the possibility of subsequent reforms allows the 
instrument to be increased. 
The probability of reform may in general be represented as the 
chance that ßl falls outside lß, ß1; when both trigger values lie 
within the range of the distribution, this may be written as 
Pr (reform) 
(H-L) - (ß - ß) (2.39) 
= H-L 
and no reform takes place if ß is inside the dead band 
ß-ß 
Pr (no reform) = H- L (2.40) 
Substituting the probabilities into the period zero objective function (2.38) 
yields . 
EU0=- (Y00X)2 -S 
(H-L) - iß-ß) 
ß 
H_L + k 
ß 
(y060 ) 2f (ßl) dß1 (2.41) 
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FIGURE 2.4 :A very risky distribution of ß 
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Notice that the probability of no reform is included in the limits of the 
integral in the last term; expectations are taken only over those values 
of ß within the dead band. The final step is to evaluate the integral, 
using the expressions for ß and ß from (2.36) 
J (y0 
ß0 x) 2f (ß 
, 
)dß1 
(H-L) 3 yO 
o 
(2.42) 
Substituting this into the objective function (2.41) and using again the 
expressions for the trigger values (2.36) 
EUO =- (y0ß0 - x) 
2+ 
He 
I- (H-L) k+ 3 
ryk 1 (2.43) 
The optimal choice of y0, given its influence on the subsequent 
trigger values requires 
l/ 
EU 02 (yß0 - x)ß0 - KdL 
3- kýk 
=0 (2.44) 
0 YO 
The implicit function theorem then reveals the following 
i) dy0/dk <0 
A higher reform cost leads the c, ýernment to aim lower. More costly 
reform means that it is more likely that y0 will be required to 
continue in period one, therefore it is reduced to hedge against 
uncertainty about what state will arise. 
1/ The second order condition fo'r a maximum requires 
46k/k < 3ßýy3(H-L) 
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ii) dy0/d(R-L) >0 
H-L is a measure of the spread of the uniform distribution, and may be 
interpreted as the degree of risk. More risk means that, other things 
being equal, y0 is less likely to'continue in period one, therefore 
it may be-increased. The standard result that y* decreases with 
uncertainty is reversed by the introduction of the trigger values. 
Comparative static effects of exogenous variables on the trigger 
values may now be derived from (2.36) and (2.37) 
dý 
__ 
1 kr x+ 1`k 
dy0 
>O dk 2 yo y2 
dk 
0 
dß 1k x- k 
!>? 
dk --2 22 YO -y dk 
acßý y'1 2/`k dy0 >O 
02 dk 1'O 
increasing k increases the width of the dead band, through its effect 
on the numerator of (2.18). But it also reduces y0 -which appears in 
the denominator, and therefore shifts the dead band upwards. The sum 
of these two effects means that the upper trigger level increases but 
the lower could move in either direction depending on the relative 
magnitude of shift and expansion of the dead band. 
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The effects of uncertainty are quite straightforward 
). 10 du 
__ _ 
(x+Vk ' dy0 
<p d (H -L) 2d (H-L) YO 
d- 
(x-k) dyO ". -- d(H-L) 
y2 
d(H-L) <O if x> 
ýk 
0 
More uncertainty increases y0 and shifts both trigger values down- 
wards. Since they, both move down by the same proportion the width of 
the dead band also shrinks. 
d(ß-ß) 2v dy0 
d(H-L) --2<O d(H-L) 
YO 
Numerical simulations are presented to illustrate the analytic 
results. Figure 2.5 depicts the solution to the first order condition 
(2.26) for the chosen parameter values. The lines are downward sloping 
since, in agreement with the comparative statics, greater reform costs 
, reduce the optimal value of y0. The lowest of the lines represents a 
less risky situation: other things being equal, a higher value for the 
upper end of the distribution of ß means greater spread (although the 
spread is not mean-preserving) and hence greater risk. Therefore the 
difference between the lines shows that for given reform costs, more 
risk means a higher y0. 
Figure 2.6 shows the results of the simulations for the trigger 
values themselves. Higher reform costs, as predicted, increase the 
width of the dead band. More uncertainty shifts the trigger values down- 
wards, reducing the width of the dead band. 
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FIGURE 2.5 : Choice of y0, given trigger values in period one. 
Simulation with parameters ß0 = 1, x=2, L=0 
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FIGURE 2.6 : Trigger Values : Simulation with Parameter Values: 
ßO= 1º x= 2, L=O 
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2.4.2. CASE 2: Slightly Risky Situations 
i 
A situation of slight risk is defined as one where the dead band 
lies partly but not completely within the range of the distribution of ß. 
Figure 2.7 illustrates the case where ß is uniformly distributed over 
a narrow interval which does not include both trigger values. In this 
case a slight increase in the spread of the distribution, holding its 
mean constant, shifts density into the dead band, making the no-reform 
option more likely. Now, such increases in risk would lead the govern- 
ment to place more weight on the possibility that current decisions 
would be allowed to persist. In the quadratic example they would aim 
lower. 
Attention is restricted to the case where ß<L5A and R<H 
(illustrated in the figure) although the arguments apply equally well to 
the other similar case where L<ß and ßSH<ß. The possibility 
that ß can never become small enough to trigger the reform affects the 
possibilities of reform and no reform, and it is necessary to reconsider 
the analysis presented in case one accordingly. The period zero objective, 
with the revised probabilities is now 
EUo =- (y x) 
2-6. H-ß 
H-L 
k+ (Y0ß1-x) 2f (ß1) dß (2.45) 
IL 
comparing (2.45) with (2.41) notice that the probability of reform is 
now independent of 5 since this value is known to be infeasible. 
Also, the lower bound on the integral in the last term now coincides 
with the lower bound of the probability distribution rather than the 
lower trigger level. 
67. 
Pr 
1 
H-L 
FIGURE 2.7 :A slightly risky distribution of 0 
'ß LßH 
68. 
The first order condition's' for optimality of y0 is 
ß 
8EU 2 (y 6 -x) ß_ 
2S 
(Y ß -x) ß d$ =0 (2.46) ay0 OOO H-L O111 
L 
From this-equation it is possible to derive the comparative static effects 
of changes in risk, and costs on the optimal values of yp, and hence on 
the trigger values. Consider first changes in risk. A mean-preserving 
spread of the distribution may be represented as an increase in H accom- 
panied by an equal reduction in L. Therefore differentiation of (2.46) 
with respect to risk, amounts to differentiating with respect to H, and 
L, setting 3H = -DL. Therefore the effects of risk on y0, given that* 
the second order condition is also satisfied, has the opposite sign to 
2rß ay0aL 
- iii j(YOL-x)L - x2L 
(Y0ß1-x)ßldßl] 
LL 
Sufficient conditions for this to be positive are 
ß=L, and y0L -x? O 
The first requires that the lower level of the distribution is close to 
the upper trigger level, ensuring that the second term in (2.47) is small. 
J/ The second order condition requires 
-3ß02 (H-L) - 6(ß3 -L 
3) 
<p 
and is satisfied for all parameter values since by assumption 
ßZ L. 
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The second implies that the first term is positive and may be inter- 
preted by recalling from the definition of the trigger values (2.36) 
yoß -x= k 
yoß -x= -k 
Thus it seems reasonable to argue that values for ß greater than the 
average of ß and 0 would yield a positive value for yOß - x: 
(Y0 L-x> 0) <=> L> (ß - ß) /2 (2.48) 
The two conditions together mean that values for ß at the upper end of 
the dead band become more likely as risk increases. Given that both of 
these conditions are fulfilled, yp, decreases with risk. This in turn 
implies that both trigger values are increasing with risk, as is the 
distance between them. The result is in marked contrast to the very risky 
situation where the trigger values decreased with risk. The explanation is 
that increases in risk may reduce or increase the probability of reform 
depending on the position of the cut-off points of the distribution 
relative to the trigger values. 
Clearly, the comparative statics for the slightly risky case are 
reversed when (2.47) is negative, and sufficient conditions for this to 
happen may be derived as follows. Since ßl is drawn from the interval 
CL, H], it'must be no less than L. Therefore, using (2.47), if 
(y0L - x) > Or 
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a2EU < 2_SL 2^ (g-Ljý , 
ay0 sL- H-L 
(YOL - X: U -L 
A sufficient condition for'-this to be negative is 
(H + L) /2 
If this condition is fulfilled, yo increases with risk, and both 
trigger values, and their difference falls. This condition, means that 
an increase in risk increases the chance that a reform will be undertaken. 
This characteristic is shared by the very risky case. 
Summarising the results of the analysis of the slightly risky case, 
it is apparent that the effect of changes in risk can work in either 
direction. If the lower bound of the distribution lies in the upper half 
of the dead band, and is close to the upper trigger level, the optimal 
value for y falls with risk. However, if the lower bound of the distrib- 
ution is in the upper half of the dead band, and the upper trigger level 
is in the upper half of the distribution, the optimal y increases with 
-risk. This reversal arises because in the first situation increasing 
risk reduces the probability of reform, but in the second it is increased. 
The comparative statics of changes in k are quite straightforward. 
k only influences yo via its effect on From (2.36) the partial 
effect of an increase in k is to increase ß. Inspection of (2.46) 
reveals that an increase in ß must be associated with 'a reduction in 
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y0 therefore 
dy0 
<O 
dk 
Returning-to (2.36) increasing k and reducing y0 has an overall - 
upward influence on but the effect on ß is indeterminate. 
dß 
,<? >0 37, ý 
and from (2.37) the width of the dead band has increased. Therefore, 
increasing k shifts the dead band upwards, and increases its width, 
the overall effect on the lower trigger level being indeterminate. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
The implications of the simple decision theory model discussed in 
this chapter may be summarised in two categories. Firstly, if data is 
costly, surveys and reforms take place simultaneously, and the government 
must decide the date of the next survey at the time of the last reform. 
The resulting optimal duration will be longer, the greater are the data 
costs and will probably be shorter if the world is more uncertain. How- 
ever, the latter result may be reversed if future expected benefits are 
greatly eroded by risk. Secondly, if the change in the policy instrument 
is costly, the timing of reforms may be governed by announcing trigger 
values. As long as the state variable remains within the dead band 
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delimited by these trigger values, old policies are allowed to persist. 
Comparative statics then reveal the following: if reform costs increase, 
the dead band expands; if the government's priors shift, the dead band 
shifts in the same direction; and if uncertainty increases the dead band 
both shifts and changes in width, the direction of these effects depending 
on the riskiness of the environment. 
The advice which policy makers could draw from the analysis relates 
to proposals for institutional change. The rigidity which bureaucracies 
impose on public sector decision-making may have quite beneficial stabil- 
ising effects: politicians are prevented from making sudden policy switches, 
and the consequent adjustment costs are avoided. The question of timing 
of policy reforms may thus be translated into one of optimal bureacratic 
inertia. If the economic environment becomes more hostile (a2 increases) 
the analysis suggests that a narrower dead band, or more frequent reforms, 
would be appropriate; thus it would be quite legitimate to require the 
institutions of decision making to become more flexible or responsible. 
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Appendix 2.1 
,r 
Two propositions are presented to show that the decision 
strategies assumed in the text are optimal. The first shows 
that with costly data it is optimal to decide on the date of the 
next reform at the time of the most recent survey. The second 
shows that when information arrives freely, it is optimal to use 
a strategy where reforms are triggered by the value of the state 
variable. 
v 
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Proposition 2. A. 1 
When new information does not arrive between reforms, there can be 
no improvement on the plan formulated at the date of the last reform. 
Proof 
At time t=0, the optimal plan for the date of the next reform 
satisfies 
E(0)J(ß, M*) Z E(0)J(ß, M) 
00 00 
where expectations formulated at time 0 are based on information 
00, M is the optimal reform plan, and M is any other plan. 
At some subsequent period t, before the planned reform date 
(O <t<M no new information has arisen (Ot = 00). Then M 
is still the optimal plan at time t 
E (t)J (ß, M*) E (t)J (ß, M) 
00 00 
1-1 
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Proposition 2. A. 2 
No decision rule can perform better than the optimal trigger strategy 
where reforms are contingent on the value of the state variable. 
Proof 
Let the decision at time t be represented as follows 
yt =1 => reform at time t 
yt =0 -> do not reform at time t 
The best of all possible decision rules chooses yt at every period 
such that 
EJ(ß, Yt, Y*) 
t0 
3(ß, YtºY*) 
t 
(2. A. 1) 
where y represents the vector of subsequent optimal decisions, and 
yt and y are any other trajectory for the instrument. The optimal 
trigger values are implicitly defined by 
EJ(ßý1, y )= EJ(ß, O, y ) (2. A. 2) 
ßt - ßt ~~ 
and reform takes place if and only if 
EJ(ßº1ºy*) ? EJ(ß"O, y*) (2. A. 3) 
ßt ßt 
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Under the assumption that the state variable follows a random walk, 
ßt is sufficient to represent all relevant information in Ot 
ýt <-' ßt 
Therefore, the trigger strategy (2. A. 3) is equivalent to (2. A. 1) 
and no other rule can perform better. 
m 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ACTIVE LEARNING 
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CHAPTER THREE: SUMMARY 
Theoretical models a: f-, presented in which the 
current decision influences the quality of information 
availible in the future. The decision-maker has 
objectives defined on a target variable which is 
influenced linearly by one instrument. Uncertainty 
results from imperfect knowledge of the parameters 
determining the influence of the instruments on the 
target. The decision-maker is allowed to choose not 
only the means of the instruments, but also the degree 
of policy variation. 
Particular emphasis is placed on the analysis of 
risky situations, and the 'safe port' is defined as the 
course of action which minimises the variance of the 
target variable. Under some circumstances, covariances 
may be used to offset exogenously determined 
uncertaities. 
In a two period lineal, quadratic example, with a 
single instrument, numerical simulations are used to 
describe the solution. In all of the examples examined, 
the optimal value for y was no lower than its single- 
period counterpart. It increased with x and T, and 
decreased with M but the effects of 0-2 and s2 varied 
between examples. Policy variation was not found to be 
desirable. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The acknowledgement of ignorance frequently leads to the prescrip- 
tion of caution. With imperfect information about the'parameters of the 
economic system, risk averse economists often recommend piecemeal or 
marginal reforms instead of global optimisation. Rather than seek to 
identify the optimum on the basis of uncertain parameter estimates, a 
less ambitious problem is addressed, namely the direction of welfare- 
improving changes. Since Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) a considerable 
literature has accumulated emphasising that limited movements towards 
the global optimum may not always be desirable but that some categories 
of second best reforms may be beneficial. For example, Green (1962), 
and Bertrand and Vanek (1971), describe the conditions under which 
reducing the biggest distortion increases welfare, and Dixit (1975) 
provides a simple unified approach for the derivation of these, and 
other related results. However, -one-issue which has received little 
attention, is that of step length: having identified a desirable 
direction for reform, how far should you go? 
This chapter concentrates on the importance of information for the 
choice of step length and allows the nature of the information revealed 
to depend on the policies chosen. Short steps are desirable in that 
their outcomes are relatively certain; however, long steps are, riskier 
and hence their outcomes provide more new information. Also, emphasis 
is placed on situations where information is very poor, and the notion 
of the 'safe port' is introduced to describe the vector of policies 
which the government would implement in cases where risk tends to infinity. 
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In the model which follows, time is divided into 
periods and sub-periods. Policies must be set at the 
beginning of each period, and are fixed until the 
beginning of the next period. Information, in the form 
of observations of the realised value of the target 
variable accrues every sub-period. For example, the 
government might be able to change taxes only at a 
budget, but the national :. zcounts are revised more 
frequently. The government is allowed to introduce 
policy variation over a period. This variation takes 
the form of specifing two values for the instrument 
each being applied to half the sub-periods within the 
period. In practice these policy variations might be 
announcments that a particular instrument will change 
within the forthcoming period: the rate of VAT on 
luxuries might be set at 10% to be reduced to 5% in 6 
months time. Alternatively, policy variation might be 
achieved by charging different tax rates to different 
regions. 
Active learning is well known in the control 
literature. Kendrick (1981b) for example, distinguishes 
between three kinds of optimal control strategies 
associated with different attitudes to learning. The 
least sophisticated is an open-loop control which bases 
the future trajectory of instruments entirely on the 
data availible at the starting period; no revisions are 
made in the light of the new data and nothing is 
learnt. The second strategy involves passive learning 
and is called feedback contr l; parameter estimates are 
revised on the basis of new data but the deployment of 
instruments is independent of their expected effect on 
future parameter estimates. Active learning is the most 
sophisticated procedure 
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and is an example of "closed-loop" control: policies are deliberately 
used to perturb the system in order more quickly to learn their 
influence on the state of the world. Kendrick (1982) shows, by means 
of simulations in a small US macro model, that active learning will 
occur when there is enough uncertainty in the model, and when there is 
a. sufficiently high terminal penalty. The analysis here provides some 
analytic explanation of how this result comes about. 
The connection between current actions and future information is 
not new in economics: it is essential to concepts such as 'learning by 
doing', Azrow (1962); 'experimental consumption', Kihlstrom, Mirman and 
Postlewaite (1984) and the 'Rothschild effect'. For example, Roths- 
child (1974) envisages a consumer faced with a two-armed bandit. He 
is uncertain about the expected payoffs from playing each arm so his 
actions are influenced by the inclination to play the arm which he 
believes to pay out most often, and also by the desire to improve his 
knowledge of the probabilities of winning. Because of sampling errors, 
the gambler may reach a long-run equilibrium where he plays only the arm 
with the lower payoff: the general equilibrium repercussions of this 
phenomenon are examined by Kihlstrom et al (1984). Tonks (1983) and 
(1984) adds a budget constraint to the model and shows that this may 
reverse the comparative statics. 
Grossman, Kihlstrom and Mirman (1977) present a closely related model. 
Faced with a new commodity whose characteristics are uncertain, the 
consumer experiments in the short run, possibly consuming more of it than 
he would if he were perfectly informed. My model is simpler because 
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firstly more restrictions are imposed on the objective function, and 
secondly, in section 3.4 OLS rather than Bayesian learning is assumed. 
The main departure is that the decision-maker may exploit variations rather 
than holding the policy fixed. In situations where at 
least, ione instrument is fixed, covariances provide some potential for 
the decision-maker to offset the uncertainty relating to the influence 
of the the uncertain variables. 
Section 3.2 gives a preliminary outline of the main argument. 
Section 3.3 presents the single-perios model and the" dynamic 
model is presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 discusses the results. 
3.2 Preliminaries 
The model envisages a decision-maker who is uncertain about the 
parameter ß which determines the influence of instruments on objectives. 
Before setting out the model in general terms, the main issues may be 
sketched using a univariate regression model illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
This also forms the basis'of the example set out in Section 3.4. 
The decision-maker is assumed to have a valuation function defined 
on deviations of the target variable x from some most preferred value 
x, but is not sure exactly what value for the instrument y will mini- 
raise these deviations. This uncertainty results from the stochastic 
error term whose variance is assumed known, and also from errors in the 
estimation of ß. If since the beginning of time y has only taken the 
value zero, the spread of observations along the vertical axis will 
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y0=0 
y+ C 
Y 
FIGURE 3.1 : Choice of y and variance of $ 
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yield some information about the variance of c, but this is useless 
information since c2 is already known; however it will be uninfor- 
mative about ß, all lines passing through the origin would fit the 
data equally well. To learn something about ß it would be necessary 
either to allow some variation around y0, or to fix y at some new 
level such as yl, or employ a combination of both strategies. 
In this-setting, there will be trade-offs between the use of policies 
for the purpose of learning, against aiming as closely as possible at the 
target value of x. More variation in y would lead to increased 
accuracy of parameter estimates, however it would also entail more varia- 
tion in x and hence a higher probability in deviating from the target. 
Deviations from the status quo y0 are rewarded with greater data 
variation upon which to estimate ß, but higher values of y also result 
in greater variance of x since the uncertainty is multiplicative. 
Dynamic issues are obviously essential to the argument. The only 
reason for concern about the variance of parameter estimates is that they 
form the basis for future decisions. Choices based on more accurate 
information have a". higher probability of hitting the target, so there will 
be conditions, relating to the discount rate and structural parameters, 
when it is beneficial to deliberately aim short of the target this period 
in order to have a better chance . 'f hitting it next period. 
The examination of active learning strategies involving endogenous 
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information requires three time periods. Period zero has the sole 
purpose of establishing a data set upon which the decision-maker's 
prior beliefs are formed: no actions are taken until period one. In 
period two the actions are taken as if there were no learning, since 
t=3 is the end of time there would be nothing to be gained by 
obtaining information which could never be used. The essential aspect 
of learning comes in period one when it is necessary to take account of 
the influence of current decisions on future information and hence on 
future policies and outcomes. The order of events is illustratrated in 
Table 3.1. 
:ý ;s 
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TABLE 3.1 3 Active Learnings the order of events 
PERIOD 0 PERIOD 1 PERIOD 2 
t- 0 t- 1 t- 2 t' 3 
PRIOR R I: PRIOR OUTCOME REVISED OUTCOPSE 
F I mTION BELIEFS x BELIEFS x 
SET O1 ßl 2 
POLICY 
CHOICE 
WELFARE 
U1 
NEW 
POLICY 
LF [12t 
yl Y2 
NEW 
INFORMATION 
SET 02 
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3.3 THE SINGLE PERIOD PROBLEM 
The model used in this chapter is similar to that 
used in section 1.4 chapter one. That model is extended 
to include an intercept, which is subsequently dropped in 
section 3.4, and also policy variations are introduced. 
in common with section 1.4, time is divided into three 
periods. The first establishes a prior data set and 
contains N sub-periods. The second, period one, lasts for 
M sub-periods and adds M observations to the prior data 
set. The final period consists of T-N-M sub-periods. 
There is no discounting. Dec-ions must be made at the 
beginning of a period, and cannot be altered as 
information accrues from subsequent sub-periods. Not 
until the beginning of the next period may any new policy 
be implemented. . 
As before, the government bases policy decisions on 
a quadratic objective function defined on deviations from 
the most preferred value 
x 
of the target variable X. The 
objective in period one is therefore to maximise 
U=- (Xt -x) 
t=1 
(3.1) 
In this section an intercept is included in the 
linear equation describing the structure of the economy 
xt =°+ (3 yt+' £t (3.2) 
where E£t=0, Eat= a'2, 
and yt is the value of the govc-nment's instrument at 
time t. It is simple to show that the inclusion of the 
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intercept has a considerable influence on the optimal 
policy in the single period me Thl , and this provides some 
indication of the difficulties involved in generalising 
the models of sections 1.4, and 3.4. Also, the formulae 
derived form the basis of the decision rules examined by 
numerical simulation in chapter four. 
As well as the intercept, this section introduces a 
new instrument for the government, namely policy 
variation. Whereas in the previous exposition of this 
model (section 1.4), the government had to fix y at a 
single value over the whole period, here the government 
is allowed to choose two values for the instrument in the 
knowledge that each of these will apply to half of the 
sub-periods over any given period. (Clearly, this 
requires an even number of sub-periods). The greater is 
the difference between the two chosen values for y, the 
greater is the degree of variation being introduced. -This 
formulation is consistent with -he interpretation of 
applying different policies to different groups within 
the economy. For example, one kind of policy variation 
observed in developing countries is charging different 
tax rates to different regions. If the sub-periods of the 
model are reinterpreted as geographical regions of the 
economy rather than subdivisions of time, the model is 
consistent with this interpretation. The important aspect 
for the following analysis is that the government knows 
in advance the proportion of the sub-periods (or 
geographical regions) which will be covered by each 
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distinct policy. This formulation is clearly not 
equivalent to the assumption that at any sub-period the 
value of y is a drawing from a distribution whose 
parameters are chosen by the government. Such an 
assumption would have the attractive interpretation that 
the government's choices may be influenced by 
unpredictable factors: for example the government may be 
obliged to set instruments in nominal terms even though 
their real values are subsequently affected by 
unpredictable changes in the economic environment. This 
alternative assumption proves to be analytically 
intractable because of the randomness of the instrument, 
therefore it is examined by simulation methods in chapter 
four. The analysis in this c! °apter proceeds with the 
assumption that the values of the instrument are known in 
advance (ie the y's are not random). 
The single period problem is to choose the two 
values for the instrument yl, and y2 to maximise the 
expected value of (3.1). Notice that the expectation of 
(3.1) may be decomposed in the following way 
EE (xt A)2 =E (xt x)2 + M(x x)2 (3.3) 
The cross-product term involving E , 7(xt-x)(x 
x) is zero 
because x is the expectation of x. Thus the objective 
function is made up of the variance of the target 
variable and squared deviations of its mean from the most 
preferred value. If in addition 
x is set equal to x, the 
government's objective is simply to minimise the variance 
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of the target variable, ie to choose the policy whose 
outcome is the least uncertain. This policy is termed the 
safe port. 
Using (3.2), the objective function may be written 
EZ (xt 
x)2= E 22(ßc+y lß+Zt 
x)2 + EL (-e +y2ß+£t-c)2 
t=1 t=1 t=M/2+1 
(3.4) 
Notice that the error term may be taken out of the 
brackets because its product with the other terms is 
expected to be zero. 
Eý (xt-c) 
2= 
+y lß 
x) 2+2 E(o(+y2ß-x) 
2+ Ma' 2 
(3.5) 
Defining xi = +Tyi this may be written 
y 12 
2 
E ý(xt x) 
2 
=2 EL i -s., ý" i( -p) +x 1x+M 
a' 
Expanding and taking expectations of each term 
(3.6) 
EZ (X x) 
2= 
MV(o() +2 (yi+y2)v((3) +2G (xi X) 
2 
+ M(yl+y2)v(a, p) + M6' 2 (3.7) 
where 
W) = Ecu=aua 
V(A) = E(P-ý)2 
(3.8) 
The optimal policy in the single period model minimises 
this expression, Having written the objective function in 
terms of parameter estimates, variances, and instruments, 
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it is straightforward to describe optimal policy as a 
function of beliefs about the structural parameters of 
the economy. This description is summarised in the 
following propositions. 
Proposition 1 
The introduction of policy variation is never desirable 
in the single period model, so the optimum always has 
Yl = y2 
Proposition 1 is obvious from the concavity of the 
objective function. A proof by contradiction might 
proceed as follows: assume that yl j4 y2 is optimal. 
Concavity implies that the payoff from the average of the 
y's is greater than the average of the payoffs from each 
y. Therefore setting both y's equal to (yl+y2)/2 would be 
preferred to the original assumption. Thus yl y2 cannot 
be optimal. 
Proposition 2 
The optimal choice of y is in general 
V(oiýý3) + (o( X)(3 
yl y2 
v(p) + ßg2 
Proof 
Using proposition 1 (3.7) may be written 
(Xt x) 2= Mv(°() + Myiv(j3) + M(c(+Pyl 
c) 2 
+2Mylv(o(r(3) + Ma-2 (3.9) 
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The first order condition for a minimum is 
- aE Z(xt-x)2 = 2My1v((3) + 2M(o(+(ßy1-i)(3 + 2Mv(o(, (3) =0 
äy1 
(3.10) 
which is satisfied by the formula in the proposition. The 
second order condition is satisfied since 
2 
ýy2 EZ(xt 
x)2 = 2Mv(ß) + 2Mp2 >0 (3.11) 
1 
Notice that the optimal choice of y does not depend 
on either cr-2 or v(j). Theil's (1957) certainty 
equivalence theorem applies to these sources of 
uncertainty. In the linear quadratic model changing y 
does not affect these types of additive uncertainty, 
therefore they are irrelevant to the decision. However, 
it is possible to exploit the covariance between a 
and /S . This argument may be made clear by considering 
the choice of y whose outcome would be least uncertain. 
proposition 2a 
The safe port for y is 
V(o, ) 
y1 = y2 = 
v(p13) 
The proof simply sets x=x in (3.7) and proceeds as 
for proposition 2. And given zero covariance, proposition 
2b is obvious. 
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Proposition 2b 
With zero covariance the safe port is 
yl = y2 =0 
This is a special case of proposition 2a. The safe 
port is solely concerned with reducing the variance of x, 
and does not attempt to control its mean. Therefore, with 
no covariance, uncertair_y about f3 is completely avoided 
by setting y=0. However, when there is non-zero 
covariance, as in proposition 2a, it is possible to 
offset some of the uncertainty which relates to the 
imperfect estimate of (3 . Consider an example where it is 
known that rý's higher that expected are associated 
with A's higher than expected (there-is positive 
covariance). If y were set to zero, uncertainty about the 
target variable would depend on the variance of the error 
term, and the variance of the estimate (having assumed 
that the estiamte of the intercept is independent of the 
errors). Given positive covariance the choice of a small 
negative value for y would add an amount to x when c/ 
turned out to be lower than expected, and subtract an 
amount wheno( was higher. This would reduce the variance 
of the target compared with the choice of y=0. 
proposition 2a gives the optimal value for y to exploit 
the covariance. 
More generally, the government would have 
preferences about the mean of x as well as its variance. 
The model used in chapter 1 section 1.4 assumes in 
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addition that the intercept is known to be zero, and thus 
there is no covariance. This special case forms the basis 
for section 3.4, and the optimal choice of y in the 
single period model may be derived by making the 
appropriate restrictions to proposition 2. 
Proposition 2c 
With no intercept and no covariance the optimal choice of 
y is 
A- 
xß 
yl y2 
v(13)+ ß2 
This formula is familiar from chapter one. With v(P) 
= 0, the government aims at the centre of the target, and 
as v(/3) increases they aim lower. 
V 
V 
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3.4 THE DYNAMIC PROBLEM 
With the restricti. _n that the intercept of the 
structual equation is zero, the model set out in: the 
previous section is very similar to that used in chapter 
one section 1.4. The difference is that in period one the 
policy-maker now chooses the two values for the 
instrument rather than the duration of the period before 
reform. This makes no difference to the single period 
problem faced in the final period because the 
government's best policy is to set the variance of the 
instrument to zero. Therefore the choice of y in the 
final peiod, and hence the maximised value of the 
objective function is identical in this model to that of 
section 1.4. 
Maintaining the notation defined in chapter one, the 
minimised value of final-period losses is given by 
chapter one's equation (1.35). The objective in period 
one is therefore to minimise 
N+M 
^2A2 v( 
ß2) 2 J= E1 2- (xt-x) + (T-N-M) [x E1 2+ c- ] t=N+1 v(/ý 2) +ý 2 
(3.12). 
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Substituting, expanding, and taking expectation through 
the first term, 
J= M[v(pl) (yi+y2)/2 + x2 + a-2 - 
xPl(y1+y2) ] 
+(T-N-M) [x2E 
V( 
1 
2) 
_2 
+ a'2] (3.13) 
v (P2) +ý52 
The first order conditions for optimality of yl, and 
Y2 are 
aJ 
A n2 v(h2) = M[v( p1)yi - xpl] + (T-N-M)x E-- 2=0 
DYi dYi v(p2)+ý2 
for i=1,2 (3.14) 
Interpretation-of these conditions obviously depends on 
the expectation of the derivative of v(P2)/[v(f32)+ý2]. If 
the expected value of the derivative is zero, then all 
that remains of the first order condition is those terms 
relating to current benefits, and the period one decision 
would be made taking no account of the future. Thus the 
formula in proposition 2c (the single period problem with 
no intercept) would provide a complete description of the 
solution. It is fairly obvious that this is the case when 
some of the parameters take limiting values. For example, 
if s2-ß oO or a-2--* 0, the model is one of perfect 
information. In this case, the derivative is clearly 
zero, and the optimal choice 's y1 = y2 = 
xP 
l 
2 Similarly, as a- a oo, any learning is impossible so the 
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safe port yl = y2 =0 is optimal. And finally, as M 
becomes large consideration of the final period becomes 
less important so the period one policy simply chooses yl 
Y2 = Pax/[v(p1)+Ail. These results are summarised in 
table 3.2. 
As noted in chapter 1 section 1.4, the expectation 
2 
of v(P2)/[v(ý2)+ ý2] is difficult to evaluate because of 
the random variable in the denominator. The problem is 
compounded in the first order condition because 
differentiation raises the power of the denominator. 
Therefore, numerical techniques are used to describe the 
solution to the model in a series of examples. The 
formulae used in the simulations are based on the least 
squares estimates described in chapter 1. From (1.21) and 
(1.25) 
Lr 
2 
v(J31) =2 (3.15) 
S2 
6'2 
v((2) 2M22 (3.16) 
S+2 (y1+Y2) 
r 
Table 3.2 
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Active Learning Model: Results in Limiting Cases 
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ý1 is set exogenously, and the formula for P2 is derived 
from (1.24) as follows. Fixing yi at yl and y2 for half 
of the sub-periods each 
M22 N+M/ 2 N+M 
- (y1+y2)v + YlZ Ei + Y2 L 'F- i 
_2 i=N+1 i=N+M/ 
2+1 P2 r P1+ 
2M22 
s+- (yl+y2) 
2 
(3.17) 
The random variables are normalised by letting 
v= 6f/s (3.18) 
N+M/ 2 
,Z 
£i = 6'1Mg/J2 (3.19) 
i=N+1 
N+M 
F= a-IMj/12 (3.20) 
i=N+M/2+1 1 
where f, g, and j are standard normal random variables. 
Now letting h be another standard normal random variable, 
and using af+bg = J(a2+b2)h, 
MQ2(y2+y2) 
+ ( 12h (3.21) 12 /11 
2s 2C52+ M (y2+y2)] 212 
These equations mean that the objective function may now 
be written in terms of exogenous parameters, choice 
variables, and a single random variable. These are listed 
in table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 
Notation 
parameters choice variables random variable 
T yl h 
N 
M 
d2 
s2 
A 
x 
Y2 
100. 
The first'question to be addressed is whether the 
government would ever introduce policy variation in 
period one: ie would yl # y2 ever be optimal. The first 
term in the objective function (3.13) is quadratic. Its 
convexity would tend to favour no policy variation. If 
the second term were convex also, the objective function 
as a whole would be convex and yl = y2 would be optimal. 
Ideally, it would be desirable to examine the convexity 
of v(P2)/(v((ý2)+ý2] with respect to yl and y2 for all 
combinations of yl and y2. However, to reduce the scale 
of the problem, attention is restricted to loci where yl 
= y2. This provides the following information: 
if v(ß2)/[v(f2)+p2' is convex at yl = y2 then yl 
= y2 will be (at least) a local minimum. 
fý2 Figures 3.2a to 3.2c display plots of V(P2) I iv(P2)+ 
against y and show that 
but becomes concave for 
small. In these concave 
cannot be judged withou 
objective function. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 
the function is usually convex 
some parameter values when y is 
cases, the desirabiity of yl = y2 
t examining the whole of the 
examine two cases in more detail, 
and provide estimates of the second derivatives of 
v(f2)/(v(ß2)+ i2] and the objective function. The accuracy 
of these estimates, based on 40 drawings of random 
numbers, may be assessed with the aid of t statistics 
which are the ratio of the estimate to its computed 
standard error. The use of antithetics (pairing the 
results-of iterations based on h and its antithetic -h) 
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was extremely useful in reducing the standard errors. 
Table 3.4 shows that when s2 = cr 
2=1 the second 
derivative of v(132)/[v((2)+j1 is negative and 
significant up to y=0.6 (excluding y= 0). After this 
point its second derivative changes sign, and the 
estimate is significant for values of y greater than 1.2. 
The objective function may also have a negative second 
derivative for small values of y. In this example d2J/'y2 
is negative and significant when y=0.2 or 0.4. This 
seems to occur when y is a long way away from the optimum 
and consequently the quadratic section of the objective 
function is very steep and has little curvature. On the 
basis of this evidence it seems unlikely that yl -4 y2 
could be a desirable policy. 
The first'and second derivatives of the objective 
function were programmed, and solutions for yl, and y2 
were obtained by Newton-Raphson (the estimates of the 
solution are updated at each iteration by subtracting the 
product of the vector of first derivatives with the 
inverse of the matrix of se`, nd derivatives). At each 
iteration the expected values of the derivatives were 
obtained by averaging over the derivatives based on 40 
drawings from a standard normal distribution (20 being 
antithetics). The-algorithem converged rapidly, in no 
more than twelve iterations, and was halted when the 
squared update for each y was less than 10-4. Despite 
considerable experimentation with starting values and 
parameterisations of the model, I was unable to produce 
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Table 3.4 
Active Learning: Concavity of the objective 
1 23 4 
0 . 50 33.09 . 29 (1.27) (. 88) 
.2 . 49 -17.41 -. 34 (-2.34) (-3.68) 
.4 . 47 -23.60 -. 42 (-3.12) (-4.44) 
.6 . 40 2.47 -. 09 (1.15) (-3.50) 
.8 . 33 10.21 0 
(6.45) (0.13) 
1.0 . 28 11.49 . 01 (10.79) (1.40) 
1.2 . 24 11.44 . 02 (16.92) (2.12) 
1.4 . 21 11.18 . 01 (26.09) (2.76) 
1.6 . 19 10.95 . 01 (39.83) (3.45) 
1.8 . 17 10.76 . 01 (60.09) (4.26) 
Parameters: s2 = 0'2 = 1, T= 30, N= M=5, x=2 
col 1 Y1 = Y2 
2 E1v(A2)/(v(P2)+ßt2) 
3 E1a2J/öy2, (t values in brackets) 
4 E1,2(v(P2)/(v( ýS2)+T2))/ay2, (t values 
in brackets) 
104. ii 
Table 3.5 
Active Learning: Concavity of the objective 
1 23 4 
0 . 67 -16.19 -. 39 (-. 55) (-1.03) 
.2 . 61 -122.57 -1.72 (-5.55) (-6.23) 
.4 . 45 9.41 -. 07 (1.42) (-. 92) 
.6 . 33 20.93 . 07 (8.00) (2.27) 
.8 . 26 19.76 . 06 (17.30) (4.17) 
1.0 . 21 18.23 . 04 (30.66) (5.43) 
1.2 . 18 17.18 . 03 (47.66) (6.04) 
1.4 . 15 16.49 . 02 (66.71) (6.04) 
1.6 . 13 16.05 . 01 (87.91) (5.75) 
1.8 . 12 15.75 . 01 (112.29) (5.36) 
Parameters: s2 = . 5,4'2 = 1, T= 30, N=M=5, 
x=2 
col 1 71 = 72 
2 Elv( 2)/(v(f32)+(i2) 
3 Ela2J/ay2, (t values in brackets) 
4 Eld2(v(h)/(v(92)+(ý2))/dy2, (t values 
in brackets) 
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an example where the solution was yl A Y2, 
The results, consisting of a single optimal value 
for y, are presented for ditferent parameterisations of 
the model in tables 3.6 to 3.9. 
Table 3.6 experiments with different combinations of 
s2 and 62. Reducing a-2 decreases the uncertainty in the 
model, and reducing s2 decreases the accuracy of the 
prior data set. The figures in the table have a general 
tendency to fall with a-2 and increase with S2. This 
would tend to support the findings of the single-period 
model that the decision-maker aims lower in riskier 
situations. However, this conclusion need not always be 
valid. There are regions where y increases with r2 (at S2 
= 2.5, y increases with when a-2 increases from 0.9 to 
1.3), or falls' with s2 (at c21.3, y falls when s2 
increases from 2.5 to 2.9). Table 3.7 takes a closer look 
at such a region. 
Table 3.8 examines combinations of T and a'2. When 
T= 10, there is no final r zriod, and the optimal values 
for y are simply x(31/[v(/31)+ßi]. For a given a-2, 
increasing T increases y. This may be explained as 
follows: T only appears in the last term of the first 
order condition (3.14). As long as final-period losses 
are reduced as y increases, a higher y would be chosen 
than in the single period problem. Increasing T simply 
scales up this effect by increasing the importance of the 
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Table 3.6 
Activ e Lea rning: Optimal vz.. Lue s of y 
45 
.1 .5 .9 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.9 3.3 
.1 1.30 
1.85 1.88 1.92 1.94 1.96 1.97 1.98 1.98 
.5 0.69 
1.44 1.88 1.84 1.79 1.96 1.98 1.98 1.98 
.9 0.52 
1.07 1.49 1.83 2.02 1.97 1.74 1.72 1.85 
1.3 0.45 1.02 1.22 1.53 1.79 1.97 2.06 1.98 1.75 
1.7 0.40 0.96 1.11 1.31 1.55 1.77 1.93 2.03 2.06 
6 
2 0.38 0.91 1.07 1.21 1.41 
3 0.32 0.77 0.99 1.09 1.19 
4 0.29 0.69 0.91 1.03 1.11 
5 0.27 0.63 0.83 0.97 1.06 
6 0.25 0.58 0.78 0.91 1.01 
A 
Parameters: x= X31 = 1, T= 30, N=M=5 
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Table 3.7 
Active Learning: Optimal values of y 
S2 
2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 
.9 1.81 1.74 1.74 1. ¬3 1.68 
1 1.97 1.91 1.83 1.76 1.71 
2 1.1 2.05 2.02 1.98 1.92 1.85 
1.2 2.05 2.06 2.06 2.02 1.98 
1.3 2.03 2.05 2.06 2.06 2.05 
A 
Parameters x= ßi = 1, T= 30, N=M=5 
s 
Table 3.8 
Active Learning: Optimal values of y 
T 
10 15 35 55 75 95 
1.82 1.83 1.89 1.95 1.99 2.04 
.5 1.33 
1.52 1.96 2.21 2.40 2.55 
62 .9 1.05 
1.22 1.60 1.84 2.03 2.18 
1.3 0.87 1.00 1.29 1.50 1.68 1.84 
1.7 0.74 0.87 1.15 1.32 1.46 1.57 
Paramete rs: 71 = s2 = 1, N= M=5 
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final period. This intuition is confirmed by noting from 
(3.14) that 
a V((2) dy 
<0->0 
ay v(132)+72 2 dT 
by the implicit function theorem. Table 3.8 also 
indicates some more situat::, ns where the optimal value of 
y increases with a'2. This happens when 62 is quite small 
and T large. 
Table 3.9 runs the model for different combinations 
of M and x. When M= T-N, the model collapses to a single 
period so the final column is simply lx(l+v(p 1)]. In 
these examples, the optimal value of y always decreases 
with M and increases with 
x. 
The reason for the latter 
finding is obvious from the first order condition (3.14). 
A 
If the derivative in the final term is negative, x always 
has a negative effect on the first order condition. 
However, the effect of M is more complicated since it 
affects both t2 and V(A2)- 
Several extensions to the model are considered in 
chapter four. First, the addition of an intercept to the 
structural equation might be expected to have a 
considerable effect on the -isults, and might alone 
produce examples where policy variation is desirable. 
Second, modelling the instruments as random variables 
whose distributions the government controls extends the 
model to situations where the government controls the 
instruments only with some error. Third, in multi-period 
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Table 3.9 
Active learning: Optimal values of y 
A 
x 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
2 
2.10 
2.92 
3.67 
4.37 
5.04 
4 
1.63 
2.28 
2.89 
3.47 
4.05 
M 
68 
1.42 1.30 
2.01 1.86 
2.57 2.39 
3.11 2.92 
3.66 3.45 
10 25 
1.23 1.00 
1.76 1.50 
2.28 2.00 
2.80 2.50 
3.32 3.00 
Parameters /L =a-2 = s2 = 1, N=5, T= 30 
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models interactions between subsequent periods might have 
a significant influence on current decisions. 
105. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
f 
The active learning strategy described in the preceeding models 
may be related to the underlying motivation of the tax reform liter- 
ature. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Chapter 12, Ahmad and Stern 
'(1984), and Deaton (forthcoming) discuss the idea that policy recommendations 
may be made on the basis of directions for marginal improvement rather 
than global optimisation. This approach is desirable in that it is 
information ally much less demanding, and the recommendations are likely 
to be more robust with respect to parameter uncertainty, and to the value 
judgements, of the underlying social welfare function. However, some 
regard tax reform as essentially a strategy of passive learning. 
Deaton (forthcoming) expresses this view quite explicitly: inadequacies of 
the data mean that local approximations of parameters are all that can be 
obtained. Global optimisation under these' circumstances is little more 
than a leap in the dark. Therefore the limitations of the data provide 
a strong justification for an incrementalist approach to policy changes: 
marginal reforms are made on the basis of local approximations, and then 
% 
as information becomes available about the new locality further reforms 
can be proposed. This is clearly a passive learning strategy, new 
information is taken into account but the choice of instruments is indepen- 
dent of their expected effect on future knowledge. The contrasting view, 
suggested by the analysis in this chapter, is that active learning tax 
reform strategies, and destabilisation, may be desirable in order to 
generate more useful data, and hence better informed decisions in the 
future. Since "nature may not have been kind enough to perform the crucial 
experiments on our behalf" (Deaton, forthcoming), it may be necessary to 
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take matters into our- own hands. 
The properties of the optimal reform strategies 
derived in this chapter may be summarised as follows: 
in simulations policy variation was found to be 
undesirable for the two-period quadratic model. 
However, learning effects usually increased the level 
of the instrument above its single period counterpart. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES AND ACTIVE LEARNING DECISION RULES 
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CHAPTER FOUR : Summary 
Monte Carlo simulations are used to examine the dynamic inter- 
actions between OLS parameter estimates and policy rules. The 
relative performance, according to a quadratic valuation function, 
of five decision rules is examined. Each rule yields a different 
time path for the instrument and as a result provides a different 
data set upon which subsequent estimates are based. 
Anderson and Taylor (1976a) is used as a benchmark. They find 
no evidence to suggest that OLS under a certainty equivalent policy 
rule produces consistent parameter estimates. Active learning 
rules which randomise in the early stage of the simulation, perform 
better than the certainty equivalent rule because they succeed in 
making faster initial reductions in parameter variances. However, 
the optimal active learning rule gives up randomisation before the 
parameters are perfectly identified and is thus less likely than 
the certainty equivalent rule to attain consistent estimates. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
When the decision-maker is simultaneously learning and making 
decisions, dynamic issues arise which cannot be incorporated in a 
simple two (or three) period model. The active learning strategies 
examined in Chapter Three have quite complicated dynamic interactions 
with the methods of estimation, or learning, in multi-period models. 
In order to examine the consequences of these interactions, this 
chapter compares the performance of several different decision rules 
by means of numerical simulation. 
Issues of choice under uncertainty and learning are central themes 
in the'control theory literature. Theil (1957), and Simon (1956) are 
frequently cited as examinations of the simplest case, certaintly equiv- 
alence, where uncertainty and hence learning have no effect on the 
optimal decision. However, when uncertainty relates to the parameters 
of an economic model, the certainty equivalence theorem no longer applies, 
although in a wide range of circumstances it may form the basis of an 
adequate approximation. Taylor '(1974) finds that both a certainty 
equivalent rule, and a variant which includes prior information, converge 
to the optimal rule with probability one. in general, it would be pref- 
erable to allow the decision rule to take account of uncertainty. 
Prescott(1971) for example, describes an "adaptive" decision rule-(here- 
after referred to as risk averse) which "would be optimal at time t if 
experimentation were not a relevant consideration" (p. 369). In short, in 
simulations Prescott finds that this decision rule is preferred to, a 
linear (or certainty equivalent) rule, the latter performing adequately 
only when uncertainty is very slight. Chow (1973) provides, an analytic 
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solution to the optimal feedback control problem under quadratic 
welfare costs, when the parameters of the econometric model employed 
are uncertain. A particular case of these risk averse rules was derived 
in Chapter Three by allowing the variances to approach infinity. Then 
the policy-maker employs a rule to minimise the variance of the outcome. 
Both Chow- (1973), -and Prescott(1971) refer to the more general 
problem of simultaneous learning and decision. However, -analytic 
solutions to this class of problems have not been forthcoming, and 
instead most of the literature has concentrated on providing solution 
algorithms, such as Chow (1975), MacRae (1975), and Norman (1981)'s 
modification to the Chow algorithm. These are reviewed in Kendrick 
(1981b), and some are detailed in Kendrick (1981a). Tse (1975) 
illustrates his adaptive dual control algorithm with simulations on a 
third order time invariant linear model with six unknown parameters. 
The performance of the algorithm is compared'with a certainty equivalent 
rule, and the optimal control based on perfect information. Bar-Shalom 
and Tse (1976) undertake a similar comparative study of different 
decision rules including a closed-loop rule. But both of these studies 
are restricted to quite short'-. time horizons (20 periods) and are there- 
fore not informative about the asymptotic properties of the control and 
the parameter estimates. An alternative approach is taken by Prescott 
(1972). Instead of using an algorithm, he suggests a first order 
moving horizon method as an approximationto the general dynamic 
programming solution. This method requires at each time period the 
solution to a two-period dynamic programming problem which is computat- 
ionally much easier than the n-period ahead problem. In simulations 
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over 6 periods on a linear model with a single unknown parameter 
Prescott finds that this approximation works better than a myopic 
(risk averse) rule which in turn is preferred to a certainty equiv- 
alent rule. 
However, this literature provides little insight into the dynamic 
interactions between learning and decisions. Anderson and Taylor 
(1976a) explicitly address the question of how the decision rule affects 
parameter estimates, however, their paper only examines the certainty 
equivalent rule. They find that under this rule, the evidence does 
not suggest that least squares estimates are consistent according to 
the convergence criterion set out in Anderson and Taylor (1976b). 
The simulations presented in this chapter are an extension to Anderson 
and Taylor (1976a). Certainty equivalent (CE), risk averse (RA), 
variance minimising (VM), and active learning (AL) decision rules 
are run in a version of their model. The least squares assumption is 
maintained throughout this chapter. 
Some attention has been directed at alternative estimation tech- 
niques. Westlund and Stenlu. nd (1982), for example, compare the relative 
merits of different estimators. In their simulations, based on a model 
where some regressors are exogenous, and others are instruments, there 
are situations where an estimator which minimises the sum of absolute 
deviations, rather than the sum of squares, improves the performance 
of the certainty equivalent decision rule. This happens because such 
an estimator places less weight on outliers. in general it would be 
desirable to allow a more sophisticated estimation technique capable of 
incorporating information about the process generating the right-hand side 
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variables. However,, the least squares assumption makes the problem tract- 
able, and its simplicity may be useful to clarify the issues. Consider tl'` 
example of a univariate regression model with a constant term. The 
true model illustrated in Figure 4.1 is assumed to be simply a 45° 
line through the origin. it is quite possible that the first two 
observations, which also depend on the random errors, suggest quite 
different parameter values. If dl, and d2, are the first two data 
points, OLS would fit a line, with slope minus one, through the origin. 
If, in addition, the policy-maker wants to achieve a target value 
of zero for x, he sets y equal to zero. Then subsequent obser- 4'' 
vations would be distributed along the x-axis, and there may be no reason 
for the policy maker to change his initial mistaken belief that the slope 
of the line is negative rather than positive. Therefore, the inter- 
actions between the policy-maker's objectives, and the estimation technique!, 
employed, constrain the ability to learn the true parameters of the 
economy. 
In the case of least squares estimation, consistercy requires some 
variation in y. A necessary condition for consistency (according to 
Theil, 1971) is that the variance of the parameter estimates tends to 
zero. Once variation in y has been suppressed, this condition cannot 
be fulfilled. The proof is obvious from Chapter Three, equation (3.30): 
var yl is set to zero, then &3 M tends to infinity, var ß tends to 
a non-zero quantity. 
Inconsistency does not necessarily mean that there is something wrong 
with the decision rule. However, it raises the question of the relative 
performance of such a rule against others which give rise to better 
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Dn of subsequent 
3 given y=0 
Y" 
+ ßy 
FIGURE 4.1 : The decision based on initial data points leads 
to false beliefs about the slope. 
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parameter estimates. The issues addressed by this chapter may be 
divided into three categories: 
i) the performance of active learning decision rules relative 
to other strategies 
ii) the time path of decisions under different rules, given that 
they yield different data sets 
iii) the statistical properties of parameter estimates under different 
decision rules. 
Section 4.2 describes the model and specifies the decision rules; 
Section 4.3 discusses the choice of simulation technique; the results 
are presented in Section 4.4 and section 4.5 add3 seins concltc inn remarks. 
4.2 THE MODEL 
The simulations are based on the univariate linear regression model 
xt =a-+ßyt+et (4.1) 
where x is interpreted as the target variable, and y as the instrument. 
The parameters are estimated by OLS. For the simulations this is easily 
done by updating the estimate of the last iteration accorcair g to the 
recursive rules (see Brown et al 1975) 
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a 
Ot + (Y'Y)tl (fit - at-1 - ßt-1 Yt) (4.2) 
t LJß t-1 Lt 
where 
1 
(Y'Y)tl1 Llýyj (Y'Y)tll 
(Ycy)l = (Y'Y 
y 
l-t tt1 
(4.2') 
1+ [1, yt) (YtY);: 1 
yt 
similarly, the covariance matrix for the parameter estimates is 
Evar a cov (a, ß) 
rl 
SSRt 
Coy Ot (YY)t 
t-2 (4.3) 
Lcova, 
Bvar 
where = SSRt1 - t-1 - t-lyt) 
21 (1+ l, y](Y' Y)ll 
[11 
These rules give the current estimate as a function of the previous 
estimate, and the new information. 
To start the process it is necessary to supply two values for 
y. The prior estimates of the parameters are then obtained by inverting 
the resulting two by two matrix. The pair of x's which result from 
the initial values of y depend on the values which the random error 
term take. e is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance of one. 
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Three parameterisations of the model are examined. They all 
share some common elements: the discount rate,, is 2.5%, the starting 
value for the sum of squared residuals is 1, and the true model has 
a 
a=0, and 0=1. The remaining parameters, y1, y2 and x are 
set out, -in 
Table 4.1, and the starting values for the covariance matrix 
are derived from the other assumptions (by inversion of the(Y'Y) matrix). 
in model 1, the starting values for y are very close together and 
therefore the prior estimates of the parameters are ill-defined. By 
contrast, model 2 starts with more accurate priors. Model 3 is the 
same as model 2 but the policy makers target is set to zero; this is 
Anderson and Taylor's model III, and as will become apparent, the choice 
a 
of x is not a question of normalisation but significantly affects the 
results. 
The valuation function is quadratic in deviations from the target 
x, and is discounted by a factor 6 over time 
T 
U=-E öt (xt x) 
2 (4.4) 
t=1 
Clearly, the optimal decision at any point in time maximises this 
valuation function, conditional on current parameter estimates. This 
optimal decision will evolve over time in response to improvements in 
information, and random errors. As approximations to this optimal 
decision path, five simple decision rules are examined. 
i) Certainty Equivalent (CE). Anderson and Taylor (1976a) 
discuss this rule, where the policy-maker aims at the target treating 
11 C-. 
TABLE 4.1 
PARAMETERISATIONS OF THE MODEL 
yl y2 x var (a) var (ß) cov (a, ß) 
M1 1.01 0.9 2 223 249 -236 
M2 0 1.0 2 1 2 -1 
M3 0 1.0 0 1 2 -1 
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the current parameter estimates as if they were known with certainty 
X at 
Y (CE) t 
ßt 
I 
(4.5) 
This formula may be derived by setting (4.4) to zero, and using the 
expectation of (4.1). 
ii) Risk Averse (RA). A generalisation of the certainty equivalent 
rule is to allow the policy-maker to take account of uncertainty. This 
rule maximises the expected value of the valuation function at time t, 
and the following formula is obtained by differentiation of (4.4) 
(RA) 
,t=- 
cov (a, ß) t- 
(x-ät) ßt 
y 
_2 var ßt + ßt 
Note that this is a passive learning strategy. 
(4.6) 
Although it takes account 
of changes in variances from period to period, it ignores the expected 
influence of current decisions on future data. 
iii) A particular case of the risk averse rule was examined in Chapter 
Three. This arises when the variances become very large. This Variance 
Minimising (VM) rule minimises the variance of x regardless of the 
expected deviations from the target. 
cov(a. ß)t 
y(vM)t =- var t 
(4.7) 
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This formula may be derived by minimising the variance of x, as 
defined in (4.1). 
iv) Active Learning (AL). This strategy allows the policy maker to 
randomise in order to increase the data variations, and hence the 
accuracy of parameter estimates in the future 
A 
coy (a, 'ß) t (x-ät) ßt 
y (AL) t=-2+ elvar at+42 varßt +43cov (a, ß)J (4.8) 
var ßt+ßt 
The degree of randomisation is conditional on the elements of the current 
covariance matrix, so that more parameter variance means more randomis- 
ation. e is assumed normal with mean zero and unit variance. Clearly, 
this is a generalisation of the risk averse decision rule, which has 
assigned all of the weights cß to zero. 
The following procedure was used to select the weights for the active 
learning decision rule. ý3 was set to zero a priori. ý1, and ý2 
were optimised by grid search, using short runs (20 periods, and 5 replic- 
ations) of model 1. The outcome was 
q=0.001 
ý2 0.01 
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After 20 periods, the discount factor has fallen to about 0.6, there- 
fore subsequent periods have relatively litt1ý effect on the value of 
the objective function, though they provide useful information about 
the paths of the instruments and the parameter estimates in the long 
run. 
v) Quadratic Active Learning, (QAL). A generalisation of the active 
learning strategy discussed above includes terms in squared variances, 
and an intercept. 
cov (a, a )j- (x - at) ßt 
y (QAL) t=- 
(4.9) 
var ßt + ßt 
+ max 
{oe 141+u2 (ýlvarat+42varßt) + u3(01varat+¢2varßt) 
2j I 
Maintaining ýl and ý2 at their values determined for AL, 111' 112 
and 113 were chosen '(by grid search) to maximise expected welfare on 
the basis of short runs of model 1. This yields 
uý _ -0.01 
u2 = -1.1 
-0.01 u3 = 
Clearly some inaccuracy is involved in the choice of weights for 
AL, and QAL, since they were optimised on a restricted model where the 
particular drawing of random numbers may have a significant effect on 
the results. Also, optimisation was over a restricted class of weights, 
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43 was set to zero a priori, and and 2 were fixed across both 
QAL and AL. These restrictions were necessary to reduce the computer 
time involved in the grid search. 
To. protect the computer program against exceptional drawings of 
random numbers, for all decision rules the value of the instrument is 
restricted to the interval [x - 10, x+ 10]. This restriction binds 
very infrequently. Anderson and Taylor (1976a) found that it had to 
be invoked about-six times per run. With the decision rules examined 
in this chapter, it is irrelevant for RA, and binds most frequently for 
QAI,. In total (across all decision rules) it is invoked about twenty 
times per run. 
4.3 SIMULATION TECHNIQUE 
Despite the capabilities of modern computers, it is nevertheless 
incumbent upon the researcher to show that good use has been made of 
computer time. The program was developed in Basic on an Olivetti 
micro-computer. The results were checked against Anderson and Taylor's 
model III. Then the program was transferred to Fortran 77 on the 
University of Warwick IBM mainframe. Besides this programming strategy, 
some effort was devoted to selecting the best simulation technique. 
The choice among alternative simulation methods may have a large 
influence on the precison of the results. The performance of a given 
decision rule will depend on the realised values of the random numbers. 
It is possible to envisage sets of random numbers under which some rules 
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perform well, and others badly. For example, rule I may generally 
perform better than rule II, but it is still possible that an unlucky 
1/ 
draw of random numbers may yield a higher payoff for TI thaii for I for 
a number of runs. Therefore, comparisons between decision rules are 
accompanied by a measure of precision, namely the standard error. 
Clearly, one way of increasing precision is to replicate the simulation 
a number of times, using fresh random numbers. Two other methods which 
are commonly used, and easy to implement, are common random numbers 
and antithetics. 
In principle, it is possible to combine these methods to maximise 
the precision of a particular comparison, for a given amount of computer 
time. Although the procedure is clearly laid out in Kleijnen (1974), 
such optimisation was not undertaken because the simulation model is 
small enough that there was no binding computer-time constraint. For 
comparability with Anderson and Taylor (1976ä), the number of replic- 
ations was fixed at 100, however, this leaves open the choice between 
common random numbers, antithetics or a combination of the two. 
Consider the joint application of common random numbers and anti- 
thetics. 
1/ Payoff is defined as the realised value of the objective function. 
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R1 } U1(I), U1 (II) 
R1 -ý U2 (I) , U2 (II) 
R2 -ý U(I), 3 (II) 
-R2 -> U4(I), U4 (I I) 
The first set of random numbers is used to calculate the payoffs, 
denoted U, under decision rules I and II. Then, at the second replic- 
ation, the same random numbers, multiplied by minus one are used. The 
process is repeated with fresh random numbers for replications 3, and 
4, and so on. The statistics of interest are the average difference 
between the payoffs, and the variance of that difference. Common 
random numbers reduces variance by introducing positive covariance between 
Ui(I) and Ui(II). Antithetics reduces variance by introducing negative 
covariance between Ui(I)' and Ui+1(I), and between U1(II) and 
Ui+1(II) However, the joint application of both methods may be counter- 
productive since there may be overriding negative covariances between 
vi (I) and Ui+i(II). In order to choose the most appropriate method of 
estimating the difference between the two payoffs, it is only necessary 
to perform one pilot run using both common random numbers and antithetics, 
since this provides estimates of all of the relevant covariances. 
However, the choice is still not completely clearcut because the 
objective of this study is to make comparisons between more than two 
decision rules in several models. After performing three pilot runs 
(detailed in Appendix 4.1), the following facts emerged: in comparisons 
between Al and CE, joint application is preferred in model 1, and anti- 
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thetics in model 2. However, in each of these cases, the use of common 
random numbers alone produces standard errors which are no higher than 
15% above the best alternative. But comparisons between AL and RA are 
much more accurate if common random numbers are used. in model 2, each 
of the other alternatives would produce standard errors more than 312 
times larger than the common random numbers method. This is presumably 
because the formulae for AL and RA contain some common terms, therefore 
covariance between them would be expected to be the over-riding consid- 
eration. 
The choice of simulation technique is, therefore, necessarily a com- 
promise. Common random numbers alone was used throughout because this 
method was in most cases expected to do not much worse than the best method, 
but in some cases considerably better than the next best. 
4.4 RESULTS 
The results may be divided into two categories. Firstly, the perfor- 
mance of the decision rules, and the time paths of the instrument are 
summarised in Tables 4.2-4.5. Secondly, the consequences of a given 
decision rule for the parameter estimates are outlined in Tables 4.6- 
4.8. Before proceeding to a discussion of these tables, it is 
possible to dispose of the variance minimising rule quite briefly. 
4.4.1. The Variance Minimising Decision Rule 
No results are presented for the variance minimising decision rule. 
The numerical simulations revealed that this rule has the unusual property 
that the time path of the instrument is determined entirely by the choice 
of starting values for y, and is fixed. Thus, its payoff, according to 
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the objective function is only a coincidence: had other starting values 
been chosen the payoff would"be much better or worse. The reason for 
the constancy of y under this rule may be explained by reference to 
the recursive OLS equations. (4.3) shows that each element in the 
covariance matric is updated by multiplication of (Y'Y) by the 
same scalar, therefore the decision rule, -cov(a, ß)/var(ß) is indep- 
endent of that scalar. Then it only remains to show from (4.2') that 
the updating of (Y'Y)-1 does not affect the relative magnitudes of the 
off-diagonal and lower right elements. 
Y(1) Y(2) 
Let (Y'Y)tl = (4.10) 
Y(3) Y(4) 
t-1 
Then the variance minimising decision rule is 
y=- LY (2 t Y(4) t-1 4.11) 
substituting into (4.2') yields 
(1) Y(2) 1 1Y(1) Y(2) 
(YIY) 
11_ 
_ 
Y(2) /f 
Y(3) Y(4) L-j Y(4) Y(4) Y(3) Y(4) t 
_22O 
= (Y'Y)tl - C1) - 
Y(4) ] /ft 
O 
O 
where 
g=1t+ Li, ytý (Y'Y)tll F'lxt 
(4.12) 
(Note that this requires symmetry, Y(2) = Y(3)). 
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Therefore, only the first element of (YY) changes and the value 
of yt remains constant over time. This result obviously generalises 
to the case of a vector of instruments, provided that the required 
inverse exists. Then 1(1), Y(2), Y(3) and Y(4) are interpreted 
as partitions of the (Y'Y)-l matrix rather than scalars. 
4.4.2 The instrument 
Table 4.2 shows the value of the objective function obtained by 
each of the remaining decision rules in each model. Results for QAL 
are presented for model 1 only. In all three models the active learning 
rule gives higher payoffs than either the risk averse or certainty equiv- 
alent rules. Its dominance over CE is not surprising for model 1 
since the choice of weights for AL would rule out the possibility that it 
might produce lower expected benefits. However, the weights were not 
optimised for-model 2, and additional runs of the model (not presented here', ' 
confirm that simultaneously increasing both yl and by by a small factor 
would improve the performance of the rule. That is, if AL were optimised 
I 
for model 2 it would require more randomisation. QAL attains the highest 
payoff in model 1, but the specification of its weights seem to be quite 
sensitive to the particular model since, in additional runs which are not 
reported in the table, it per' . med quite badly in model 2. RA performs 
badly, coming last in both models 1 and 2, however, it attains the second 
highest payoff in model 3. 
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TABLE 4.2 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DECISION RULES 
AL RA CE QAL 
M1 -51.24 -67.55 -56.87 -48.65 
M2 -54.38 -58.55 -56.12 
M3 -40.36 -40.41 -48.01' 
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The statistical significance of these rankings is displayed in 
Table 4.3. The difference between the payoffs of each rule is calculated 
at each replication, and the means and standard errors of these differ- 
ences appear in the table. Those which are significantly different 
from zero, according to at test at the 95% confidence level, are 
indicated with This procedure confirms that for model 1, RA is 
significantly worse than AL, QAL, and CE, and in addition that QAL 
is significantly better than CE. Similarly, for model 2, the domin- 
ance of AL over RA is significant; and for model 3, CE is signif- 
icantly worse than all contenders. 
Part of the explanation of the relative performance of the decision 
rules is the speed with which they get close to the target. Table 4.4 
shows the proportion of the runs for which the outcome was within an 
arbitrary small distance ( 0.166) of the target at time t. The out- 
standing feature of these results is the good performance of the certainty 
equivalent rule. For model 1 it is beaten only once, by AL and QAL 
at time 5; for models 2 and 3 it dominates the other rules. Clearly, 
the merit of the certainty equivalent rule is that it gets quite close 
very quickly. Comparing the active learning rules with RA by this crit- 
erion, the former dominate in models 1 and 2. in model 3 however, both 
have very similar performances. 
Table 4.5 presents the time paths for the instruments'. themselves, 
and their variances across the 100 replications. The distinguishing 
features are as follows. The risk averse rule initially has a very 
small variance. This means that the decisions are only slightly affected 
by the particular drawing of random numbers and results from the importance 
of variances, rather than new observations in the decision rule. The 
TABLE 4.3 
DIFFERENCE IN PERFOP 4MCE 
AL 
M1 AL 0.00 
0.00 
RA 
CE 
QAL 
M2 AL 0.00 
0.00 
RA 
CE 
M3 AL 0.00 
0.00 
PA 
CE 
RA CE QAL 
-16.30* -5.62 2.60 
(1.99) (2.89) (1.88) 
0.00 10.68* 18.90* 
0.00 (2.86) (1.75) 
0.00 8.22* 
0.00 (2.87). 
0.00 
0.00 
-4.17* -1.74 
(1.26) (3.19) 
0.00 2.43 
0.00 (3.43) 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.06 7.65* 
(0.14) (2.31) 
0.00 -7.60* 
0.00 (2.29) 
0.00 
0.00 
Standard errors in brackets 
* indicates significance at the 95% confidence level 
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TABLE 4.4 
ESTIMATES OF THE PROBABILITY THAT THE OUTCOME IS CLOSE TO THE TARGET 
T AL 'RA CE QAL 
M1 5 0.29 0.00 0.12 0.31 
10 0.48 0.00 0.51 0.46 
25 0.69 0.03 0.89 0.72 
50 0.82 0.20 0.97 0.83 
75 0.87 0.24 0.99 0.88 
100 0.93 0.25 1.00 0.91 
M2 5 0.01 0.01 0.49 
10 0.21 0.22 0.72 
25 0.68 0.63 0.94 
50 0.88 0.78 0.98 
75 0.93 0.85 1.00 
100 0.94 0.86 1.00 
M3 5 0.53 0.53 0.60 
10 0.63 0.64 0.80 
25 0.73 0.73 0.98 
50 0.74 0.75 0.99 
75 0.76 0.74 1.00 
100 0.80 0.76 1.00 
Close is defined as (X_y)2 < 0.116 
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TABLE 4.5 
THE TIME PATHS OF TEE INSTRUMENT 
M1 
M2 
M3 
t 
5 
10 
25 
50 
75 
100 
5 
10 
25 
50 
75 
100 
5 
10 
25 
5o 
75 
100 
---AL ----- 
y var y 
1.38 0.36 
1.55 0.27 
1.71 0.25 
1.83 0.16 
1.86 0.13 
1.93 0.07 
0.79 0.25 
1.13 0.34 
1.64 0.26 
1.85 0.12 
1.89 0.12 
1.92 0.08 
0.39 0.07 
0.35 0.17 
0.26 0.09 
0.23 0.09 
0.21 0.09 
0.20 0.08 
y var y 
0.96 0.00 
0.96 0.02 
1.03 0.07 
1.17 0.16 
1.22 0.20 
1.22 0.20 
0.80 0.25 
1.14 0.32 
1.52 0.33 
1.71 0.30 
1.77 0.26 
1.78 0.24 
0.39 0.07 
0.36 0.17 
0.27 0.09 
0.23 0.08 
0.23 0.08 
0.22 0.08 
-----CE ----- 
y var y 
1.45 4.09 
1.67 1.76 
1.94 0.07 
1.99 0.04 
1.99 0.02 
1.99 0.01 
1.81 1.92 
1.91 0.16 
1.96 0.05 
1.99 0.03 
1.99 0.02 
1.99 0.01 
-0.08 1.87 
0.02 0.12 
0.01 0.04 
0.02 0.03 
0.01 0.02 
0.01 0.01 
ý_ý_.. QALý_-- 
y var y 
1.33 0.29 
1.57 0.25 
1.74 0.16 
1.84 0.10 
1.87 0.09 
1.90 0.07 
Var y is the variance across one hundred replications of the value of the instrument at time t. 
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opposite is true for the certainty equivalent rule. Since it only 
depends on the parameter estimates, which over the first few periods 
are greatly affected by the drawings of random errors, var y is 
initially high but rapidly falls as the parameter estimates settle down. 
In model 2, AL and RA are very similar, except that RA maintains 
a fairly high variance of the instrument. The same is true for model 
3 where once again the certainty equivalent rule rapidly converges, 
this time to zero. 
The extent of randomisation involved in the active learning decision 
rule may be calculated by substituting the values in Table 4.7, or the 
prior variance in Table 4.1, into the rule itself (4.8). This reveals 
that in period 3 (the first time when a decision is made) the random 
element of AL has a variance of about 2.7 but by period 5 this has 
fallen to 0.04. As expected, the active learning rule introduces a great 
deal of variance for a very short time. 
Similarly, QAL hasa variance of 2.9 at time 3, and on average 
falls to zero by time 5. The extent of randomisation as a function of 
parameter variance is sketched for AL and QAL in Figure 4.2 Clearly, 
the important difference is that QAL gives up randomisation quite early, 
and reverts to a risk averse strategy. Notice also, that although 
QAL is based on a quadratic it only operates on the upward sloping 
section of the function. 
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var y 
var 0 
FIGURE 4.2 : Active, Learning Decision Rules 
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4.4.3 Parameter Estimates 
Turning now to the properties of the parameter estimates. 
Table 4.6 shows that the parameter estimates associated with AL, and 
QAL are generally closer to the true values, than those generated by 
BA, and CE. In all models CE produces estimates of a with a 
negative bias, and ß with a positive bias. This is consistent with 
the findings of Anderson and Taylor (1976a, p. 1298). The other 
decision rules do not display such regular biases across all three 
models. In model 3 however, all of the decision rules produce very 
good estimates of a. This result is also obtained by Anderson and 
Taylor (1976b) for the certainty equivalent rule, and may be explained 
by the normalisation of x to zero. Under this assumption all three 
decision rules converge towards y=0, and thus over time more obser- 
vations of x are revealed at this point. In terms of Figure 4.1 data 
points accumulate along the x-axis and therefore the true intercept is 
identified. Even so, there is no reason to believe that the estimates 
of ß will be consistent, and Anderson and Taylor, on the basis of a 
longer run for model 3 with the certainty equivalent decision rule 
argue that it is not. They also state that in models where the assump- 
tion that the true'value of a=0 is relaxed,. the estimates of a 
would converge as slowly as those of ß. 
Consistency of the parameter estimates under RA, QAL, and AL 
remains an open question. There are strong arguments to support the 
conjecture that under these rules the parameter estimates are less 
likely to be consistent than under CE. Consistency requires (y'y)-l to 
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TABLE 4.6 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
------RA-- 
t a a a a a $ .Q $, 
M1 5 0.11 0.86 
, -0,12 0.93 -1.01 1.89 0.16 0.85 10 0.02 0.91 0.05 0.74 -0.87 1.76 -0.13 1.09 25 -0.06 0.96 0.32 0.59 -0.44 1.31 -0.17 1.10 50 -0.13 1.01 0.52 0.41 -0.32 1.19 -0.15 1.05 75 -0.13 1.02 0.59 0.34 -0.26 1.15 -0.13 1.03 100 -0.18 1.06 0.58 0.35 -0.27 1.15' -, -0.15 1.05 
M2 ,5 -0.15 0.98 -0.15 0.99 -0.27 1.31 10 -0.18 1.01 -0.18 1.02 -0.30 1.25 25 -0.22 1.11 -0.19 1.01 -0.26 1.17 50 -0.21 1.10 -0.17 0.99 -0.26 1.15 75 -0.20 1.09 -0.15 0.99 -0.25 1.13 100 -0.20 1.07 -0.16 1.00 -0.25 1.13 
M3 '5 0.05 1.23 0.05 1.24 -0.15 1.67 10 0.05 1.35 0.04 1.36 -0.15 1.76 25 0.06 1.45 0.07 1.43 -0.09 1.76 50 0.05 1.49 0.06 1.46 -0.09 1.74 74 0.06 1.51 0.08 1.45 -0.07 1.70 loo 0.07 1.49 0.11 1.41 -0.05 1.67 
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converge to the zero matrix (Anderson and Taylor, 1976a), and the 
greater the variations in y, the more likely is this condition to be 
satisfied. Therefore, it might be argued that since CE maintains 
greater variations in y *for a longer period than any of the other 
rules, it stands a better chance of attaining consistent estimates. 
However, CE always centres the instrument around the target whereas 
AL, RA and QAL aim lower than the target according to the extent of 
uncertainty. Therefore, although the variances of these rules diminish 
faster than that of CE, the shifts in their means may be sufficient to 
attain consistency in some cases. 
The evolution of the elements of the covariance matrices are 
displayed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Not surprisingly, in model 1, the 
active learning rules succeed in obtaining the most rapid reductions in 
parameter variances over approximately the first ten periods. QAL gets 
the fastest initial reduction, but is rapidly overtaken by AL. Then 
they are both overtaken by the certainty equivalent rule which finishes 
with the lowest variances at period 100. This is presumably because 
the active learning rules use the accuracy of the parameter estimates 
in the early stages to settle on the best policy. The certainty 
equivalent rule, which performs worse in the early stages keeps making 
relatively large changes in y which improve the parameter estimates 
in the late stages. In all models the risk averse rule has the least 
well-defined parameter estimates because the inclusion of variance in 
the decision rule has the effect of damping changes in y. With these 
small changes in y, the parameter variances remain quite high. In 
models 1 and 3, RA, AL, and QAL have higher parameter variances in 
period 100 than CE. Extended runs of model 3 (reported in Appendix 
4.11) suggest that by period 3000 CE still has lower parameter variances 
136. 
TABLE 4.7 
PARAMECER VARIANCES 
t a ß a ß a ß a ß 
M1 5 2.36 2.12 143.19 157.27 37.89 41.52 2.20 1.87 10 1.31 1.00 88.89 97.52 6.69 6.76 1.57 ' .1 20 25 0.87 0.51 53.55 58.69 0.61 0.27 0.97 . . 0 57 50 0.60 0.27 41.88 46.08 0.41 0.13 0.70 , 0 33 75 0.54 0.21 40.65 44.84 0.35 0.10 0.63 
. 
0 27 100 0.48 0.16 39.75 43.84 0.33 0.09 0.57 . 0.23 
M2 5 1.01 1.80 1.01 1.82 0.77 0.56 
10 0.67 0.94 0.67 0.96 0.49 0.22 25 0.42 0.38 0.44 0.48 0.40 0.13 
50 0.32 0.16 0.36 0.32 0.35 0.10 75 0.28 0.12 0.32 0.28 0.33 0.09 100 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.25 0.32 0.08 
M3 5 0.67 2.05 0.68 2.06 0.45 1.01 
to 0.43 1.54 0.43 1.55 0.19 0.68 25 0.26 1.24 0.28 1.28 0.08 0.55 50 0.18 0.99 0.20 1.07 0.04 0.45 
75 0.15 0.88 0.18 1.00 0.03 0.41 100 0.13 0.80 0.17 0.96 0.02 0.38 
The parameter variance is the average across one hundred replications of the variance of the parameter estimate at time t. 
TABLE 4.8 
COVARIANCE . (p i_ ) 
t AL RA CE QAL 
M1 5 -2.03 -149.89 -39.49 -1.84 
10 -1.05 - 93.00 - 6.64 -1.28 
25 -0.61 - 55.99 - 0.38 -0.70 
50 -0.37 - 43.88 - 0.23 -0.46 
75 -0.32 - 42.65 - 0.18 -0.39 
100 -0.27 - 41.70 - 0.17 -0.34 
M2 5 -1.10 - 1.11 - 0.50 
10 -0.66 - 0.67 - 0.28 
25 -0.34 - 0.38 - 0.21 
50 -0.21 - 0.28 - 0.18 
75 -0.17 - 0.25 - 0.17 
100 -0.15 - 0.23 - 0.16 
M3 5 -0.91 - 0.92 - 0.39 
10 -0.64 - 0.65 - 0.19 
25 -0.45 - 0.48 - 0.10 50 -0.33 - 0.37 - 0.06 
75 -0.27 - 0.34 - 0,04 
100 -0.24 - 0.32 - 0.03 
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The covariance is the average across one hundred replications 
of the covariance between the parameter estimates at time t. 
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than the other rules, and this is indicative of. a stronger tendency 
-1 for (Y'Y) to converge to the zero matrix. However, this is not 
true for model 2 where AL, and RA attain lower variances of a,, but 
higher variances of ß, than does CE. Clearly, this analysis does 
not provide strong evidence to support the consistency of the estimates 
in any of the models under any decision rule. 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The optimal active learning rule has the following properties; 
firstly, when parameter variances are very large it converges to some 
non-zero, level of randomisation. This is supported by the fact that 
only the upward sloping secti-- of the quadratic approximation was 
operative, 
Secondly, when parameter variances are 
sufficiently small, the optimal rule stops randomising. This is 
described by the negative intercept of the quadratic approximation, 
and the findings of Kendrick (1982) for a small macro-model. 
The results of the simulations may be summarised as follows: 
i) there is no evidence to suggest that the certainty equivalent 
rule generates consistent estimates (Anderson and Taylor, 1976a) 
ii) a linear active learning rule performs significantly better 
than certainty equivalence. However, 
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iii) the optimal learning rule gives up randomisation before 
parameter variances have reached zero. At this point, it reverts 
to a risk averse strategy which, in some cases, would be expected to 
have less chance of attaining consistent estimates than a certainty 
equivalent rule. 
The implications are quite clear. The optimal decision rule 
neither requires, nor does it necessarily attain consistent parameter 
estimates. Therefore, "consistency provides very little indication of 
the likely performance of the estimator in the context of the relevant 
decision-making problem. The generalisation of these results to 
estimation techniques, other than least squares, which incorporate 
the known process generating the right-hand side variables, remains 
a question for further research. 
140. 
APPENDIX 4.1 ;1 
Joint application of common random numbers and antithetics 
yields the covariance estimates in Table 4. Al (the underlying 
formulae are eq. 281-290, Kleinjnen, 1974, pp. 226-228). From 
these, estimates of the variance of the difference between the 
payoffs of the decision rules are obtained by applying the 
formulae in Kleinjnen (1974), Table 10, p. 221. 
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TABLE 4. A1 
EXPECTED PRECISION OF DIFFERENT SIMULATION METHODS 
Ml M2 M2 
1=AL I=AL I=AL 
II=CE Il=CE II. =RA 
COV(Ui(I), Ui+1(i)) 10.9 -228.8 -228.8 
COV(Ui(II), Ui+l(II)) -74.2 -362.2 -363.0 
(II)) (I), U COV(U 48.0 134.7 415.9 i i 
COV(Ui(I), Ui+l(II)) 46.4 -254.3 -293.7 
VAR'(U, (I)) 303.9 370.8 370.8 
VAR(U(II)) 804.0 1155.6 652.0 
VAR(DIFF) - l1NTITHETICS 10.7 9.6 16.6 
- COMMON 
RANDOM 
NUMBERS 10.3 12.8 2.0 
- JOINT 
APPLICATION 8.7 12.0 14.1 
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APPENDIX 4.11 
Extended runs of model 3 (over 3000 periods) show that the 
elements of the (Y'Y)-1 matrix display less tendency to converge 
to zero under AL and RA than under CE. The time paths of the 
elements of the matrix are displayed in Table 4. A2. 
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TABLE 4. A2 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE INVERSE OF Y'Y FOR AN EXTENDED RUN OF MODEL 3 
t 
-5 
10 
25 
50 
75 
100 
500 
1000 
3000 
-----AL------ 
(1,1) (1,2) 
0.61 -0.83 
0.44 -0.68 
0.28 -0.47 
0.19 -0.34 
0.14 -0.27 
0.12 -0.22 
0.02 -0.05 
0.01 -0.01 
0.00 0.00 
(1,1) (1,2) 
0.61 -0.83 
0.44 -0.68 
0.28 -0.48 
0.21 -0.37 
0.19 -0.33 
0.17 -0.31 
0.15 -0.26 
0.15 -0.25 
0.15 -0.24 
AL RA 
t 
5 
10 
25 
50 
75 
100 
50o 
1000 
3000 
CE 
(2,2) (2,2) (2,2) 
1.79 1.79 0.87 
1.55 1.57 0.63 
1.20 1.22 0.49 
0.99 1.04 0.39 
0.84 0.95 0.35 
0.74 0.90 0.32 
0.33 0.69 0.21 
0.23 0.64 0.18 
0.16 0.58 0.14 
-----CE------ 
(1,1) (1,2) 
0.40 -0.35 
0.20 -0.20 
0.09 -0.11 
0.04 -0.06 
0.03 -0.04 
0.02 -0.03 
0.00 -0.01 
0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 
r 
I 
CHAPTER FIVE 
TAXATION AND PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY: THEORY 
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY 
Techniques are described for the incorporation of parameter 
uncertainty into existing models of optimal taxation. Attention is 
restricted to cases where only one parameter is imperfectly known. 
Two questions are addressed: 
i) should optimal tax rates based on the assumption of complete 
certainty be regarded as upper or lower bounds? 
ii) Should econometric parameter estimates intended for a particular 
tax optimisation problem be regarded as upper or lower bounds? 
The means of obtaining answers to these questions are summarised 
in three theorems, the first two being applicable to choices over only 
a single instrument: 
i) the optimal tax rate increases or decreases with the variance 
of a given parameter according to whether the first order condition 
is convex or concave in the parameter (Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974). 
ii) An econometric estimate should be regarded as an upper or lower 
bound when the ratio of the second and first derivatives of the first 
order condition, with respect to the uncertain parameter, is positive 
or negative. 
iii) If each element of the vector of first order conditions is linear 
in the uncertain parameter, then the vector of optimal decisions is not 
affected by that uncertainty. 
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Approximations for the magnitudes of the required adjustments are also 
provided. :1 
Distinction is drawn between revenue constraints which apply ex 
ante, or ex post. The former applies at the planning stage, and depends 
only on expected values, but the latter requires some ex post adjustment, 
and therefore depends on the uncertain parameter. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
By accident or design economists have almost invariably separated 
questions of parameter estimation and policy optimisation. As a result, 
studies of optimal taxation, such as Ramsey (1927), Mirrlees (1971), 
Stern (1976) and Seade (1977) and the literature on the formulation of 
empirical models, such as Hendry and Richard (1982) and (1983), have devel- 
oped quite independently. The former generally treat demand system 
parameters as if they were certain, or could be known with certainty given 
information on consumers' characteristics; and the latter discuss criteria 
for model selection, and the properties of estimators, with little or no 
reference to their intended use. 
Rather than attempting a general unification of parameter estimation 
and policy optimisation, this chapter concentrates on two connections 
between them. Given that econometric models provide uncertain estimates, 
the first question is how to adjust optimal tax rules for uncertainty. 
A case of particular interest is that of 'certainty equivalence' (Simon, 
1956, Theil, 1957) when the policy- choice is independent of parameter 
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uncertainty. 
The second question is how parameter estimates may be revised in 
the knowledge that they will be used in a particular policy optimisation. 
problem. The case to be considered is that where the policy rule regards 
all parameters as if they were known with certainty. Information about 
uncertainty, and the social welfare function, may then be incorporated in 
a 'certainty equivalent parameter estimate'. In practice, this might 
reveal whether, in the context of a specific policy choice, a particular 
parameter estimate should be regarded as an upper or lower bound. 
As the methods for adjusting optimal taxes for uncertainty are 
described, it will become apparent that general results are hard to find. 
The outcome will depend on the source of uncertainty, the specification 
of the objectives, and the kinds of policy constraints incorporated in 
the model. Therefore, rather than establishing general results, the aim 
of this chapter is to outline techniques which may be applied to specific 
tax problems in Chapter 6. 
5.2 METHOD 
For tractability it is assumed that only one parameter is uncertain. 
This is necessary in order to be able to infer from an increase in the 
variance (or spread) of that parameter that the riskiness of the environ- 
ment has unambiguously increased. Clearly, it would be desirable to 
consider cases of multi-dimensional uncertainty arising from many parameters, 
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however it would then become difficult to say whether a simultaneous 
increase in some variances, and reduction in others led to an increase 
or decrease in overall riskiness. Atkinson and Bourginon (1985) have 
suggested criteria (stochastic dominance) for making such a judgement. 
However, attention is restricted'tb the simple case of uncertainty 
about one parameter only. 
The number of instruments available is also an important consider- 
ation. The single instrument case is generally more tractable, however, 
weaker results also apply in the case of many instruments. 
5.2.1 A single instrument 
In its most general form the criteria for the choice of tax rate 
may be described by the social welfare function, W, 
W= W(t, 0) (5.1) 
where t is the tax instrument and 0 is a vector of parameters describ- 
ing the influence of the tax rate on social welfare. It is assumed, for 
the time being, that other instruments are fixed, or are determined by 
rules independent of t, and hence may be regarded as parameters in the 
present context. 
The basis of the methodology adopted here is comparison between a 
situation of certainty where the welfare function (5.1) applies, with a 
situation of uncertainty, where decisions are made on the basis of expected 
welfare. 
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+Co 
EW = W(t, 0)f(0ý)d0j (5.2) 
where f(Oj) is the probability distribution of parameter j; 
Diamond and Stiglitz (1974) provide a theorem relating the sign 
of the difference between the policies which maximise welfare and expected 
welfare to the concavity or convexity of the first order condition. An 
approximation due to Malinvaud (1969) for the magnitude of this difference 
is also exploited. Points other than the maxima of the functions are 
examined by considering the tax rates which yield a fixed amount of 
revenue. 
Consider the problem under certainty.. The first and second order 
conditions for a welfare maximum are 
Wt(t, 0jfO_j) =O; Wtt(t, 0j, 0_j) <0 (5.3) 
where 0_j is the vector of parameters exluding the 
th. 
Given the 
parameters 0_j and 0j, t is the optimal tax rate. By holding t 
at its optimal value and allowing 03 to take values other than 0j it 
is possible to plot the first order condition; Figure 5.1 also assumes 
that it is concave in 0J. Now if 01 takes values of 0ý and 0j1 
each with probability 
l (there is a mean preserving spread around 0 
the expected value of Wt falls below zero. From the second order 
condition, Wt increases as t falls, therefore a reduction in t is 
required to restore optimality. Thus, an increase in uncertainty about 
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:1 
wt(t, oi'e i) 
wt(t, öj, o_j) =o )j 
FIGURE 5.1 : Increase in uncertainty about 0: the concavity of 
the first order condition 
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01 requires an increase (decrease) in t if Wt is concave (convex) 
in 0 J. 
This argument is formalised in Theorem 1. 
Theorem 1 (Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974) 
The optimal tax rate increases, is constant, or decreases with 
uncertainty about parameter j according to whether the derivative Wt 
is convex, linear, or concave in 0V, i. e. 
WOj0jt <0 -> 3varOj 
Note, this is true for more general measures of risk than variance - mean 
preserving spread for example. Here attention is restricted to means and 
variances; as indicated by Samuelson (1970), there are a large number of 
situations where this approach may be regarded as a first approximation to 
more general classes of distributions. Direct application of Theorem 1 
to optimal tax problems reveals when tax recommendations on the basis of 
certain parameters may be regarded as upper or lower bounds, i. e. it 
indicates the desired direction of adjustment. The value of the optimal 
tax rate under uncertainty may be estimated by taking a second order 
Taylor expansion of the welfare function, around the mean 01 of the 
parameter. 
Ew [t, ftoj), 0_jl = w(t, äj, ©_j) +2 wojoj(t, öj, 0_j)var 0j (5.4) 
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Differentiate with respect to t, and set both sides equal to zero 
tt2 
(5.5) 0= EW =W+1 ýý0jr 
_ 
var 00 
where the arguments of the functions have been suppressed. 
* ** 
The solution to the left-hand side is t and to the right is t 
. 
This may be summarised as f6Ulows: 
Approximation 1 (Malinvaud, 1969) 
The solution to the problem under uncertainty may be approximated 
by adjusting the first order conditions for the problem under certainty 
in the following way: 
** _ wt(t GjlO_j +2 wojojt(t**, öj, 0_J) var 0j 
Then the solution to this adjusted FCC is approximately equal to that of 
the problem under uncertainty 
** * 
t=t 
Analogous results apply to the certainty equivalent problem. This 
requires the introduction of a bias into the estimate of 0j such 
that the resulting certainty equivalent parameter estimate 0 may 
be used in policy optimisation as if it were known with certainty. 
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Thus the choice of 0* would ensure that t*, satisfies j 
wt(t o (5.6) 
Theorem 2 shows the conditions under which a parameter estimate should be 
regarded as an upper or lower bound in the context of a particular optim- 
isation problem. 
Theorem 2 
The certainty equivalent parameter estimate is above (below) the 
expectation of the parameter when the ratio-of the second and first 
derivatives of the first order condition is positive (negative),. 
-*-- 
00tO <=> 0Öý0 wojt <j 
Proof: 
Defining u as the degree of risk, the first order condition 
for welfare maximisation is 
EWt(t, O. u) 0 .. (5.7) 
Holding 0 constant and differentiating yields 
dt 
EW 
tu 
d EWtt (5.8) 
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By definition, the certainty' equivalent parameter estimate is required 
to satisfy (5.6) which implies 
dt tE)j 
d0j wtt 
combining (5.8) and (5.9) 
d0 EWtu Wtt 
dtit EWtt Wt0 j 
(5.9) 
(5.10) 
Since the second derivatives with respect to t are negative for maxima, 
doj/du has the same as ENtu/Wtoj The proof of Theorem 1 
(Diamond and Stiglitz, 1974) showed by integration that the sign of 
EWtu is the same as that of WOJOjt' Therefore 
4- 
-0 <=> 
W ojt o- -' o du < Wfl jt < 
t5.11ý 
and hence 
0* -00 <=> 
Wit 
0 
3j ojt 
(s. ix) 
0 
The magnitude of this difference may be estimated using a technique similar 
to approximation 1. 
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Expanding (5.6) around 01 and equating to zero 
* 
wt = wttt , 0j, o_j) + wtoj (t*, oj,. o_j) toj - öj) o (s. is) 
From Approximation 1, 
wt(t*, 0=j; 0_j) = Wt(t**, öj, O_j) 2 wojojt (t**, öj, 0_j) var Oj (5.14) 
substituting (5.13) into (5.14) yields 
Approximation 2 
2W 
var 0 
ojt 
These theorems and approximations all relate to the maxima of the approp- 
riate welfare functions. A wide variety of tax issues require the exam- 
ination of other properties of the functions. Consider, for example, the 
case where the government is required to raise a given amount of revenue. 
This is illustrated in Figure 5.2 where the revenue under certainty, and 
expected revenue are plotted for different values of t. The functions 
A 
are assumed to be concave with unique global maxima at t and t 
respectively. In the absence of other constraints it would seem natural 
to choose the lower of the two tax rates which satisfy the revenue 
requirement. Therefore, if the expected revenue curve lies everywhere 
above the revenue curve, uncertainty means a lower tax rate. If, in 
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Revenue 
R 
evenue 
tax rate 
FIGURE 5.2 : Revenue and expected revenue functions 
*}A* 
{tt 
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addition expected revenue may be approximated by the Taylor expansion 
ER(t, o) = R(t, Oj, o_j) +2 Rojo (t, öj, 0_j) tear of (5.1! ) 
then the vertical distance between the revenue and expected revenue curve 
is given by 
2 
RO j var 
0 Hence 
Approximation 3 
The lowest tax rate t which on average raises i decreases 
(increases) with uncertainty if RQjoj is positive (negative). 
> 
dt 
R00 <0 => dvaro 
5.2.2 Many Instruments 
By defining t as a vector of tax instrument, the Diamond Stiglitz 
theorem may be generalised as follows. Expected welfare depends on the 
uncertain parameter 01 whose distribution F(Oj, u) has a spread, or 
riskiness, described by the scalar 11. 
I1 EW = W(0, t)F0i (01 111) d0j (5.16) 
O 
The first order conditions 
EWti =0 for all i (5.17) 
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implicitly define a relationship between the vector of taxes, and the 
riskiness of 0j. Defining EWt as the vectgr of derivatives of EW, 
and totally differentiating yields 
a (Ewt)au + at (Et) "at =0 all 
(5.18) -- 
For a unique global maximum, the matrix of second derivatives of EW 
with respect to t must be negative definite; therefore (5.18) may be 
rearranged 
dt 
dü _- 
(EWtt) -1 
au 
(EWti (5.19) 
it is a straightforward generalisation of Diamond and Stiglitz to show 
that every element in 
äü (EWt) has the same sign as the corresponding 
element in Wtojoj and is zero if WtOjO: j - 0. However, this does dt 
not necessarily have implications for the sign of dü , since there 
may be over-riding cross effects from the matrix of second derivatives. 
But, the following theorem is obvious from (5.19) 
Theorem 3 
If each element of the vector of derivatives of EW(O, t) is linear Ow N 
in Oj then the vector of optimal instruments is not affected by risk. 
(ý dt 
(WtýýO j°) _> Lä= 
(EWt) = Oý e> (d= O) 
u 
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Given uncertainty and many instruments, the government's revenue 
constraint requires careful interpretation. It is 
impossible to know in 
advance exactly how much revenue will result from the application of a 
particular set of tax instruments, therefore the revenue constraint which 
would be applied under certainty must be modified. There are two alter- 
natives: 
(i) Ex ante revenue constraint. 
raise a given amount of revenue R. 
t. x =R 
The government is required to plan to 
This may be written 
(5.20) 
where t is the vector of tax rates and x is the vector of expected "M 
demands for each commodity. Be"ause the world is risky and errors are 
made in forecasting consumers' responses, it is unlikely that the planned 
revenue target will be precisely fulfilled; however, under this inter- 
pretation the constraint states only that the target would be met if 
Z/ 
the forecasts turned out to be exactly true. 
ii) Ex Post revenue constraint. Under this interpretation exactly the 
right amount of revenue is always recovered because one instrument to 
is determined ex post. This is written 
n-i 
R-E tixl 
i=1 
to = xn 
(5.21) 
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Footnotes for page 158 
l/ Note that when the demand functions are linear in 
parameters it is possible to write the ex ante revenue 
constraint simply in terms of the expected values of 
the uncertain partameters. 
2/ In models where the government revenue constraint 
is equivalent to a social resource constraint, it is 
necessary to make the additional assumption that there 
exists a resource which may be transfered over time. 
(Without this assumption a shortfall of government 
revenue would violate the resource constriant. ) The 
motivation for considering the ex ante cconstraint is 
that such transfers may be costly. For example it is 
sometimes argued that unplanned changes in the Public 
Sector Borrowing Requirement impose a real burden on 
subsequent economic activity. 
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where the x's on the right-hand side are the actual demands, not fore- 
casts. Usually indirect tax models are applied to consumer demands, and 
it is difficult in that context to imagine the tax rate on the nth 
commodity being determined after the demand for all goods including the 
nth have been revealed. However, this kind of constraint is a plausible 
model in other areas of government policy-making. For example, the 
scheme of prices at which Area Boards buy electricity from the Central 
Electricity Generating Board, has elements which are determined ex post 
(see Electricity Council, 1981). The Area Boards formulate expectations 
about the prices which they are likely to face., and behave accordingly; 
then at the'end of the Cw: a". A1 
makes adjustments to the announced price schedule to ensure that revenue 
targets are fulfilled. 
The distinction between ex ante and ex post revenue constraints is 
crucial in determining the infl_ence of uncertainty on optimal taxes. 
The reason is as follows: the Diamond Stiglitz theorem indicates the 
importance of the curvature of the first order condition ui tl: respect to 
When demands are linear in the uncertain parameter the 
the uncertain parameter. 4 ex ante revenue constraint depends on nothing 
but the expected value of this parameter and contributes no curvature to 
the programme. However, the ex post revenue constraint depends on the 
entire probability distribution of the unknown parameters and this makes a 
difference to the convexity of the first order conditions. 
The order of differentiation is a convenient way of capturing these 
contrasting effects. The ex ante revenue constraint amounts to first 
ico. 
differentiating the welfare function twice with respect to the uncertain 
parameter, and then using the the constraint 
dt 
dt. 
(w0 0j) = at W0 jej + at W0 dtn 
(5.22) 
iin 
Notice that the term dtn/dti, 
'when 
the revenue constraint enters, is not 
differentiated with respect to 0. But if the order of differentiation 
is reversed 
22 dt ;w aw 
aoaao. (wti) - aoaao 
(at + at dtn) (5.23) iý1j1i 
curvature of dtn/dti is incorporated and hence the revenue constraint 
has been imposed ex post. 
5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In principle it would be possible to avoid any distinction between 
parameter estimation and policy optimisation. Rather than using statis- 
tical criteria to derive estimates from the data, and then selecting 
optimal taxes according to a welfare function, the whole procedure may be 
condensed into one operation. Policies may be chosen to maximise welfare 
given observed data, making policy rules and parameter estimates redundant. 
This chapter makes only a small step towards such a unified approach how- 
ever it does draw attention to two pieces of information which may be 
neglected as a result of the separation of estimation and optimisation. 
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Firstly, parameter' uncertainty may be included in optimal policy rules; 
and secondly, the 'best estimate' depends on the kinds of policy choice 
for which it is intended. 
The techniques which have been set out in this chapter may be 
directly applicable to certain categories of policy decisions. In an 
institutional setting where policies are subject to a large number of 
constraints it is possible that only one degree of freedom remains. 
In electricity pricing, for example, although there are a multitude of 
different rates for different kinds of supply, their relationship to 
each other is severely constrained. For practical purposes, the standard 
domestic supply price may be taken as the basis from which other rates 
are derived. in addition, if there is predominantly one source of 
uncertainty, such as the price elasticity of electricity demand, the 
policy problem has the required characteristics and the techniques in 
Section 5.2 may be applied. 
It is difficult to envisage robust generalisations about the influence 
of uncertainty on optimal taxation. However, before proceeding to 
examine particular tax models, it is possible to indicate factors which 
are likely to play an important role in determining the outcome. The 
Diamond stiglitz theorem draws attention to the curvature of the first 
order conditions in the uncertain variable. This in turn is likely to 
depend on the government's objectives: revenue maximisation would be 
linear in demands, though not necessarily linear in parameters= and more 
complex social objectives would be less likely to be linear. Also, the 
'i62". 
nature of the policy constraints must be taken into consideration; the 
properties of the solution may be completely different if an ex ante 
'planning' constraint is replaced by an ex post 'balancing item' 
constraint. 
"I". 1 
J 
CHAPTER SIX 
TAXATION AND PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY: EXAMPLES 
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CHAPTER SIX : SUMMARY 
parameter uncertainty is introduced in six existing models of 
optimal taxation. The consequences for optimal tax rates, 
. nd 
certainty equivalent parameter estimates are described. The first 
five models are a direct application of the methods discussed in Chapter 
Five; the sixth is a more straightforward argument in terms of covariances. 
The results, detailed in Table 6.1, are briefly as follows. In 
the first three models which all examine linear income taxation, the 
importance of parameter uncertainty depends on the functional form 
chosen for labour supply. If it is Cobb Douglas, then the optimal tax 
rate should be adjusted upwards; however if it is linear, only the 
coefficient on lump sum transfers matters, and its uncertainty can 
influence the optimal tax rate in either direction. Simulations on the 
basis of the empirical estimates of Brown et al (1976) suggest that the 
required adjustment is likely to be small. 
Models four to six deal with commodity taxation, four and five 
being based on the Corlett Hague (1953) model, with a linear expenditure 
system representing demands. With an ex ante revenue constraint, 
uncertainty about any of the marginal propensities does not matter, 
but uncertainty about necessary expenditure on goods one and two 
reduce and increase the optimal tax on good one respectively. How- 
ever, when the revenue constraint is applied ex post, uncertainty 
about any of the parameters is important. Model 
five shows that 
with many consumers, and lump-sum transfers, the uniformity result 
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does not hold under uncertainty. And model six, which following 
Deaton and Stern (1986) allows lump-sum grant based on household 
characteristics, shows that uniformity only holds if there is no 
correlation between errors in observing household characteristics, and 
social marginal utilities. 
6.1 introduction 
Somewhat rough calculations tend to suggest that the empirical 
significance of parameter uncertainty for real-world taxation decisions 
is slight. One measure of this importance is the uncertainty surround- 
ing the revenue that would be raised by a small increase in income 
taxation. Taking Abbott and Ashenfelter's (1976) estimate of the 
elasticity of labour supply, and using their reported standard error, it 
is possible to predict upper and lower bounds for the revenue that would 
be generated by a policy change. For the UK in 1984, these admittedly 
crude calculations suggest that the revenue arising from an increase of 
lp in the pound on the aggregate income tax rate lies (with 95% confidence) 
between £1.43 bn and £1.44 bn. The difference, which is interpreted as 
the uncertainty about exchequer revenues, is £7.5 m which amounts to 
less than 0.1% of PSBR. (Details of the calculations are provided in 
Appendix 6.1. ) 
Policy makers who have in the past treated econometric estimates of 
elasticities as known quantities may draw some comfort from this kind of 
argument. Although policies are based on imperfect information, the 
imperfections are not very large, and would probably not have any great 
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influence on the best decision. Therefore, it saves time and trouble 
if they are ignored. Nevertheless, this chapter proceeds to examine 
parameter uncertainty in several tax models. In the light of the 
preceding argument about its likely significance for decision making, 
such a project requires some justification. 
Firstly, Chapter Five suggested that generalisations about taxation 
and parameter uncertainty may be hard to find. Despite a strong prior 
belief that the final decision will not be much affected, it is not 
possible to lay down precise conditions under which the effect will be 
small. Therefore, each case must be considered on its merits, and every 
case where uncertainty does not matter may make some marginal contribution 
to the peace-of-mind of the risk averse decision-maker. 
Secondly, the concept of an "ideal type" has guided and contributed 
to a great deal of economic thought. Indeed, the models upon which this 
chapter are based may fall into this category. Although uncertainty is 
a part of real-world decision-making, the exercise of describing what the 
perfectly rational government would do if they had available all relevant 
information, is worthwhile. It establishes a convenient vocabulary for 
discussing broader issues, and also provides a benchmark against which 
more complicated problems and solutions may be judged. The inclusion of 
uncertainty in these simple models therefore serves two roles. The more 
ambitious is to convert simple models 
into operational devices for giving 
policy advice. Given 
likely orders of magnitude, this may not be a very 
worthwhile exercise. Even so, there remains the more modest aim of 
providing another benchmark. The 
ideal type under perfect information 
already exists, and 
its usefulness may be enhanced by considering in 
addition an ideal type with parameter uncertainty. 
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The tractability of models of optimal taxation relies on their 
assumption. In the most general Diamond Mirrlees (1971) framework 
it is difficult to establish any properties of the optimal tax system, 
and presumably, it would be equally difficult to rule out many of the 
possible uncertainty adjusted systems. In this unrestricted case the 
only way to proceed would be by means of numerical simulations (see 
Stern, 1976, and Heady and Mitra, forthcoming for discussions of this 
approach in models with perfect information ). This chapter takes the 
alternative approach applying analytic techniques to greatly simplified 
tax problems. The models may be divided into categories according to 
the assumptions which they make about the instruments available to the 
government. The first three models restrict attention to the choice of 
a single linear income tax rate to maximise revenue; and the remaining 
three models examine commodity taxation. The assumptions of perfect 
competition, and constant returns to scale, which are required for 
Diamond and Mirrlees' "production efficiency" result are implicit 
throughout. These assumptions ensure that as long as the government's 
budget constraint is fulfilled, society's resource constraints must be 
satisfied also. 
The six models are described in detail in Section 6.2. The proofs 
rely on the theorems and approximations set out in Chapter Five. Section 
6.3 discusses and summarises the results. 
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6.2 The Models 
6.2.1 Model 1: Cobb Doublas Utility Functions and Diversity 
of Time Endowments 
Broome (1975) proves the following: given Rawlsian objectives 
with revenue from the linear income tax being equally redistributed 
across individuals, identical Cobb Douglas preferences, and a lower 
limit to the distribution of wages, the optimal tax rate is 58.6%. 
The most obvious way to allow for uncertainty in this model would be 
to increase the spread of the distribution of wages: optimal taxes 
depend on the distribution of abilities which is represented with 
imperfect accuracy by the distribution of wages. However this is 
difficult to interpret in terms of econometric parameter estimates and 
their variances, therefore the following method is adopted. 
Firstly the model is restated taking differences in time endow- 
ments rather than wages, to represent differences in abilities. Secondly, 
Broome's theorem is shown to hold when preferences take a particular form. 
And finally, uncertainty about the parameter characterising preferences 
is introduced and the results compared with Broome's. 
if consumers maximise identical utility functions 
Uh = qh (Th-Lh)(1-a) (6.1) 
where O<a<1 
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subject to budget constraints 
Pqh = wlh +m (6.2) 
where q is consumption of goods, T is time endowments, a1 is lump- 
transfers, and subscripts are for households, the associated labour sum 
supply functions are: 
kh = Th '- (1-a)m/w (6.3) 
The government can obtain an econometric estimate of a, which 
will be required for tax optimisation, by regressing aggregate expenditure 
on leisure on non-labour income (or alternatively by regressing expen- 
diture on commodities on non-labour income). 
Aggregating across households, noting that transfer payments equals 
average per capita tax revenue, m=t. i, and normalising such that 
w= (1-t), average labour supply may be written 
T (1-t) 
1-at (6.4) 
where bars denote averages. Thus the government objective function is 
= 
tTTu-t) 
R U. (6.5 1-at ) 
The first order condition is 
as Ll+t (at-2 )1 T 
= 
(1-at) 2 
(6.6) 
and yields the optimal tax rate 
I/ The second order condition (a2R/8t2 < 0) <_> (a <1)ý 
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t= 
l-/(l-a) 
a (6.7) 
If a=1 consumers place no value on leisure, and thus their 
labour supplies are inelastic. Therefore the best tax rate is 100% 
and the outcome is perfect equality of income. However, for smaller 
values very high tax rates are counter productive since the tax base 
shrinks as individuals decide to consumer more leisure. For a<1, 
lower tax rates maximise revenue, but the optimal rate never falls 
below 50%. Note that if information about a is diffuse - it is 
equally likely that it takes any value between zero and one - its 
expectation will be 0.5, and if this is substituted into the optimal tax 
formula a rate of 58.6% emerges. The following propositions examine 
the sensitivity of this tax rate to uncertainty about a. 
Proposition 1.1 
Under Cobb Douglas labour supply, the introduction of uncertainty 
about the expenditure share of goods increases the optimal level of 
income taxation 
(O <a< 1) => 8vara >O 
Proof 
From (6.5) 
2t2T(3-4t+t2(l) 
Raat 
(1-t)4 
(6.8) 
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which implies 
Raat 
70 <=> 3-4t+t2a Z0 (6.9) 
Substituting (6.7) into (6.9) the sign of Raat along the locus of 
points satisfying Rt =0 is given by 
t 
3-4 1-(1-a) 
+a 
[LV(l1-a) 2 
sign{Raat =sign{ 
` 
iR=01 
`aa 
= signJ72 (1-a) - (1-a) (6.10) 
Therefore 
Raat >O 
O<a<1 => (6.11) 
Rt=O 
The proposition is then true by Theorem 1. 
0 
This shows that for all feasible values of estimates of a, under 
uncertainty the optimal tax formula (6.7) will produce tax rates which 
are too low. Thus, in fact Broome's theorem should say that the optimal 
tax rate is no less than 58.6%. Indeed, it may be closer to the rate 
of 66.6% which he proposes is valid for a more general utility function, 
and may be easier for politicians to advocate. 
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Proposition 1.2 
Under Cobb Douglas labour supply, the solution to the certainty 
equivalent problem entails upward adjustment of a above the mean of 
the distribution 
O<a<1 => a -a>O 
Proof 
Differentiating'(6.5) 
R_ 
tT(2-3t+at2) (6.12) 
to (1-at) 3 
which implies 
> <_> 2-3t+at2 (6.13) ta <O R0 
substituting (6.7) into (6.13), the sign of Rta along the locus of % 
points satisfying Rt =0 is given by 
Lt ( jýi'-V(1-a) jý1'-(1-a) 2 
sign{1 to 
== 
signi 2-3 La]+aLj -j 
} 
l O! lJ 
= sign{ L(1-a) - (1-a) ýý (6.14) 
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Then, using proposition 1.1 
o<a<1 => 
Rtaa 
>0 (6.15) 
Rt=O 
Therefore the proposition follow- from Theorem 2. 
13 
Proposition 1.2 suggests that it may be possible to retain tho 
simple and attractive-optimal-tax formula given by equation (6.7). 
Instead of including complicated terms involving variances, it is 
possible to make the appropriate adjustment in terms of a. Given 
that the estimate of a=0.5 is uncertain, it may be regarded as a 
lower bound: some a greater than o. 5 will yield the optimal tax rate 
under uncertainty. 
Estimates of the magnitudes of the required adjustments to t 
(or to a) may be derived using approximations 1 and 2. i'lguro 6.1 
illustrates for all values of a the optimal tax rate t(a, vara - 0) 
if a is certain, and the expected revenue maximising tax rate t 
(a, vara =. 1) given the. variance of a=. 1. The former is calculated 
directly from (6.7) and the lattý_ by substituting the derivativou of 
(6.5) into approximation 1 to give 
11 + t* (at*-2)J(1-at*)2+(2t*2 (3-4t* + t*2a)). 1- O (G. 16) 
having normalised T to unity. The figure of .1 is chosen for the vjtrimnc+r 
for the following reason. Given that oC is between 0 and 1. its rretitent 
possible variance is . 25. This occurs when o( takes the values of 0 and 1 
each with probability . 5. Therefore, the value of .1 is chohen becrtuse it 
is roughly in the middle of the feasible range. 
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FIGURE 6.1 : Optimal Choice of Income Tax Rate, Cobb Douglas 
example with vara =, 1. 
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In Figure 6.1, the adjustment of t for uncertainty is the 
vertical distance between the two lines. For values of a below 0.8 
the increase in the tax rate to allow for uncertainty is between 37 
and 5%.; Then as the expo: 'sture share of leisure approaches zero, 
both t, and t tend to loot, so the difference tends to zero. 
Thus, Broome's important theorem would require an income tax rate of 
61.2% with a variance of a of . 1. 
The solution to t: Aa certainty equivalent problem, the adjustme-$ 
of a for uncertainty, may be represented in the figure as the hori. nntal 
distance between the two lines. Taking the Broome theorem as an example, 
if the estimated value of a is 0.5, with a variance of one, the optimal 
tax rate is . 61 . The same tax rate would result from regarding an a 
value of about . 6- as known with certainty. Thus the approximato solution 
to the certainty equivalent problem in this case would be a" -av .1 
The required percentage increase in a (that is (a*-ä)/ä) is 207. 
6.2.2 Model 2: Linear Labour Supply with Diversity of Warns 
The clear-cut results wit]- the Cobb Douglas utility function do not 
necessarily apply to other demand systems. The linear labour supply 
function provides an example of when uncertainty about some parameters 
matters, and others do not. Also it is possible to use empirical 
estimates and their standard errors to assess the likely significanco of 
uncertainty adjustments. Assume that labour supply is a linear function 
of wages w and lump-sum transfers m 
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Rh = awh(1-t) + ßm +yh=1,..., H 
The associated utility function (see Stern, 1984a) is 
R-b rß (x+a) 
ph =ß exp j-1+ b-+ 
} 
where 
b=ß : a=ß -ß2 
(6.17) 
(6.18) . w.. 
The government wishes to maximise revenue, therefore the objective function 
is simply 
m. _= EtwhIh/H 
h 
(6.19) 
substituting (6.17) into (6.19) it is possible to express this in terms 
of instruments and parameters 
mHh twh[wh(l-t) + ßm +y 
tlas(1-t) + 
ci 
A 
= v-tß v-tß 
(6.20) 
2 
where v= 
Ew 
%S= 
Ew 
' and A is defined above. 
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Clearly. the per capita revenue function (6.20) is linear in a 
and y, therefore by Theorem 1, uncertainty from either of these sources 
does not affect the optimal choice of t. Hence, 
Proposition 2.1 
Under linear labour supply, uncertainty about either the coeff- 
icients on wages or the intercept does not affect the choice of expected 
welfare maximising t 
at at _o avara 3vary 
However, ß, the coefficient on non-labour income in the labour supply 
function appears in the denominator of (6.20), therefore uncertainty 
about this parameter does affect policy choice; the direction of 
influence depending on the other labour supply parameters. 
 
proposition 2.2 
Under linear labour supply the introduction of uncertainty about 
increases or decreases the optimal level of income taxation depending 
on the signs and magnitudes of the intercept, and wage coefficient 
as (1-t)+Y 0 <=> 
at > 
2varß < 
177. 
Proof: 
Under certainty the optimal choice of t is implicitly defined by 
the first order condition, differentiating (6.20) and simplifying 
mt2 
$as - 2tasv + vas + vy a0 (6.21) t- (v-tß)2 
As long as the numerator is bounded this is equivalent to 
t2$as - 2tasv + vas + vy -0 (6.22) 
Also from (6.20) 
_ 
6Atv - 2t3asv + 2t4asß m 
(v-ta) 4 
(6.23) 
hence, substituting for A, collecting terms, and making some cancell- 
ations 
signimßßt} = sign 
{3csv 
- 4asty + 3yv + ast201 (6.24) 
Subtracting (6.22) from (6.24) the sign of mßßt along the locus of 
points satisfying mt =0 is given by 
mßßt 
I 
mt=o 
<O <_> cis (1-t) +y0 (6.25) 
13 
This means that if labour supply is upward sloping with a positive inter- 
cept (a, y > 0) the optimal tax rate increases with uncertainty, but if 
17 8. 
the intercept is negative the outcome depends on the magnitudes of the 
parameters. A backward-sloping labour supply curve could not have a 
negative intercept (this would allow only negative supplies) therefore 
the outcome is again indeterminate, taxes increasing with uncertainty 
only if the intercept is very large relative to the slope. 
The solution to the certainty equivalent problem is more complic- 
ated because it depends on the second as well as the third derivatives 
of the revenue function. However, it is possible to characterise the 
solution given parameters of certain signs. This is summarised by: 
Proposition 2.3 
Under linear labour supply with positive intercept, and non-positive 
coefficient on transfers, the solution to the certainty equivalent 
problem entails an upward adjustment of ß above the mean of the distrib- 
ution. 
(a, Y>O, ß<0) _>ß*-ß>O 
Proof 
From ; (6.20) 
3 
2Av + ßt Sol +. t2sav 
mßt 
(v-ßt) 3 
(6.26) 
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If '$ O, substituting from (6.22) yields 
,l 
mßtý 
-O 
<_> as(l-t) +Y -< O (6.27) 
mt 0 
Assuming that a, y > 0, and using (6.25) 
m88t 
>0 (6.28) 
mat 
Therefore Theorem 2 provides the required proposition. 
0 
It would be very surprising if the coefficient on non-labour income 
were positive in empirical studies - such results would probably not by 
published - however a negative slope (y < 0) " cannot be ruled out a 
priori. Thus proposition 2.3 applies only for upward sloping linear 
supply functions. 
Consider the case when the government is required to use taxation 
to raise a. given amount of revenue rather than to maximise tax receipts. 
The introduction of uncertainty rules out the exact fulfillment of tho 
revenue target ex post, however it may still be imposed as an ex ante 
planning requirement. If the revenue function is concave in the 
uncertain parameter, an increase in uncertainty would tend to reduce 
expected revenue and require an increase in taxation (given that taxes 
are not above the level required to maximise revenue) to meet the planning 
target. With the linear labour supply function, the curvature of the 
revenue function 
depends on the signs and sizes of the paramotors. 
1ßO. 
Proposition-2.4 
with linear labour supply the lowest tax rate which raises i 
(to a second order approximation) under uncertainty is less than that 
which collects R under certainty if 
as (1-t) +y>0 
Proof 
From (6.20) 
2At2 
mßß =tß) (6.29) 
Since ß is non positive, this has the sign of A, and the proposition 
follows from approximation 3. 
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6.2.3 Model 3: Simulation using Quadratic Labour Supply Function 
The previous two sections showed how adjustments for uncertainty may 
be made, and examined their theoretical properties. Some numerical 
results were presented for the Broome theorem but their -relationship to 
my empirical data was rather tenuous. In order to assess the likely 
magnitudes involved, the labour supply function estimated by Frown at al 
(1976) is taken as the basis for this example. Their preferred 
1©1. 
specification is quadratic: 
R=a+ b(1-t)w +c (1-t) 
2w2 
+ dI '+ eI2 + fIw(1-t) + cgm (6.30) 
It is convenient for this exercise because it is in levels, and is linear 
in non-labour income. I stands for intercept, and is included by Brown 
et al to capture non-linearities in the budget constraint which arise 
from the overtime premium ý and the tax threshold S. I is defined as 
I co tT + w(1-4) (1-t)S (6.31) 
where T is the average working week. Substituting into the labour 
supply function summing over households and rearranging for m yields 
to 
Q1_gt 
where II =a+ dtT + et2T2 + 
{c1_t)Ed+2etT) 
(1-4)S+b+ftT] 
icy2 
+ (1-t) 
2E (1-4) 2S2 +c+f (1-¢) (1-t) S] }03 
H 
ý1 Ew 
Zw 
ý2 EW 
(6.32) 
Ew3 
ý3 = Ew 
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Clearly, the only parameter which does not enter the per capita revenue 
function linearly is g, the cofficient on non-labour income. The 
expected revenue function, given uncertainty about g may be approximated 
by the Taylor expansion, around the expected g 
Em -- m+2 mggvar (g) 
S 
(6.33) 
These two functions are plotted against t, using the parameter estimator 
from Brown et al, see Figure A. 2. Incorporating the variance of their 
estimate of g increases the revenue maximising tax rate by 6.3%. 
Looking at the upward sloping sections of the lines in Figure 6.2, 
it is apparent that uncertainty makes little difference to the tax rates 
which raise small amounts of revenue (up to £15 per capita per week). 
However, if the revenue requirement was in the order of £23 per capita 
per week, adjustment for uncertainty would lead to a reduction in the 
tax rate of about 10%. 
The sources of the parameter values used in the construction of 
Figure 6.2 are as follows: 
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O 0.2 0.4 T 0.6' 0.8 1 
0.491 0.522 
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Taken directly from Brown et al, Table 1, column 1, p. 274. 
10 1 
a= 55.3 
b= -14.3 
C= 3.63 
d= -0.959 
e= 0.0105 
f= 0.644 
g= -0.114 
T= 47.4 
Inferred from reported elasticities 
= 1.5 
S= 128 
°1 2 
Assumed 
cr 2 
1.25 
a3 = 3.9 
7 
The values for a2 and a3 are consistent with a log-normal distribution 
for w with mean inferred from reported elasticities, and assumed variance 
o. 375. (See Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981, p. 89, for details of the relation- 
ship between the moments of the log-normal distribution, and t ho moan and 
variance of w. ) The reported standard error for g is 0.046, and tho 
sample size is 434, therefore the variance of g is 1.0. 
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6.2.4 Model 4: Ramsey Taxes 
Let consumer behaviour be represented by the linear expenditure 
system with unitary elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure. 
The direct utility function is 
n 
U=E ßi 1og(gi-y ) 
i=O 
(6.34) 
where ßi are marginal propensities and yi are necessary or subsistonco 
expenditures. Endogenous labour supply may be incorporated in this modal 
by defining -y0 as the time endowment, and -qO as the supply of labour. 
Utility maximisation, given no lump sum income yields demand functions 
qi Yi + 
Pi (- P"Y) 
i 
(6.35) 
The vector product (- P. Y) is the income which would result from working 
all endowed hours minus "necessary" expenditure on goods, and is ASSumod 
to be positive. p0 is the fixed wage rate and pi is the consumer price 
of good i. Producer prices are held constant at unity, therefore 
pi =1+ ti. Substituting the demands into the utility function yields 
the indirect utility function 
n ßi 
VEß log P"Yi 
i=0 
i Pi 
(G. 3G) 
Chapter Five drew a distinction between ex ante and ex post revenue 
186. 
constraints which the government might face. The former is easier to 
analyse because the revenue constraint containi$, only fixed quantities, 
such as expected demands. However, when one instrument is determined 
ex post, to balance the books, the optimal tax problem must take into 
account the curvature of the constraint with respect to the unknown 
parameter. The results for the ex ante constraint are presented first. 
One quite general result emerges from this case, namely that even in 
the n commodity model, uncertainty about any one of the ß's does not 
matter. 
Proposition 4.1 
With ex ante revenue constraint, optimal taxes are invariant with 
uncertainty about any one of the ß's. 
Proof - 
Differentiating (6.36) 
vß j=1+ 
log 
1P 
(-P"Y (6.37) 
j 
and 
vßjßj 
ß (G. 38) 
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Therefore 
vß jßj ti =0 for all 
i., i (6.39) 
0 
However, it is not possible to make such generalisations about 
uncertainty surrounding the y's. Differentiating (6.36) gives 
2 
- Pi 
VYjYj 
(P"Y)2 
(6.40) 
which clearly does depend on the taxes. To define precisely what affect 
uncertainty about any of the y's has on the optimal tax on each good, 
it is necessary to restrict attention to the special case where only two 
goods are taxable. This is the model developed by Corlett and Hague 
(1953). As indicated in Chapter Five this restriction is required so 
that, taking account of the revenue constraint, only one independent 
instrument is available to the government, and thus the Diamond and 
Stiglitz theorem may be applied. Otherwise, the outcome would 
depend on a matrix of second derivatives, the inversion of which would 
render the problem analytically intractable. 
Proposition 4.2 
With an ex ante revenue constraint the optimal tax on good 1 
decreases with uncertainty about y1 but increases with uncertainty 
about 12" 
lea. 
atl atl 
avary. l avary2 
o 
Proof 
Differentiating. (6.40) with respect to tl 
dt 2 
dtl Yjyj at, Y. JYj 
+ at2 VYj': dt1 (6.41) 
From the budget constraint, eq. (5.20) Chapter Five 
2 aqj 
q+Et at2 1 j=1 j atl 
dt1 2 dqj (6,42) 
q2 +Etj at 
j=1 2 
Using Cournot aggregation (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 16) 
2 
dt E 2o 
dt1 2 
E 
' j=o 
dj 
dt1 
aq j 
(G. 43) 
dt2 
Note also that this depends on the previous assumption that labour is not 
taxed, and producer prices. are=fixed and normalised to unity. Using 
(6.40) and (6.43) in (6.41) 
_ 
2p -` dq dq d4. 
ý 
dtl lyl )3 
tP1Y1 P"Y)E ddt Ply2E d- - dt-ý- (6.44) P"Y 12 
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From (6.35) 
2 dq 2ßßl 
E__YE_ -i +i (P"Y) (6.45) 
j=0 dti i j=0 Pj Pi 
Therefore, using (6.45) in (6.44), and simplifying 
d 
2p 1 ß0 
ß2 Plylß2 
dt Vylyl 3 P' Y Y2 
(p + 
p2 
)+ 
1 (p : y) O2 p 2 
- (P"1) 
2 ß2 >Ed<02/ 
dt (6.46) 2 p2 
Thus the optimal tax on good one decreases with uncertainty about y1 
atr 
<o (6.47) 8vary1 
A symmetric argument applies to t2 and Y2 
at2 
<0 (6.4ß) 3vary2 
Since the linear expenditure system rules out inferior goods (Doaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980, p. 139) the revenue constraint requires that tl 
is increased if t2 has been reduced 
dtl 
t<0 (G. 49) 
2 
Inspection of (6.43) and (6.45) confirms that this is true. 
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Therefore 
**/ dt2 atl 
( 
BvarY < 0) => (: 8vary > 0) (6,50) 22 
-0 
The interpretation of this result relies on the concavity of the welfare 
function. When the revenue constraint applies ex ante it is unlikely to 
be fulfilled precisely when demands are revealed. Then concavity implies 
that a revenue surplus will entail a greater loss of welfare than the gain 
which would be associated with a deficit. To hedge against this risk, 
the deployment of tax instruments is shifted towards goods whose demands 
are more certain. Thus if yl is uncertain the demand for ql is 
relatively risky so taxation, relative to a situation of perfect knowledge 
is shifted away from good one, increasing the burden on good two. How- 
ever no such result applies to y0. 
With -an ex ante revenue constraint., the effect of uncertainty about Yo 
. depends on the parameter values. Following the method of the previous 
proof 
2 p0 
dt yo'yO ( )2 
Ylß2 Y2ß1 
2 2 
dq 
E 
t 
Id 
l p. Y P p 21 2 
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Therefore 
Proposition 4.3 
,l 
8vary <O 
if y2ß1 p2 
< y1ß2 pl 0 
- The question of whether to regard an uncertain parameter estimate 
as an upper or. lower bound for a particular policy application is answered 
by the solution to the certainty equivalent problem. The desired 
direction of adjustment of the optimal tax rate has already been established. 
Therefore, the certainty equivalent problem requires in addition knowledgo 
of how the optimal tax rate would be affected by changing the parama tor, 
namely the sign of dt /dO. Once again, this problem may be reduced to 
that of signing the appropriate derivatives, and the following proposition 
emerges. 
Proposition 4.4 
With an ex ante revenue constraint the certainty equivalent ©stimato 
is larger than the standard estimate for y1 and Y2" 
yi yi >01=1,2 
Proof 
Differentiating (6.36) yields 
P1 
v 
p. y (6.52) 
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Differentiating with respect to tl 
dd t vYl at v Yl 
+ at ß 
at 
y2 dt2 
(6.53) 
1121 
Evaluating the derivatives, and using (6.43) and (6.45) 
d1 
V= t1 Y l (p. Y)2 
[P1Y182 
+ Y2(p + p2) 
(- p. Y) 
P2 
+ 
ß2 
(P"Y)2 dqi 
(6.54) 
P2 dt2 
proposition 4.2 showed that 
d 
dtl VYlyl < O' 
(6.55) 
Therefore 
dtl VYl. rl 
f 
dtd I 
Vyl 0 (6.56) 
A symmetric argument applies to y2 
4-]: ýýy2y2 / dt1 vy2 '0 (6.57) 
Thus the proposition follows from Theorem 2. 
Q 
193. 
The preceding results under the ex ante revenue constraint may 
be contrasted with the analogous outcomes given) that the constraint 
must bind ex post. A slightly different method is used in the deriv- 
ations, as explained in Chapter Five. This requires imposition of the 
budget constraint before examining the concavity of the programme. 
Differentiating (6.36) with respect to tl yields 
dV 
^ 
av 
+ 
av dt2 
at1 ^ atl at 2 dt1 
(6.58) 
Using Roy's identity (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, p. 41), this may ba 
expressed as 
dV 
- 
di-2 
= dtl a 
[q, 
+ q2 dtl (6.59) 
where a is the derivative of the indirect utility function with roupect 
to lump-sum income. Now, using the derivative of the budget constraint 
(6.43) 
where 
dV H 
dtl K 
2 dqv 2 dq 
H=-a 
[1 
dt q2 dt 
j=0 2 j=0 1 
and 
2 
dq 
K= j=0 dt2 
(G. GO) 
es 
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Notice that at the optimum, the contents of the brackets in Ii is 
equal to zero. The task is now to examine the) convexity of (6.59) 
in the region of the optimum, thus some simplifications will be gainod 
by setting H=0. Differentiating (6.60) with respect to some parameter 
0, and using H=0, 
82 ýHý _1 ä2H 2 öH äK a02 K 
1a02 
K 00 ö0J 
(6.61) 
By mechanically implementing this formula it is possible to derive the 
effects of uncertainty about any of the parameters. The procedure is 
as follows: firstly, write H, and K in terms of the parameters by 
using (6.35) and its derivatives 
ß ß2 
3 P2 
(G. 62) 
ß2 Y2 ß1 B 
H Yl 2 (1 - p2 Ep)-2 (1 - pl E 
4-) (6.63) 
p2 j P1 Pi 
+ 
ß2ß2 
(p2 - p1) (p"Y) 
PZpl 
Secondly, find the first derivatives of H and K, and the second 
derivatives of H with respect to each of the parameters. Thaso Giro 
displayed in Table 6.1. Finally, substitute these derivatives into 
(6.61) and hence prove, by Theorem 1 in Chapter Four, the propositions 
listed'iri Table 6.2. 
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TABLE 6.1 Derivatives of H and K 
ax- ax i a2H 
ß2 ß1ßa 
aY0 2 PO >O -Y-2 (P2 - Pl) PO 0 
P2 p2p1 
ß2 P2 2 ay1 p1 >O <O 20- p0 0 P2 P2 
ý l Pi ay2 
P 
<O -P 
O1 
-2 ß0 (1 - p) 
>0 
pl O 
0 
Y2 1 Y2ß1 y1ß aß 
0 
<O - p0 p0 Pl P2 0 
aß1 - 
L2 
<O 
1 
l2 Y2 
(1 - P1 Ep- ßl) 2 p1p2 
p j 
2 
Y2 
>O 
l P1 
aß1 
ß 
+22 (P2 :- p1) (P. Y) 
p2P1 
aß2 -P2+Pty<O 
P2 
+y2ß1 
+ 
Y2 
(1-p E---ß ) Plp2 
p 
2 Pj 2 -2 
Y1 
<0 2 
2 P 2 
aß2 +22 (P2 - P1) (P. Y) 
p2pl 
Note that this requires 'E ßi = 1. 
i=0 
TABLE 6.2 : Propositions 4.5 - 4.10 
Proposition With an ex post constraint, 
good one: 
the optimal tax on 
4.5 increases 
if t1> 
(decreases) with uncertainty about YO 
(<) t2 
4.6 decreases with uncertainty about y 
4.7 decreases with uncertainty about Y2 
4.8 increases (decreases) with uncertainty about 0 
if 82Y21 > (<) Pl'Ylß2 
4.9 decreases with uncertainty about ßl 
4.10 increases 
tl > t2 
with uncertainty about ß2 if 
19G. 
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The striking feature of these results, in contrast to the analysis 
of the ex ante budget constraint, is that unce-tainty about any of the 
parameters matters. No longer is it possible to say that variance of 
the ß's does not affect optimal taxation. This is hardly surprisingt 
the revenue constraint now includes uncertain quantities whereas 
previously it-was expressed in terms of their expectations. Therefore, 
the ex post revenue constraint adds another element of uncertainty to 
the problem. Comparison of the ex ante and ex post results requires 
some careful interpretation since the meaning of t2 is rather different 
in the two cases. With an ex ante constraint, t2 is simply the tax 
rate which is expected to balance the budget given the choice of t1. 
it is an expression containing the expectation of the uncertain parameter 
which is in turn ä fixed quantity. However, in the ex post case t2 is 
the tax rate which actually balances the budget when the true value of 
the uncertain parameter is revealed, i. e. it is a stochastic variable. 
Therefore, when proposition 4.5 says that t1 increases with the variance 
of Y0 if tl is greater than t2, this condition depends on the value 
that the uncertain parameter actually takes. If attention is restricted 
" to cases where variance is small, there will be a wide variety of 
situations where t1> t2, or vice versa, could be asserted with groat 
confidence, and thus provide a guide to the best policy response to changes 
in uncertainty. If the optimal tax structure is close to uniformity under 
certainty, then the introduction of a little uncertainty about '' will 
cause a shift away from uniformity. It is difficult to compare this 
result with proposition 
4.3 where the revenue constraint applies ex ante 
because firstly, the interpretation of t2 is different, and secondly, in 
198. 
both sets of conditions t1 and t2 are themselves functions of all 
the parameters of the model, and the possibility of writing them out 
explicitly was ruled out at an early stage in 
/the 
analysis. 
However, propositions 4.6 and 4.7 are unconditional as is their 
ex ante counterpart 4.2. There is agreement between the two models that 
the tax on good one decreases with uncertainty about necessary consumption 
of good one, but the symmetry of the ex ante case, which requires that the 
tax on good one decreases with uncertainty about necessary consumption of 
good two, does not carry over to the ex post model. One possible explan- 
ation for this difference is as follows: in the ex ante case, increases in 
tl are necessarily associated with' reductions in t2. A good with an 
uncertain i is a risky source of tax revenue, therefore taxation is 
adjusted towards the safer good. But in the ex post case, there is good 
reason to adjust t1 downwards because there is always the chance that 
t2 may turn out to be smaller than expected. Thus it is worth risking 
some mismatch between the tax rates in order to increase the chance that 
the most favourable outcome, with low taxes on both goods, may come to 
pass. Clearly, this is not an entirely satisfactory explanation bocauso 
it does. not say why different results apply to different parameters, and 
does not offer support for the conditions derived. Such an explanation 
is only to be found in the algebra. 
Propositions 4.8 - 4.10 are quite distinct from their ex ante 
analogue 4.1, since uncertainty about the marginal propensities does Mattor 
in the ex post model. Uncertainty about ßl reduces the optimal tax on 
good one regardless of parameter values. This 
is presumably bocause 
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the tendency to reduce ti in response to any uncertainty, and the 
riskiness of good one as a source of revenue, tend to work in the same 
direction. Propositions 4.8 and 4.10 state the conditions applying 
to uncertainty about ß0 and ß2. (Note that t1 could be increased 
or decreased by uncertainty about 2 
if t2 > t1). Once again there 
are difficulties in interpretation because t and p are quite complic- 
ated functions of the parameters of the model. 
6.2.5 Model 5: Uniform taxes 
The conditions under which optimal indirect tax rates are identical 
for all commodities are well known, see for example Sadka (1977), Deaton 
(1981), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). In this section a simple modal 
which satisfies these conditions is examined in order to show that the 
introduction of parameter uncertainty precludes the uxiformity result. 
The model extends the LES/Corlett-Hague model by introducing a second 
consumer, and a third tax instrument - lump-sum transfers. The govern- 
ment's objectives may now be written as a function of each consumer's 
indirect utility 
T LVl (tl, t2, m) , V2 (tl, t2, m)J (6.64) 
Sufficient revenue must be raised to cover these lump-sum payments: 
they are included on the right-hand side of the revenue constraint 
t1g1 + t2g2 =R+ 2m (6.65) 
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Given the quasi-homothetic structure of the linear expenditure system, 
and consumers distinguished only by their time endowments, the necessary 
conditions for optimality under certainty are satisfied by 
ti = t2 
This is a special case of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) pp. 433-4. 
(6.66) 
When parameter uncertainty is introduced in this model, the outcmmA 
will depend not only on the properties of the consumer's indirect util. Ly 
function, but also on the weights these receive in the social welfare 
function. The simplest case to consider is equal weights 
'= V1(tl, t2, m) + V2(tl, t2, m) (6.67) 
Under this assumption the following proposition about uncertainty about 
the ß's is a trivial extension of proposition 4.1 
Proposition 5.1 
Uncertaint y about the ß's does not perturb the uni fcurrai ty rcrtul L 
when the revenue constraint applies ex ante 
It is difficult to interpret uniformity in the context of an ox post 
revenue constraint; t2 would be determined by unpredictable factors and 
therefore it makes little sense to assert that the policy maker equato it 
with tl. Concentrating on the ex ante constraint, uncertainty about tho 
y's does matter, but once again it is impossible to derive analytic results 
when the model has-more than one independent choice variable. 
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One way to proceed is to assume that one of the instruments is 
determined by a rule which is invariant with'upcertainty. For example,, 
lump-sum redistributions may be calculated as if there were perfect know- 
ledge of the required parameters. Then in would be set to satisfy the 
first order conditions of the constrained programme 
L=- A(2m +R- t1g1 - t2g2) (6.63) 
where all uncertain quantities had been replaced by their expectations. 
The solution to this programme, m is a fixed quantity which may be 
substituted into (6.67). This effectively reduces the problem to one 
identical to Ramsey taxation in model 4 and similar propositions apply. 
Proposition 5.2 
If the revenue constraint applies ex ante, uncertainty about any 
of the y's means that the uniformity result no longer applies 
Yl uncertain '_> tl < t2 
y2 uncertain => tl > t2 
y0 uncertain -=> t1 
1 depending on parameter values 
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6.2.6 Model 6: Uniform Taxes with Demogrants 
The preceeding five models were all analysed by means of the tech- 
niques described in Chapter Five. In this model, however, uncertainty 
about errors in administering the tax system may be incorporated using 
more simple arguments. These arguments are set out in terms of the 
correlation between the errors and other variables in the model, and 
are quite distinct from the methods applied to models one to five. 
Deaton (1981, p. 1253) provides the basic model where the government max- 
imises welfare subject to individual rationality and budget constraints. 
Deaton and Stern (1986) extended this model to allow the distribution 
of lump-sum grants (known as demogrants) on the basis of the demographic 
characteristics of the recipient. When this ability is combined with 
the empirical assertion that Engel curves are linear, a strong argument 
emerges in favour of uniform indirect commodity taxes. 
The analysis here provides an additional extension to the model. 
uncertainty about the parameters representing household characteristics 
is incorporated in the form of observation errors so that demogrants must 
be based on imperfect information about household characteristics. The 
desirability of uniform commodity taxation then depends on the correlation 
between observation errors and social marginal utilities. 
Following Deaton (1981), the welfare function is defined on house- 
hold utilities 
W= W(U1,..., UH) (6.69) 
.. 03. 
This is maximised subject to two constraints. The government budget 
constraint I 
tk 
k=R+ 
Egh (6.70) 
khh 
requires revenue from taxation of commodities (tk is the tax rate on 
good k, and qk is h's consumption of k) to equal some arbitrary 
level R plus the amount paid in lump sum grants gh to households. 
The individual rationality constraint 
mh + p0 Th+ gh = ch(uh"P0, P) for all h (6.71) 
ensures that households have maximised utility by equating income (fron 
lump-sum endowments 
m, 
wage income p0 
h, 
and grants) with the 
h 
expenditure or cost function c In the usual way the Lagrangian is 
written 
j=W+-R- 
zg'J +Eahmh+pýh+gh-c'j (6.72) 
However, departure from the standard tax problem results from tho defin. 
ition of the grants. They are assumed to have one element, yo which 
is identical across consumers, and a second which is determined by 
observed household characteristics. 
gh = y0 + Syi(Zhj + ehj) (6.73) 
3 
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where zhj represents the jth characteristic of household h, and 
otj 
the corresponding observation error. Deaton and Stern (1986) assumo 
that z is known with certainty, and thus e 
hj 
=0 for all h, j. _ 
Using (6.73) in the Lagrangian, and differentiating, yields first 
order conditions with the following implications: 
Exh = Ha 3-yo 
a 
)", 
ay =o => EX (zhj + ehj) = 
AE(zhj + ehj 
jhh 
at 0 => 
E siktk =- (qi - qi) 
k 
(6.74) 
(G. 75) 
(6.76) 
where bars denote arithmetic means, 
sek is the average acrosct houso-_ 
holds of the ikth element of the Slutsky matrix, and *Is denote 
weighted sums with weights ah, /()H), so 
*h 
qi qi (6.77) 
h 
Ah may be interpreted as the social marginal utility of incoma accruing 
to household h. 
Now, it is clear that the characteristics of the optimal tax systcra 
are intimately related to the structure of preferences' (the nature of the 
demand system generating q, q and s in the first order conditions). 
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The case examined here is quasi -homothe ticity, that is linear Engel 
curves with positive intercepts. Deaton (1979) shows that in this 
case the left-hand side of (6.76) is proportional to l 
ßi and tk 
thus if the right-hand side is proportional to ßi a uniform tax 
solution is possible. 
The definition of quasi-homotheticity (Deaton and Muellbauor, 
1980, p. 144) requires an indirect utility functions whose numerator is 
super-numerary income, and whose denominator depends on the Engle curve 
slopes. Following Deaton and Stern (1986), allowing intercepts to vary 
across households 
Uh _ 
ch - ah (p ) 
b (p) (6.71 1) 
The variation in ah(p) is assumed to depend on household charactoristics 
and idiosyncratic differences in tastes 
ah (P) =a (P) + Eaj (p)zhj + Eh (P) (6.79) 
Demand functions are derived from (6.78. ) and (6.79) using the method 
given by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), p. 144: rearrange (6.78) for ch 
differentiate with respect to pi, substitute for Uh from (6.70)" and 
use the derivatives of (6.79) to get 
qi = ßic' + (a, - ßia) + j(ai - ßaj)zhj + Cc - ßieh) (G. 80) 
b 
where ßi = bi and ai, 
bi, ai, and ei are partial derivativa s with 
2(. 14. 
respect to pi. Hence 
.0 f 
ßi (c-c) +Z (ai-ßa ) (z -z )+ 
ý(Ei-ei) 
- ßi (e-s )] (6.01) 
From this expression it is clear that qi - qi will be proportional bc+ 
ßi if. the. last two terms are zero. The following propositions usn this 
to derive conditions under which a uniform tax solution is possible. The 
first, which was proposed by Deaton and Stern (1986) assumes no obsar- 
vation errors. 
Proposition 6.1 (Deaton and Stern, 1986) 
If there are no observation errors. (ehj -0 for all htj) the 
uniform tax solution holds if idiosyncratic taste differences are not 
correlated with social marginal utilities of income. 
ehj =0 sth, j 
=> qi qi a ßi 
h 
Cov (X , e) =0 
Proof 
i) e. O => EX= XEzhj from (6.75) 
hh 
(G. 02) 
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ii) Cov(Xh ch)=0 <_> E (ah-A) (eh-e) aO 
h 
<_> 
L. E(aheh + äe - Xhe - Ieh) O 
ei. m 
Therefore i) and ii) imply, from (6.81) 
qi - qý = ßi (c - c) - ßi 
Proposition 6.2 
(6.03) 
(G. ß4) 
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If there is no correlation between idiosyncratic tastes and social 
marginal utilities, the proportional tax solution holds if and only if 
there is no correlation between observation errors and social marginal 
utilities. 
Cov(ah, eh) =0 
_ý qi - qi « ßi , < 
Cov (X ', ehj )=0 
Proof 
h 
Cov(Xh )=0 <_> e* -e= ci - e`i "0 (Proposition 6.1) 
w 
ii) Cov(Xh, ehj) =0 <=> E(ah- X) (ehj - ej) =0 
h 
<_> e*j - ej =O 
<_> zj - z*j =0 using (6.75) 
Therefore i) and ii) are equivalent to 
qi - qi = ßi (c-c*) a ßi 
0 
An example may help to clarify the consequences of these propos. 
itions. Consider the demographic characteristic 'number of depan ent3 ',. 
If no grants are available and society wishes to redistribute to those 
with low incomes and many dependents the only option is to tax more, 
heavily the least important goods in their consumption bundle. I10ulavvr, 
if demogrants are available there is no need to deviate from proportional 
commodity taxation unless consumption reveals something about the nkravr 
of dependents which could not be included in the system of transfers. 
With demogrant errors, it is impossible to link transfors procin*ly 
to household characteristics. Hence if there is some correlation ba twoon 
the administrative errors and society's preferences about radistribution, 
it is desirable to tax more heavily those goods which are least important 
in the large-family consumption bundle. 
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6.3 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
,l 
The results of the six models examined in this paper are st =aat- 
ised in Table 6.3 Clearly, these examples are all quite spacial, casa* 
of the general problem of taxation under uncertainty, but despito t ha 
restrictiveness of their assumptions, they may be of some interest per a*, 
Each example uses a model, and a functional form for preferences which is 
well known in the literature, thus Table 6.2 may be regarded as an attacpt 
to throw light on previously neglected aspects of wall-established Is 
6.3.1 Linear income Tax Models 
The first three examples are based on the linear income tax modal 
where the government is allowed only one instrument. The tractability 
of this model is the consequence of quite restrictive 
assumptions. Zho 
first, following Rawls (1971), is that zero weight is allocatad to all 
individuals except the least well off, thus social welfare is identical 
to the utility of that individual. The second requires, that, all ind tv- 
iduals face the same tax rates and that tax revenue is redistribute 
equally across the whole population. This assumption ansuros that no 
policy change can change the ranking of individuals= henco t ho woLt r 
function equals the same individual's utility function before and afttr 
the change in income taxation. 
TA2LZ 6.3 s ELmmry of Results 
Yodel Instrument Demand Specification Result under Result under attalaty etýhLwlowt 
Certainty uncertainty a'iriaetar s6U"t. s 
1 linear income tax 
(1-a) 
U Qa(T-t) 
1-/(1-aI 
t 
" 
It 
O ivaro 
e4 
a" 1 
2 linear income tax t" av(1-t) f Lm + ti N/A 
it, It* 
avers - ivory 
O "s at too, º 0.4 e im 
"/ 
slpn 
fat 
stanIs's t) 
t 
4 T) 
3 linear income tax t-a+b(1-t)vrc(1-t)2v2 t-0.491 t"0.522 
fdI+e12+flv(1-t)+ym 
2 
4 indirect taxes U-! 811oq(9-71) N/A as alte rev Constr. lat 
tilt2 1-0 ! t" 
O tog ali 1.3 ivarTI 
""-- i ON, *At* I" 0060%AOLNI 
wrt aO ivagY e OI TL e Tl 1al. ä = l 
"x poet rev constraint 
! ti ! t1 !T 
very. 
war%1 e 
v1 il -- -- -- l 
5 indirect taxes U-I0 loq(a1-T1 Uniformity Itl 
t1. t2. transfers a 1-0 vrý-aý 
"0 for all 1.3 
' 
"" lt ) log all 3 00)_>(t (vary 
; 
l 2 , 
(> indirect taxes O- gro(P) 
Uniformity If Unifonýlty It 
h t, Demogrants yh b(P) covhbrh) "0 cov(Yh. cb) cov(Tbreih l"O` -- , 
'_s 
k 
1 i 
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The Rawlsian criterion requires an explanation of why some indiv- 
iduals are better-off than others. Stern (1976) provides a variety of 
models of individual differences, two of which are used here. In models 
2 and 3, differences in skills are represented by a distribution of wages; 
individuals have identical preferences but the less skillful face lower 
wages. An alternative approach is used in model 1 which also assumes 
identical preferences. In model 1, however, wages are constant and 
individuals differ according to their time endowments. 
The combination of linear income taxation with equal redistribution 
and a Rawlsian welfare function greatly simplifies the government object- 
ives. The utility of the least well-off increases with transfers, there- 
fore the government maximises tax revenue. The tractability of this model 
has made it the subject of considerable literature, Mirrlees (1971) 
Atkinson (1976) and Phelps (197: ` have examined it as a particular example 
of more general models, and have used it for optimal tax calculations. 
Sheshinski (1972) restricts attention to linear income tax models and 
describes propositions which apply to more general welfare functions. 
Feldstein (1973) concentrates on the disincentive effects of income 
taxation on labour supply. Broome (1975) uses the most restrictive 
assumption of Cobb Douglas preferences which form the basis of model 1. 
Under uncertainty, the results may be summarised as follows: 
firstly (model 1) with Cobb Douglas preferences, uncertainty about the 
share parameter increases the optimal income tax rate, and the magnitude 
of the adjustment is likely to be in the order of 3° to 5'70 ). 
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The solution to the certainty equivalent problem indicates that the 
standard parameter estimate may be regarded as a lower bound. In 
this case the parameter estimate may be increased by about 204 and 
regarded as known with certainty. Secondly, if the labour supply 
function is linear in non-labour income (models 2 and 3) only uncertainty 
about the coefficient on non-labour income matters, the magnitude and 
direction of uncertainty adjustr -it depending on parameter values. 
Model 3 uses the econometric estimates of Brown et al, and finds that 
the incorporation of uncertainty increases the revenue maximising tax 
rate by 6.3%. 
6.3.2 Indirect Tax Models 
Three indirect tax models are examined. The first, model 4, concen- 
trates on efficiency issues, and assumes that there is only one consumer. 
Preferences are represented by the linear expenditure system. Even in 
this simple framework it is impossible to derive analytic expressions 
for the optimal tax rates in terms of the demand parameters. However, 
the effect of 'parameter uncertainty may be precisely characterised. 
When the revenue constraint applies ex ante, at the planning stage, 
uncertainty about any of the marginal propensities does not affect the 
optimal tax rates, but uncertainty about the subsistence levels does. 
In the simplified model with two . roods and labour (Corlett and Hague, 
1953) the optimal tax on good one increases (decreases) with the variance 
of the estimate of y2(yl)" The effect of uncertainty about yl 
depends on the magnitudes of the parameters. These results are, perhaps 
not surprisingly, quite different when the revenue constraint applies ex 
post. In this case, the effect of uncertainty about 0 0, 
ß2 and YO 
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on tl depends on parameter values, and uncertainty about any of the 
other parameters reduces tl. Models 5 and 6 both examine uniform 
commodity taxes, where the model has many consumers and thus incorporates 
considerations of equity. Sadka (1977) shows that uniformity is 
optimal under the assumption that either all goods must have the same 
compensated wage elasticities, or that uniform indirect taxes must 
maximise the supply of labour. The, linear expenditure system has the 
property of quasi-homotheticity, and given the possibility of identical 
lump sum grants to. all consumers, this is known to imply the optimality 
of uniform taxes (see Deaton, 1981, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 433). 
Model 5 uses these assumptions and shows that in this context uniformity 
is not affected by the introduction of uncertainty about any one of the 
marginal propensities. However when one of the subsistence levels is 
uncertain it is desirable to have different indirect tax rates across 
goods. 
w 
A more convincing argument in favour of uniform commodity taxation 
has been suggested by Deaton and Stern (1986). A powerful and frequently 
used tool for redistribution of income is lump-sum grants based on the 
demographic characteristics of the recipient. When such a system of 
'demogrants' is combined with the empirical assertion that Engle curves 
are linear, uniform commodity taxation emerges. However, model 6 shows 
that if demographic characteristics are observed with some error, and 
that this error is related to society's distributional predelictions, 
then the uniformity result no longer holds, and it becomes desirable to 
use the system of indirect taxation to compensate for errors in the 
administration of demogrants. Stern (1982) discusses errors in the 
administration of a system of lump-sum grants to compare its merits 
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with optimal non-linear income taxation. The argument here indicates 
the consequence of such errors for the structürg of indirect taxation. 
2157 
APPENDIX 6.1 
,r I 
Abbott and Ashenfelter (1976) provide augmented LES estimates of 
a demand system including labour supply. Although their work was based 
on US data, the accuracy of their estimates may provide an indication of 
the-importance of parameter uncertainty for UK taxation. Taxes on 
income in the UK yielded a total revenue of £34.6 bn in 1984. In 
aggregate this may be represented as 
34.6 =R= two 
where t is the tax rate, w is the gross wage rate (assumed fixed) 
and L is the number of hours worked. The effect of a change in the 
rate of taxation is 
8t ° 
etw+týw r (6. A. 1) 
Abbott and Ashenfelter (1976) show that the elasticity may be written in 
. terms of their parameter estimate, and household income 
äW i- wyRs- ti+ß) 
where y is non-labour income. From Financial Statistics, wages and 
salaries in. 1984 amounted to £156 bn, out of a total of £280 bn of income 
before tax. Combining this with Abbott and Ashenfelter's estimate of 
216. 
ß, the estimated elasticity is 
,ý l 
aý" w 156 . 124 121 - 
(1 + . 121) =-1.27 aW R- 
The tax-rate may be approximated by dividing the total tax revenue by 
wages and salaries. The Department of Employment Gazette gives average 
hourly earnings for all employees, as £3.65, which implies that £42.7 bn 
hours were worked in 1984. Using this information in (6. A. 1) reveals 
that 8R/at = 143.9; an increase. of lp in the pound on the income tax 
rate would yield an extra £1.44 bn to the exchequer, which is a 4.2% 
increase in tax revenue. 
A confidence interval around this revenue effect may be obtained 
by repeating the calculation using upper and lower bounds for the 
elasticity. Elementary statistical theory provides the result that 
Pr(ß- 2 
S'2 <ß<ß+2 = 0.95 Eq 2 Eq2 
, where 2 is the critical value of the t distribution with 38 degrees of 
freedom. Abbott and Ashenfelter report 0.121, s=0.0368, and 
by inference from their Table III Eqi ° 4.12. Thus the 95% confidence 
interval for ß is 
0.103 <ß<0.139 
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which translates into elasticities of 
-1.31 < 
8w 
< -1.23 
The revenue effects of a lp in the pound increase in the tax rate are 
then £1.43 bn and £1.44 bn on the basis of the lower and upper limits 
of the elasticity respectively. The difference is £7.5m. 
This may be regarded as an upper bound because: firstly, in 
practice a number of other sources of information would be brought to 
bear on the question. And secondly, general equilibrium effects would 
be expected to erode the revenue increases. The initial reduction in 
labour supply would reduce disposable income, and may reduce revenue 
from taxation of expenditure. of course, general equilibrium effects 
could go either way, but it seems reasonable to assume that they would to 
some extent offset the revenue generated by increased income taxation, 
and reduce the associated confidence interval. However, econometric 
estimates are usually only regarded as local approximations to more 
general functions. The accuracy of the approximation would fall rapidly 
as the size of. the policy change increases. Thus the narrow confidence 
interval described in the preceeding analysis may be appropriate for lp 
tax changes, but would increase dramatically if the exercise were scaled 
up to lOp. 
POSTCRIPT 
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OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
One recurring theme throughout the thesis is the diversity of 
interactions between imperfect information, and optimal decisions. 
The simple examples in Chapter One showed that there are quite 
plausible circumstances where increases in risk will lead the decision- 
maker to choose a riskier environment. Such an apparently perverse 
result arises, in this case, from the combination of a particular 
curvature of the objective function with additive uncertainty, and it 
is difficult to identify more generally the types of models in which 
this result applies. 
However, for the purpose of the optimal choice of taxes, these 
considerations may not be empirically significant. Chapter Six shows 
that it is. rather difficult to find examples where parameter uncertainty 
has a very big effect on optimal tax rates. Although parameter 
uncertainty, which is necessarily associated with the process of econo- 
metric estimation, could in principle have any effect on the best choice 
of taxes, in practice these effects tend to be small. Therefore, for 
the standard models of optimal taxation, parameter uncertainty is a 
small ex post refinement to the model rather than an important issue. 
Such refinements may be difficult to implement. A number of issues 
arise relating to the dimensionality of the problem. With more than one 
uncertain parameter, some ad hoc measure of overall risk would have to be 
adopted; and when more than one instrument is available, the problem 
becomes analytically intractable. Also, Lagrangian techniques are not 
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necessarily valid for the incorporation of a revenue constraint 
because of the endogeneity of the Lagrange multiplier. These 
difficulties restricted the analysis to fairly simple models, but 
nevertheless, it is difficult to refute the assertion that the magnitude 
of uncertainty adjustments would generally tend to be small in these 
models. 
However, one of the main arguments of the thesis is that dynamics 
relating to both changes in information over time and sequential policy 
revisions, may reassert the importance of aspects of policy choice 
relating to information. The decision theory models of Chapters Two 
and Three provide examples of situations where this may occur. Firstly, 
when policy reforms are triggered by changes in a variable describing 
the state of the economy, optimal decisions may have quite unusual 
properties, and even when risk is small, the comparative statics of the 
standard model may be reversed. Secondly, in'very risky situations, 
learning becomes an important consideration, and in extreme cases the 
optimal policy may entail allocation of some instruments exclusively for 
short-sighted goals, and others to improve information in the future. 
In the numerical simulations presented in Chapter Four, active 
learning decision rules performed significantly better than risk averse 
or certainty equivalent strategies. in conjunction with the analytic 
results obtained in the two/three period models, the optimal active 
learning strategy has the property that it gives up learning before 
the variances of the parameter estimates have converged to zero. 
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Under these circumstances, least squares estimates are unlikely to 
have desirable properties and there is a strong suggestion that other 
more sophisticated estimators would also lack desirable asymptotic 
properties. Of course, in this context, inconcistency would not 
necessarily mean that the estimator was bad, since its merits may be 
judged by the combined performance of the estimator and the decision rule. 
I, 
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FURTHER RESEARCH 
Three potentially useful topics for further research have arisen 
during the course of work on this thesis. The first is the examination 
of tax evasion with errors in the administration ofthe deterrence 
mechanism. Existing tax evasion models allow the possibility that 
evaders may get away with it; the innovation suggested here is that 
the innocent may be falsely convicted. This would allow the possibility 
of over-reporting, which in existing models only occurs in repeated 
games. The, object of the analysis would be to derive the effect of 
false convictions on the optimal deterrence mechanism, and to examine 
the relationship between the parameters of the deterrence mechanism, 
and the standard tax instruments. This research would be a natural 
addition to the optimal tax models of Chapter 6, the main extension 
being that tax evasion, r aises issues of incentives, and possibilities 
of policy games, which were not present in the 'Other models. Also, 
the notion of administrative errors is the same as that used by Deaton 
and Stern (1986), and Stern (1982), which appeared in Section 6.2.6 
in the context of administration of a system of demogrants. 
The second research possibility is also related to taxation. The 
theory of tax reform used by Ahmad and Stern (1984) takes no account of 
parameter uncertainty. Although the standard errors of the estimates 
used in their study of India are so small that uncertainty was not an 
inportant consideration, it would generally be desirable to allow for 
uncertainty in their methodology. Whereas Ahmad and Stern calculate 
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directions of welfare improving tax reforms which maintain constant 
revenue, the question proposed here would be to calculate the prob- 
ability that any'tax change will increase welfare holding expected 
revenue constant. The objective of this research would be to 
establish a technique for calculating the direction of reform least 
likely to decrease (or most likely to increase) welfare. 
Finally, the third possible area of further research arises from 
the Monte Carlo simulations in Chapter 4. Firstly, the restrictive 
assumption of OLS estimation, which is maintained throughout Chapter 
4 could be relaxed. OLS in the situation where. the right-hand side 
variables are determined by a rule based on previous estimates, 
probably makes poor use of available information. A potentially more 
attractive estimation strategy may be available in the recent control 
theory literature on non-linear filtering. Similarly, the type of 
decision rules used in Chapter 4 are quite arbitrary. A more satis- 
factory approach to the formulation of approximately optimal decision 
rules would be to base them on an approximation to the dynamic valuation 
function. 
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